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Present-day Marine ground intelligence is configured for attrition warfighting and
the predictable conventional adversaries of the past. Designed during WWII, it has
undergone little change; what has changed is the threat environment. Modern-day threats
are less centralized and regimented. They think on their own and they adapt quickly This
thesis analyzes the current configuration of Marine ground intelligence and compares it
with two major threats of the next century: asymmetric military threats and non-
conventional threats. To counter these smart adversaries, Marine ground intelligence will
need to be configured differently. Sophisticated sensors and rote intelligence work are no
longer enough to identify and track these powerful threats. The performance of Marine
intelligence during the GulfWar demonstrates that having failed against the Iraqi army,
intelligence is very likely to fail again. Indeed, Marine intelligence faces a serious dilemma:
it can either reform or face ever-decreasing relevance and effectiveness Having presented
the rationale for urgent reform, this work recommends an intelligence enterprise centered
around the leveraging of human intellect. It suggests the network as the design change
that best leverages intellect and optimally configures ground intelligence for operating
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Present-day Marine Corps ground intelligence is a product of the industrial age It
is configured for the predictable, conventional adversaries of the past. Designed during
WWII, it has undergone little change since.
This thesis examines the critical need for dramatic structural change in Marine
Corps ground intelligence operations and suggests an alternative, intellect-centric,
network enterprise designed to meet the demands of the next century.
What is the basis of this call for change? Now more than ever, Marine combat
forces face a spectrum of threats that present grave challenges to future ground
operations. In the Gulf War, intelligence was unable to provide suitable ground
intelligence to tactical commanders against the Iraqi army. Despite urgent calls from
battlefield commanders and intelligence professionals alike, little has been done to
modify intelligence practices and organizational design; in fact, Marine ground
intelligence has remained fundamentally unchanged in the seven years since the Gulf
War.
1 Even efforts to incorporate automated information systems have not stirred
reexamination of operating practices and organization. Accepting current practices and
'This work recognizes that a series of changes to Marine intelligence have occurred since the conclusion of
the Gulf War. Most notably after the completion of a study by the Department of Defense inspector
general, a mission area analysis, and the work of the Marine Corps Executive Steering Group, six specific
areas were highlighted for improvement. They were inadequate doctrinal foundation, insufficient tactical
intelligence support lack of professional intelligence officer career development, insufficient joint
manning, insufficient language capability and inadequate imagery capability. From (FY) 1995-1997 each
of these deficiencies were systematically addressed and corrective action taken. While these improvements
are important, they have only been incremental, peripheral changes. This thesis argues that the fundamental
processes that transform raw data into useable knowledge or intelligence have not changed since WWII
Incremental manning, training, or career enhancement changes are not solutions to this wider problem and
therefore are seen as minor adjustments to an enterprise that still is wedded to practices of the industrial
age.
design as sound, management information system (MIS) efforts have done little more
than automate existing procedures
2 The results of these actions can be seen in ground
exercises throughout the Marine Corps in which intelligence continues to fail combat
decision-makers. 3
While intelligence has remained unchanged and tied to outdated processes and
design, Marine warfighting doctrine has undergone significant transformation. Seeking a
framework for fighting wars that is consistent with the emerging threat environment, the
Marine Corps has abandoned warfare of attrition and adopted instead maneuver warfare.
Yet, in spite of this transition, experiences in the Gulf War demonstrate that intelligence
repeatedly failed to provide the intelligence required to operate in the maneuverist
paradigm. Careful study shows that Marine ground intelligence was organizationally
unable to provide the detail of information age intelligence demanded by combat
decision-makers facing the Iraqi army. This analysis highlights the mismatch between
maneuver warfare and existing Marine intelligence operations, one of the major weakness
of the current intelligence organization.
Indeed, Marine intelligence faces a serious dilemma: it can either reform or face
ever decreasing relevance and effectiveness. Unless significant reform is realized,
2 The intelligence analysis system or IAS is the Marine Corps' intelligence information management
system. It has been in development since before August of 1991 and is presently fielded at the Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) G-2 (intelligence) level. The mission of IAS is to automate intelligence
activities like directing collecting, processing and disseminating combat intelligence in order to rapidly
analyze, produce and disseminate all-source intelligence. IAS does not change doctrine or fundamental
intelligence activities that convert raw data into useable intelligence. Rather. IAS automates preexisting
tasks and reinforces traditional intelligence practices by replacing manual processes with an automated
management information system (MIS).
3 The fundamental intelligence question that combat decision-makers repeatedly ask is "where is the
enemy?" The author spent three years as an intelligence officer of a Marine Infantry Battalion from (1992-
1996) and could rarely answer this using quantitative data, like imagery, or "hits" from other information
age sensors. Identifying the enemy's disposition is critical to successful intelligence work. Yet this is a
task that continues to be troublesome for Marine intelligence. Until this detail of intelligence can be
intelligence as a fundamental component of command and control on the battlefield will
fail decision-makers facing emerging twenty-first century threats.
B. PURPOSE OF THE WORK
This thesis is about the misalignment of intelligence with its environment. As this
work will demonstrate, the structure of Marine ground intelligence is that of a machine
bureaucracy: centralized, hierarchical and slow. Marine intelligence is designed to
accommodate attrition warfighting and simple predictable adversaries; it is severely
challenged when confronted with the demands of maneuver warfare and non-standard,
unpredictable adversaries.
Ill configured for threats like the Iraqi Army, Marine ground intelligence will
assuredly fail against emerging twenty-first century threats. So far, disaster has been
averted by the individual innovation and "get the job done" attitude of intelligence
personnel. Yet these "quick fixes" are rarely formalized by the organization. There is
generally an official way to do intelligence and then there is the way things are actually
done. It is the largely informal, ad-hoc actions of innovative intelligence professionals
that have dealt with recent challenges, but the dictates of the machine bureaucracy still
permeate the organization. The restrictive boundaries, formalized processes, regimented
hierarchical approach to collections and dissemination, and the centralization of assets
and resources prevents Marine ground intelligence from exploiting its full potential and
effectively performing its critical mission. Unless intelligence adapts its structure and
processes to meet the demands of its environment it faces irrelevance as a component of
provided seamlessly to decision-makers, intelligence will continue to fail at its primary mission; to provide
combat decision makers with the knowledge necessary to make informed decisions about an enemy.
command and control on the battlefield.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This paper seeks to answer three broad questions. First, what is the emerging
threat environment of the twenty-first century 9 Second, is the present Marine ground
intelligence design adequate to support combat decision-makers in this threat
environment? Third, if not, what design changes are necessary to align intelligence with
this environment?
D. METHODOLOGY
This study is a conceptual analysis that draws on case studies to describe and
prescribe how Marine ground intelligence should be configured as it enters the next
century. It uses the methods of the futurists by identifying important trends and
projecting what the future may look like. This work analyzes current military and
economic trends to project what the threat environment will mean for current ground
intelligence practices. It then breaks down the current ground intelligence design and
compares it with this environment to demonstrate the misalignment between the two.
Drawing on industry examples and academic research this work recommends how
intelligence should be reconfigured to better align itself with the emerging threat
environment.
E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The goal of this thesis is to highlight the inadequacy of the present-day Marine
ground intelligence organization and to suggest an alternative configuration that is
aligned with the environment this organization will face in the coming century Before
the reader can truly appreciate the implications of the emerging threat environment
described in later chapters of this thesis, it will be essential to acquire an adequate
background on the current structure and functioning of Marine ground intelligence.
Chapter II, therefore, sets up the current problem with intelligence by demonstrating the
failure of Marine ground intelligence in the Gulf War. This discussion helps the reader
identify the misalignment between modern ground intelligence practices and the
warfighting doctrine of the Marine Corps. It supports the argument that intelligence will
most likely fail against emerging twenty-first century threats given its performance in the
GulfWar
Chapter III continues this discussion by presenting an overview of the
organizational design of existing Marine Corps intelligence. Additionally, it provides an
evaluation of elements of the intelligence bureaucracy, emphasizing that the
organizational design, by its very nature, lacks effectiveness and is limited in its ability to
respond to New Order Threats
After orienting the reader to contemporary Marine intelligence operations, this
thesis focuses on an in-depth exploration of the major threats of the next century:
asymmetric military threats and emerging non-conventional threats. Chapters IV through
VI will make startlingly clear the imperative for change in Marine intelligence by
providing evidence compiled from recently collected data on a wide range of topics, such
as global military spending, U.S. gang activity, and world refugee population statistics, as
well as an analysis of case studies from actual and hypothetical military encounters in
Somalia and China, respectively.
The common thread woven throughout this rationale for change is the premise
that asymmetric and emerging non-conventional threats are posing greater complexity
and danger for the Marine Corps than threats of the past. These emerging New Order
Threats require that significant and immediate attention be paid to the need for Marine
intelligence reform.
Having presented the rationale for why Marine intelligence needs to change, the
final and most important chapter of this thesis recommends the direction and types of
particular reforms mandated by maneuver warfare and emerging New Order Threats.
Applying lessons learned from the private sector and from organizational theory it argues
that the development and deployment of intellect is the key to successful ground
intelligence. It further argues that successfully leveraging intellect demands an
organizational design that pushes responsibility outward, flattens and removes hierarchy,
and exploits a wide range of expertise within and outside of the military. The network
organization is the form that best does this. Accordingly, network based intelligence is
suggested as the model for intelligence reform.
F. NEW ORDER THREATS
For purposes of this thesis, the term New Order Threat is used to capture the two
primary challenges that threaten Marine combat operations in the next century. First are
asymmetric military threats. Defined in Chapter IV as an evolving form of twentieth
century conventional war, asymmetric military threats attempt to circumvent Western
conventional superiority. Pushed into new forms of warmaking because of U.S.
conventional dominance, they seek asymmetry to overcome American military and
technological dominance. The second is the emerging class of non-conventional threats.
As explained in Chapter V and VI these emerging threats harness inherent organizational
asymmetries to circumvent American conventional dominance. They are no longer a
phenomenon of developing nations. Indeed, they are appearing throughout the modern
world. Together these two powerful threats represent a New Order of Threats that
promise to severely challenge American military dominance in the twenty-first century
New Order Threats challenge American military dominance because they are difficult to
recognize and understand. As a result decision-makers delay or respond ineffectively.
Left unchecked New Order Threats harness powerful asymmetric capabilities that allow
them to gain influence that is out of proportion to their political, economic and military
strength.
G. FOCUS OF STUDY
The thesis focuses on only one facet of Marine Corps intelligence: ground
intelligence. The other components, air intelligence, signals intelligence and human
intelligence are not studied specifically but are included in the body of the work as they
relate to the ground intelligence effort Ground intelligence is the focus of this work
because the Marine Corps is essentially a ground force. The Marine Corps is
fundamentally an air-ground, combined-arms team. It is the maneuver and fire of ground
forces operating in conjunction with close air support, naval surface fires and artillery
that place our adversaries in a position from which they have few choices. Therefore,
ground intelligence is critical to all Marine operations. If ground intelligence cannot
provide knowledge on the enemy, the entire air-ground, combined arms team is effected
Accordingly, as the center for all Marine intelligence operations, ground intelligence is
taken as the critical element for reform.

H. WHY CHANGE MARINE GROUND INTELLIGENCE?
A. MARINE GROUND INTELLIGENCE AND THE GULF WAR
This chapter will frame the need for intelligence reform by demonstrating the
failure of Marine intelligence during the Gulf War. The broader implications of these
failures coupled with similar failures of Army intelligence will then be used to expose the
central cause for the escape of the Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions prior to the
conclusion of the war. This discussion serves to highlight the dim prospects present-day
Marine intelligence holds for operating successfully against the emerging threat
environment of the twenty-first century; it also initiates the reader to the study of the
emerging threat environment, presented in later chapters, that provides a true sense of the
intelligence requirements needed as the Marine Corps enters the twenty-first century.
B. CHANGE IN MARINE WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE
During the Gulf War a new information era for the military came of age, and
ground commanders demanded information age intelligence. At the same time,
warfighting doctrine also changed.
With the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the American military had begun a
transformation that manifested itself during the Gulf War as a new, high technology
force. Extremely sensitive to public opinion, this military transformation witnessed the
development ofweapon systems and warfighting doctrine that were designed to reduce
collateral damage and friendly casualties. The impetus for this transformation was the
Congress' and American society's changing attitudes towards the military. The American
military could no longer count on a limitless spending and labor pool. The draft had
ended in the early 1970s, and training was an expensive and time-consuming process.
Furthermore, defense budgetary oversight by the Congress and shrinking defense
expenditures forced DoD into conservative approaches toward spending and defense
infrastructure. In short, in order to overcome the constraints imposed by the Congress
and American society, the military abandoned warfare by attrition. Military victory
would need to come through military competence, not from sheer superiority of men and
material as it had in previous conflicts.
The Marine Corps' response to the military transformation was made evident in
the adoption of warfare by maneuver. As shown in Table 2.1, attrition warfare demands
numerical and technological superiority for success, while maneuver warfare applies
strength against selected enemy weaknesses. Attrition warfare calls for the wearing
down of each individual component of the enemy system, while maneuver warfare relies
on speed, surprise, and the application of strength at the right time and place to shatter an
enemy's logic.
Attrition Warfare Maneuver Warfare
Style of Maneuver Movement to Contact Deliberate Attack










Indicator of success Destruction of all enemy
units
Destruction of enemy logic
Table 2.1. Attrition vs. Maneuver Warfare.
Maneuver warfare allows components of the enemy system to remain untouched,
for it is the shattering of the enemy's logic or "raison d'etre" that renders him incapable of
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functioning as a cohesive entity. Thus the destruction of that logic through violent
contact creates a situation in which the enemy cannot cope and his ability to fight is
paralyzed. Maneuver warfare success is achieved by shattering the enemy's cohesion,
organization, command and control, and physiological balance, not by physically
destroying each enemy unit. It is through maneuver warfare that an inferior force can
achieve decisive superiority by applying overwhelming force at the necessary time and
place.
Unlike attrition warfare, where firepower and movement are massed to
incrementally reduce the enemy's strength, maneuver warfare is designed to counter
threats that are ambiguous and numerically superior. While maneuver warfare accepts
and thrives on the chaotic and uncertain battlefield of the future, it demands precise
intelligence. Fundamental to warfare by maneuver is circumventing enemy strengths and
attacking from a position of advantage rather than head-on. As a result, successful
maneuver depends on the ability to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses. This is not a
trivial task; it requires complex intelligence work. Intelligence, therefore, is a key
element in the successful application of maneuver warfare on the battlefield.
Ground combat leaders cannot collapse an enemy's logic or shatter its cohesion if
they do not know where to inflict such violent blows. Yet, Marine intelligence is not
configured to meet the demands of maneuver warfare. Indeed, we will see that Marine
intelligence failed even to support attrition warfare during the Gulf Conflict. Left without
intelligence on the enemy, commanders attacked forward, unaware as to enemy strengths
and intentions. Fortunately, the Iraqi Army proved weak and irresolute, and American
combat power defeated the enemy without the need for precise intelligence. However,
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the future promises to be much different. A similar failure may provide future threats
with unprecedented battlefield advantages, the repercussions of which could pose serious
challenges for Marine combat forces.
1. Movement to Contact vs. the Deliberate Attack
The Gulf War provides an outstanding backdrop to highlight Marine ground
intelligence's failure to provide battlefield commanders intelligence on enemy
dispositions and intentions. This failure led to the Marine's heavy use of movement to
contact operations, rather than the deliberate attack characteristic of maneuver warfare.
Representing the quintessential twentieth century conventional force, Saddam
Hussein's military was centralized, regimented, and very conventional. His army was the
adversary which Marine intelligence had been designed to operate optimally against.
Furthermore, the desert was the perfect terrain to support offensive operations. Flat, bare,
and open, the desert was an environment where American technology and intelligence
collection systems could be harnessed to their full potential.
Unfortunately, Marine ground intelligence did not enter the Gulf War configured
to provide the critical battlefield intelligence needed to support maneuver warfare.
Because of this, offensive combat operations during the war remained tied to the
"movement to contact," an attrition style of maneuver that leaves the uncovering of the
enemy to forward units. Tactical combat leaders use the movement to contact when they
are not fed the intelligence necessary to conduct combat operations. Consequently, they
are left to locate the enemy with their own resources.
The movement to contact is characterized by friendly units moving in the
direction of suspected hostile forces and locating them by physical contact. This form of
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maneuver is costly in both lives and equipment. In contrast to the movement to contact is
the deliberate attack. The deliberate attack is characterized by precise, timely intelligence
on the enemy's disposition. Ground combat leaders use this intelligence to plan and
execute detailed operations where indirect fire support and air and naval surface fires can
be coordinated in conjunction with ground maneuver to destroy the enemy. Where time
prevents detailed coordination, precise intelligence fed to commanders in battle can be
used to reshape the battlefield through the maneuver of friendly forces and the
deployment of direct and indirect fires.
Combat experience in the Gulf War demonstrates that Marine Corps combat
operations remained tied to the movement to contact. During the ground war little useful
intelligence was provided to ground combat commanders. Blind to the enemy in front of
them, Marine forces maneuvered forward seeking to make contact with enemy units to
identify enemy strengths and dispositions. Once contact was gained and suitable
intelligence acquired, ground leaders were then apprised of enemy dispositions and
addressed the enemy using available combat power. The experiences of Marine Light
Armored Infantry (LAI) units are particularly illustrative of this.
LAI units act as a screening force for marine ground forces, using their speed and
combined arms capability to surprise and overpower forward-echelon enemy. LAI units
operate in front of friendly units and provide a buffer between the enemy and the Marine
main body; one of their primary missions is reconnaissance. Used as a collection tool,
they uncover enemy forces as they move forward and report back intelligence on enemy
dispositions and strengths. This intelligence is relayed to combat decision-makers who
then deploy combat power from the main body to address the enemy threat. LAI forces
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are quintessential movement to contact weapon platforms. Like the horse cavalry of the
19th century, they discover enemy through contact. Once contact is gained, they fix the
enemy in place in order to buy time for follow-on friendly forces to move up and destroy
the enemy.
C. INTELLIGENCE FAILURE LEADS TO IRAQI TROOPS' ESCAPE
During Desert Shield, just before the ground war started, Saddam Hussein
launched a major attack designed to trigger the ground war and rout Saudi and American
Marine forces defending along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. At the time, no signs existed
that the Coalition was in any hurry to invade, and Hussein's combat power was quickly
eroding. Iraqi forces, pounded continuously by air, were becoming increasingly less
effective as each day passed. If Hussein's forces were to crush an American attack, they
needed to do it soon.
Key to the Iraqi attack was surprise. Using three front line divisions, all over 70
miles away from American and Saudi defensive positions, Iraqi commanders ordered
their troops to move at night to avoid detection and devastation from American air power.
There is significant evidence that Iraqi commanders may have also been aware of
American satellite coverage, as they made their attack "consistent with when the satellite
was not there." (Gordon and Trainor, 1995 p. 271) Their precautions were successful, and
no intelligence on the impending Iraqi attack was reported to Marine forces. (Gordon
and Trainor, 1995, pp. 265-270)
Fortunately the night before the attack, just as the enemy was moving into
assembly positions, a Marine reconnaissance team manning an observation post on the
border spotted tanks and detected a large mechanized force. The team called in air strikes,
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and the following morning the smoke from the burning tanks provided ample clues as to
the enemy's intentions. Nevertheless, Marine commanders dismissed the Iraqi attack as
some sort of exercise and returned their attention to preparing for the future ground war.
When the full Iraqi attack came just as darkness fell that same day, January 29, 1991, the
Marines were still unaware of the Iraqis' plan. (Gordon and Trainor, 1995, pp. 265-275)
The battle lasted most of the night and into the early hours of the morning. As the
forward traces of the enemy divisions maneuvered into the LAI screen, Marines hastily
formed a defensive line to meet the advancing Iraqi attackers. At OP4, an old police post
along the border, a reconnaissance team was the first to spot the forward elements of the
1st Iraqi Mechanized Division. A LAI company already operating in the vicinity rolled
into the area just as the Iraqis were preparing to overrun the OP.
To save the reconnaissance team, the Company Commander ordered his LAVs
forward to cover their extraction. By this time however, enemy tanks were dangerously
close, and in a confused firefight a LAV was hit and destroyed by a TOW missile fired
from a friendly LAV. The company commander ordered his LAVs to concentrate their
25mm cannon fire in the direction of the enemy, hoping that by doing this friendly
aircraft loitering above could key in on the stream of fire and spot the advancing enemy.
Unfortunately, this did not work, and a flight of A-10's passing over fired a
Maverick that slammed into another friendly LAV, destroying it in a fireball. With two
vehicles destroyed, the company commander believed he was being outflanked and
ordered a withdrawal to reorganize. Despite this, the Marine defense combined with
close air support had been enough. After five intense hours of fighting, the Iraqi attack
was stopped. (Gordon and Trainor, 1995, pp. 265-275)
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Still uncertain as to what the enemy had planned, another LAI Company 1
screening just north near OP6 was hit by forward elements of the same division. This
Iraqi attack began with an artillery barrage followed by illumination rounds that lit up the
area as dozens of Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers crossed into Saudi territory
and seized the OP. The reconnaissance marines escaped, but this time the Iraqi force did
not continue the attack. Instead they deployed their vehicles around the position and
waited for the Marines to attack.
With little idea of what was in front of him, the LAI Company Commander called
in close air support while he moved within 500 feet of the OP. As the LAVs moved
forward, the Iraqi mechanized force suddenly came alive and launched a hasty attack. In
minutes, LAV TOW shots and close air support stopped the Iraqi assault. By morning
there was nothing left but burning vehicles and surrendering Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqi's
had been repulsed, and the 1st Mechanized Division retreated back into the Kuwaiti
desert.
While superior Marine air and ground firepower stopped the surprise Iraqi attack,
Marine units quickly learned that intelligence on Iraqi forces was severely lacking. In an
effort to prevent future surprises, a stopgap measure was employed. 2 Marine OV-lOs,
slow flying Vietnam era propeller planes outfitted with forward looking infrared imaging
devices (FLER), were tasked to fly along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border each night and pass
any enemy intelligence directly to forward combat commanders. This measure worked in
the static defense that was characteristic of Desert Shield. However once the ground war
began and Marine units started conducting offensive combat operations, intelligence




again failed, and operations moved back into the movement to contact paradigm, as we
discuss below.
Indicative of the fall back to traditional attrition warfare, the movement to contact
paradigm characterized all Marine offensive combat operations during the ground war.
Typically, forward combat leaders who were blind to the enemy disposition in front of
them moved to contact to uncover and destroy unknown enemy units. Regarding the
general weakness of this approach in the Gulf War, one example is particularly telling. 3
On D-day, February 24, 1991, Charlie Company, 1st LAI Battalion was the
screening force for Task Force Taro. Charlie Company's first objective after passing
through the Iraqi barriers was the seizure of a Korean Workers Camp just 10 kilometers
inside the Kuwaiti Border. As with all Marine attacks into Kuwait, Charlie Company had
little information about what and how enemy forces were deployed at the camp. Given
orders by the Task Force commander to reconnoiter and fix any enemy, the Company
Commander moved towards the objective cautiously. Once on the objective, however, it
became apparent that valuable time had been lost looking for the enemy on a position that
had been abandoned weeks earlier. This prudent type of movement is characteristic of
the movement to contact, for risky tactics that unnecessarily expose friendly troops can
spell disaster if they are ambushed by a well-camouflaged, competent enemy. With little
information on enemy dispositions, combat commanders must be cautious as they move
to contact.
This very need for caution in the Marine's movement to contact operations in
Kuwait can be seen as leading to the ultimate collapse of Schwarzkopf s "Hail Mary"
ground campaign. That plan called for the Marines to attack first, one day before the
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Army, and fix the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. This action would buy time for the Army's
heavy mechanized and tank units to swing around from the west and trap fleeing Iraqis as
they attempted to escape. However, the outcome of the Marine attack changed
everything. (Gordon and Trainor, 1995, 265-295)
Other encounters on D-Day, similar to the one described above, quickly taught the
Marines that the Iraqi defenders were not going to defend to the death as intelligence had
reported earlier. It became clear to Marine Commanders that the Iraqi defense was
collapsing and that their forces were fleeing back to Iraq as fast as they could. In
response, Marine commanders pushed their units at breakneck speeds into Kuwait.
Collapsing in the face of the Marine attack, the Iraqi forces were fleeing Kuwait much
sooner than expected.
Because of poor intelligence on the enemy, the Marine and Army attacks were at
that point out of sync. Realizing that the hugely successful Marine attack was violently
pushing the Iraqis out of Kuwait instead of fixing them, Schwarzkopf ordered the Army
to attack early. However, the Army had yet to fight the Iraqis, whom many army
commanders saw as Arab equivalents of the Soviet Army, and did not have the same
intelligence on the Iraqis as the Marines had. As a result, the Army "planned to fight
them just as they would take on the Red Army, with massive firepower and careful
coordination." (Gordon and Trainor, 1995 p. 377)
Reluctant to attack early, the Army sprung its attack at 2:30 PM on the 24th of
February. The attack began with a ferocious barrage of artillery. For a half-hour, five
artillery brigades fired 6,136 artillery rounds and 414 rockets at the suspected Iraqi
positions on the other side of the tank and mine obstacles. The Army wasn't taking any
3
Ibid.
chances; unaware that the Iraqis had abandoned many of their positions weeks before and
expecting a strong defense, they threw everything they had at the defensive positions. At
3:00 PM the assault began. The Army encountered little opposition as they moved across
the Iraqi defensive barriers. But it was getting dark, and progress was slow through the
narrow lanes in the Iraqi obstacles. Wary of the enemy and determined to concentrate his
forces, General Frank, the commander of the Army's VII Corps, suspended the attack
until "every last piece of equipment had gotten through the obstacles." (Gordon and
Trainor, 1995, p. 380)
In this way the main enveloping force, overly cautious because of poor
intelligence on Iraqi units and unaware of the Marines' overwhelming success to the east,
delayed the attack and allowed fleeing Iraqi units precious time to escape north. The next
day the VII Corps movement was slow and deliberate. Each successive movement was
coordinated and synchronized with artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The technique was
effective; the corps met the enemy with superior firepower in every engagement.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi army was fleeing north, and the few units the Corps ran into were
only blocking positions established to buy time for Iraqi Republican Guard forces and
other units to escape deep into Iraqi territory. By February 26, the Corps movement was
so slow that Schwarzkopf personally got involved to get it moving. Earlier Baghdad had
ordered a general retreat. Also, the Russians were planning to call a Security Council
meeting to push for an end to hostilities. The Corps was moving too slowly, and the
Iraqis were escaping to the north. Schwarzkopf knew that he had precious little time to
close the back door and destroy the Republican Guard units before either they escaped or
a cease-fire was called. Unfortunately, the cease-fire came too soon, and the deliberate
19
methodical movement of Frank's Corps prevented the envelopment from trapping the
fleeing Iraqis.
Previously, "Schwarzkopf had left no ambiguity about the Army's mission. The
Republican Guards were not to be routed, they were to be made combat ineffective."
(Gordon and Trainor, 1995, p. 429) However, on March 1, after the cease-fire, American
intelligence photos showed that "842 Iraqi tanks (a full quarter of Iraq tanks from
southern Iraq and Kuwait) and 1,412 armored personnel carriers (half of all APC's in
theater) had escaped." (Gordon and Trainor, 1995, p. 429)
What is most significant about the success of the Iraqi retreat is that the majority
of the equipment and personnel that escaped north were Hussein's Republican Guard
divisions. These were the divisions that were instrumental in suppressing the Shiite
uprisings that occurred in the marshes in Southern Iraq following the war; these same
forces were the units that deployed into Southern Iraq in 1994 to intimidate Kuwait and
the UN no-fly zone. Most analysts agree that these units were pivotal in propping up
Hussein's regime during the critical internal rebellions that shook both northern and
southern Iraq following the war. (Gordon and Trainor, 1995, pp. 420-430)
D. ANALYSIS OF MARINE GROUND INTELLIGENCE IN THE GULF
WAR
The experiences of both Marine and Army forces in the Persian Gulf highlight
what Carl Von Clausewitz described in his book, Vom Kriege (On War), as the friction
of war. With little intelligence on what was in front of them, Marine units operated in the
movement to contact paradigm. Once they gained an understanding of the collapsing
Iraqi defenses, Marine units sped north and pushed the fleeing enemy out of Kuwait.
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This threw Schwarzkopf s plan out of sync. Thus the VII Corps4
,
unaware that the Iraqis
were collapsing, fought a slow and methodical battle that allowed time for Iraqi combat
power to escape north. In the end, the war concluded without the destruction of the
Republican Guard.
Interestingly, this fog or friction existed despite the advances in surveillance and
information technologies that permitted high level intelligence to see nearly everything
on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi battlefield. At issue is the fact that the Central Command
(CENTCOM)5 intelligence and other high level Marine and Army intelligence (J-2, G-2)
functions were designed to provide intelligence for an attrition era military. In effect, the
configuration of intelligence that had served America well in the past became irrelevant
during the Gulf conflict.
A new American military emerged during the Gulf War: a military concerned
with casualties and collateral damage. The fundamental offensive doctrine had also
changed; attrition warfare was replaced by maneuver warfare. As described earlier,
maneuver warfare relies on superior operating tempo, surprise, and decentralized
command to defeat the enemy as a system. In contrast, attrition warfare relies on a
willingness to absorb attrition so that the enemy can be defeated through the systematic
destruction of all its individual parts. Hence, maneuver warfare demands accountability
4 The "Left Hook" or "Hail Mary" envelopment was a two Corps thrust commanded by Lt. Gen. John
Yeosock commander of Army Forces in the Gulf. Lt. Gen. Frank's VII Corps was the innermost
enveloping force while Lt. Gen. Gary Luck's XVIII Airborne Corps was the outermost. While this section
has focused primarily on Frank's slow moving VII Corps, the reader should understand that Luck's XVIII
Corps, while not similarly disposed, was also unable to close the envelopment in time to trap the fleeing
Republican Guard Forces. Major General Barry McCaffrey commander of the 24th Mechanized Division
(assigned to Luck's XVIII Corps) was the northern most unit in Iraq when hostilities ended. He stated
"...They probably should have sent us forty-eight hours before the Marines." (Gordon and Trainor, 1995,
p. 432) His Division sped across the Iraqi western desert but arrived too late to block the fleeing
Republican Guards.
5 CENTCOM or Central Command J2 is the intelligence staff that supported General Schwarzkopf during
the war. As such, they were the highest echelon of military intelligence during the war.
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for confronting enemy strengths when, alternatively, exploiting enemy weaknesses can
save lives and collapse an enemy more effectively and efficiently.
Yet, while ground combat leaders were swiftly adopting these new operational
concepts by decentralizing command and control and demanding low-level initiative
from subordinates, intelligence remained tied to past practices and continued as a
hierarchical, centralized organization. Thus, the flexible, high-speed analysis required to
feed the intelligence demands of ground leaders during the war was an impossible task.
The Persian Gulf War may perhaps be the last twentieth century-era, conventional
adversary the American military fights. Using attrition era tactics, American military
power easily overwhelmed the Soviet-armed Iraqi army. Hussein's forces were no match
for high-technology weapon systems like the M-l tank, precision guided bombs and
advanced tactical fighters. However, the emerging New Order Threat environment will
present an entirely different threat picture for future U.S. military engagements.
Operating in the movement to contact paradigm (attrition era tactics) will no longer be
suitable against these threats. Conducting ground operations without intelligence on the
enemy will be disastrous in this new environment. Thus a paradigm shift away from the
movement to contact and towards the deliberate attack will be necessary to operate
successfully in this new, emerging environment. Key to effecting this transition is the
establishment of an intelligence enterprise uniquely configured to support maneuver
warfare and understand and provide suitable intelligence on New Order Threats.
The Gulf War highlights the inadequacy of the present-day Marine ground
intelligence organization. The challenge is to suggest an alternative configuration that is
aligned with the environment to be faced in the coming century. In the next chapter, the
22
emerging threat environment is described. The threat environment is characterized by
two major challenges: asymmetric military threats and non-conventional threats.
Asymmetric military threats attempt to circumvent Western conventional superiority by
developing counters to American conventional and technological dominance. Emerging
non-conventional threats harness inherent organizational asymmetries to also counter
American conventional dominance. Together they represent a New Order Threat
environment whose complexity and asymmetric advantage will render irrelevant current
intelligence practices and seriously challenge any intelligence enterprise configured
expressly to meet their challenge.
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m. THE CHALLENGE FOR MARINE GROUND INTELLIGENCE:
MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
A. INTRODUCTION
Marine ground intelligence is a complex organization that was designed in the
industrial age. As a result, its configuration assumed the predominate organizational
form of its time: that of the machine bureaucracy. As a machine bureaucracy in an
attrition warfare era, its design was satisfactory; however, this design is grossly
inadequate to meet the intelligence demands of a new operational environment
characterized by New Order Threats and maneuver warfare. What are the characteristics
of intelligence's structural and functional design that leave it so woefully unprepared to
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st
century Marine combat decision-makers?
This chapter describes the modern intelligence bureaucracy by first defining the
fundamentals of its organization. Four elements of the intelligence bureaucracy are
highlighted: 1) the centralization of power and control of resources, 2) the standardization
1 The work of Arthur Stinchombe suggests that the structure of an organization reflects the age of founding
of the industry. He found a relation between the era the industry was founded and its organizational design.
For example, organizations of the pre-factory era - farms, construction firms, retail stores and the like- tend
to rely more heavily on family personnel, retaining a kind of craft structure, whereas those of the early
nineteenth century - apparel, textiles and so on - use virtually no unpaid family workers, but many clerks, a
sign of a bureaucracy. Those of the next era - railroads and coal mines - tend to rely heavily on
professional managers in place of owner-managers, a second stage of the developing bureaucratization of
industry. (Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 123-124) Extending this theory helps explain why Marine Ground
Intelligence is configured in its present design. Marine intelligence assumed the characteristics of the most
prevalent organizational frame of its era: the Machine Bureaucracy.
2 The term Machine Bureaucracy (or Machine Organization) was coined by Henry Mintzberg (Mintzberg.
1993) and is used to describe organizations that display the following design characteristics: highly
specialized, routine operating tasks; very formalized procedures; a proliferation of rules; reliance on the
functional basis for grouping tasks; relatively centralized power for decision making and resource control:
and an elaborate administrative structure with a sharp distinction between line and staff (Mintzberg. 1993.
p. 164). The reader is reminded that when the term Machine Bureaucracy is used it is referring to the
Mintzberg definition rather than Weber's classical definition. Max Weber (1947) in the beginning of the
1900's developed theories on the "ideal" efficient organization. He proposed several characteristics to
define this archetypal bureaucracy: division of labor, well-defined authority, formalization, and impersonal
nature.
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of task, 3) the focus on organizational control, and 4) the configuration of the divisional
intelligence community.
Following the presentation of the current intelligence organization, this chapter
provides an analysis ofhow the bureaucratic elements described are inherent sources of
fallibility in that they limit ground intelligence's ability to adapt to the challenging threat
environment and are incapable of achieving timely processing of the ever-increasing
volume of information-age data. This analysis leads to the conclusion that current ground
intelligence design is incompatible with the threat environment it faces in the next
century.
B. BUREAUCRATIC ELEMENTS OF MARINE INTELLIGENCE
During World War II and the Cold War, warfare was essentially an industrial
problem. Both sides fought with little regard for resources, raising huge armies with
almost limitless masses of men and material. These conflicts of attrition warfare
demanded mass forces that were effective at warfighting; thus, monolithic armies fought
with each other head-on and employed every known resource to materially overwhelm
their opponent.
This style of attrition warfare does not demand precise tactical intelligence for
success. After all, superior numbers and technology are the key to achieving victory.
Battle with the enemy was sought under almost any conditions; less important was when
or where. The focus was pitting superior strength against the enemy in order to exact the
greatest toll from him and force his destruction. In this context, the movement to contact
was the predominate form of offensive maneuver. Tactical intelligence on forward
enemy units was important in that it indicated that enemy forces were there and
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movement would guarantee contact. However, detailed intelligence that indicated precise
locations, weaknesses, and possible courses of action was of lesser importance, for the
enemy would be destroyed not so much from military competence as from sheer force.
In an era dominated by attrition warfare and the movement to contact, battlefield
intelligence could afford to move slowly. For most of the 20th century, mass armies
could only fit and maneuver through certain areas, their weapons were known, and their
effectiveness well understood. With both sides battling regardless of the costs, the
sudden appearance of an enemy position would not greatly affect an offensive moving
army. Contact was expected; men and material would be destroyed; replacements would
be forthcoming.
The machine bureaucracy was an ideal organizational form for intelligence at a
time when both sides were entrenched in the relatively predictable and stable task of
attrition warfighting. The bureaucratic organization was thus particularly suited for an
intelligence function that could be slow and deliberate, methodical, and very
conventional. This is not to say that unorthodox, highly sophisticated intelligence was
unknown during this period. On the contrary, great advances in intelligence were
achieved, often by those working in non-bureaucratic structures. The great code breakers
who aided in breaking the German and Japanese codes, code named Ultra (Rosen, 1991,
p. 133), operated in unstructured and very effective organizations. These operations were
pivotal in operations against the Axis powers. Nevertheless, on the whole, ground
tactical intelligence was perfectly suited to a bureaucratic structure and faced little
pressure to innovate and seek other organizational forms. Let us now explore the
elements that define this machine bureaucracy that is Marine intelligence.
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1. Centralized Organization
One of the defining elements of the machine bureaucracy is the centralization of
power. In an intelligence bureaucracy this means that the majority of organizational
power, decision-making authority, and resources or assets are controlled at the highest
level within the organization. Typically, this is at the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
level.
3
Hierarchy and chain of command are tools that reinforce the vertically centralized
structure of Marine ground intelligence, illustrated in the organagram in Figure (3.00).
At the top of the organization is the MEF intelligence section (G-2), the level at
which all most organic assets and resources are centralized and controlled. 4 Outside
intelligence agencies and collection platforms link here as well. These include national
assets (e.g., satellite imagery and high level human intelligence from the CIA) and theater
assets (e.g., an array of sophisticated platforms like the Joint Surveillance Target
The MEF is the largest Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command in the Marine Corps. The
MAGTF is a unique organization that consists of a command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE),
air combat element (ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE). (For purposes of this thesis, the
MEF will be studied as the MAGTF CE (highest intelligence echelon). The reader is reminded that a
MAGTF CE is not limited to a MEF headquarters. In theory any tactical headquarters can be designated as
a MAGTF CE. ) The MEF, commanded by a Lieutenant General, is essentially a headquarters whose
mission is to aid the Commanding General prosecute combat operations (i.e., the intelligence staff provides
intelligence that is used for operational planning etc.) The MEF headquarters, therefore, is comprised of a
large supporting staff that includes administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and other elements.
In a large contingency or war, a MAGTF is usually formed under the command of a MEF. For example, in
the Gulf War, I MEF from Camp Pendleton, California, was the CE for the First and Second Marine
Divisions during the ground war; I MEF was also the CE for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
4
Intelligence assets are separate functional organizations that aid in fulfilling MAGTF intelligence
requirements, they are categorized as organic, theater, and national assets. Organic assets belong to (are
owned by) the MEF (or MAGTF CE) . Theater assets are owned by the CINC (or Commander in Chief) of
a particular area of operations. Each CINC (e.g. CINCSOUTH for Latin America, CINCPAC for the
Pacific, etc.) is the highest military authority in a geographic region, they oversee all military operations
within their specified area. They own various intelligence assets that are used to assist in the intelligence
effort in times of crises. In such a crises the MEF intelligence section would be given access to these
platforms and incorporate them into the intelligence collection plan. Finally, national assets are those that
are run by the various DoD and Executive agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
National Reconnaissance Officer (NRO) etc.
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Acquisition Radar aircraft, JSTARS, that track moving vehicles and objects from high
altitudes).
Below the MEF is the ground combat element (GCE) comprised of divisions,
regiments, and battalions. Each division, regiment, and battalion has its own intelligence
staff that supports its respective commander. The farther down the intelligence hierarchy
one goes, the fewer the assets assigned. At the battalion level (S-2), only one organic
asset exists: the infantry Marine."
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the MEF intelligence section is the provider of
combat intelligence for the entire organization. Division, regiment, and battalion rely on
LEGEND
HUMINT - human intelligence
SIGINT - signals intelligence
TECHINT - technical intelligence
EMINT - imagery intelligence
ELINT - electronic intelligence
MASINT - measurement and signature intel
RECON - reconnaissance
SENSOR - ground sensor reporting
Figure 3.1. GCE Intelligence Hierarchy.
5 By infantry marine the author is referring to the lack of collection assets available to the battalion. The
battalion has two organic collection assets: forward-deployed marines engaged in combat and Scout
Snipers who employ expert field tactics to stealthily reconnoiter enemy positions. Both these assets,
however, are limited by operational reach. Because of this they are limited to collecting intelligence on
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the MEF G-2 to collect, process, and analyze relevant intelligence to support their
organizations' intelligence requirements.
To facilitate its operations, the MEF G-2 (or MAGTF) is organized into three
sections (Figure 3.2): the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), the All
Source Fusion Center (AFC), and the Dissemination Cell. The particular responsibilities
of each of these sections are clearly delineated. The Reconnaissance Center is the
reception point for all MEF organic intelligence assets; information attained here is
processed and sent over the management information system (MIS) to the Fusion Center,
which is the "brain" for the intelligence section. It is at the Fusion Center that organic,
national, and theater intelligence is integrated to build an understanding of the enemy.
This is done by comparing data from various assets to determine accuracy and by plotting
valid enemy units on a situation map that forms the common enemy picture for the MEF.
Fused intelligence is next sent to the Dissemination Cell where the developed enemy
picture is approved by a senior level intelligence officer and forwarded to the Combat
Operations Center. The enemy picture is incorporated into the MEF's situational
awareness of the battlefield, and, together with his staff, the MEF commander prosecutes
the war. The figure below illustrates this process and shows how the same fused
intelligence is disseminated throughout the MEF to the GCE, ACE and CSSE.
enemy that arc already inside the battalion battlespace. Thus, while they provide valuable intelligence, it is
often too short fused to provide anything but early warning.
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Combat Operations Center
The common enemy picture is
displayed for analysis by the MEF
Commander and his staff. At the same
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The fused intelligence picture is
validated by a senior intelligence
official Once validated it is
integrated into the common battlefield
picture of the MEF
FUSION CENTER
Data from National, Theater and
Organic assets flow into the fusion center
Here a team of analysts correlate raw data
An intelligence picture is developed from





Figure 3.2. Intelligence Production: MAGTF Intelligence Cell. After (BSTF, 1997).
Because the task of intelligence is complex, it is divided up into many subtasks.
The result is a division of labor that involves considerable interdependence, and therefore
coordination, between specialties. The intelligence bureaucracy formally adheres to the
intelligence cycle process to accomplish coordination of the efforts of the separate
divisions involved in intelligence processing (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3. The Intelligence Cycle. After (FMFM 3-21, 1991).
The first coordinating mechanism of the intelligence cycle is the articulation of an
information need. Termed Direction, this sets the work of intelligence in motion;
direction is established by the demands of the operation. Battlefield commanders and
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their intelligence staffs work together to identify the priority intelligence shortfalls
necessary to conduct combat operations. Because they do not have the assets or
connectivity to collect on these shortfalls themselves they forward their intelligence
requirements to the MEF G-2 (or MAGTF), where it is prioritized with other requests.
Priority intelligence requirements are then passed to the next phase, Collection.
Collection involves the tasking and gathering of information from all available assets; it
is the point where organic and non-organic agencies communicate with the MEF
intelligence cell. Collection tasks these agencies and is the first to receive their data
inputs. Collected data is then fed to Processing where it is converted into a form suitable
for the production of intelligence. From Processing, the data goes to Production where it
is converted into intelligence through evaluation, integration, and interpretation. Finally,
the intelligence is disseminated back down the hierarchy to the requestor. This cycle
reflects the emphasis on the efficient management of centralized resources and assets. In
other words, the assembly line approach insures that the scarce resources located at the
top are efficiently applied to each task. Like building a refrigerator on an assembly line,
the cycle enforces a fixed, step by step, serial dependence between requestor, collector
and analyst. In this way the organization can harness the benefits of specialization and
division of labor, which increase efficiency and ensure the production of suitable quality
intelligence. The centralized nature of Marine intelligence is therefore exemplified by
the consolidation and accumulation of resources at the top of the intelligence hierarchy
and by the complete dependence of lower level elements of the hierarchy on the top
levels for intelligence.
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2. Standardization of Task
A second element of the machine bureaucracy is the standardization of task, the
breaking down of complex tasks into narrow specialized areas through the division of
labor. The intent of standardization is to reduce a task into a series of simple, routine
processes, thereby increasing efficiency and ensuring that every process is accomplished
in the same manner. Jobs are made repetitive to require a minimum of skill and training.
This results in narrowly defined jobs with routine tasks, reliance on divisions for the
grouping of different tasks, and a rationalized work flow where a highly elaborate
hierarchy manages coordination and communication throughout the organization.
"Workers are left with little discretion, as are the supervisors, who can therefore handle
very large spans of control." (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 635)
The intelligence bureaucracy seeks to simplify complex tasks so that they can be
done efficiently by most any operator. Standardization ensures intelligence work is
consistent and conforms to the doctrines or standards of the organization. To aid in the
standardization, "recipes" or "cook book" procedures become important. Thus, when
analyzing an enemy, intelligence professionals apply standardized frameworks to
understand enemy actions.
Marine intelligence processes have been standardized around the two most
threatening conventional enemies facing the American military: the Former Soviet Union
and North Korea. Both these adversaries have been studied exhaustively and are well
understood. To ensure a standard and accurate analysis of these enemies, a standardized
process for analysis called "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" (IPB) was
developed. This analytic method breaks down the enemy and his environment into
simple blocks, facilitating comprehension of his potential actions and capabilities. EPB,
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however, presupposes the following conditions, which will be shown in later chapters to
be increasingly irrelevant in the New Order Threat environment: 1) the enemy has a
doctrine, 2) that the enemy follows that doctrine, 3) we know the enemy's doctrine in
detail, and 4) we have an extensive knowledge of the weather and terrain of the area of
operations. (Steele, 1992)
An analyst using EPB first analyzes the enemy in order to understand his
organization and how he may fight. The analyst does this by employing a set of doctrinal
templates that describe the enemy's known organization and fighting methods. For
instance, assume an enemy anti-aircraft site is located. Using his template the analyst
could surmise that under Soviet doctrine, anti-aircraft sites usually protect important
command and control nodes. Driven by this knowledge, the analyst could assign a
collection asset to observe the area and look for command and control equipment like
radio antennae. This formulaic approach to intelligence reduces the uncertainty
associated with intelligence work and standardizes the processes so that the entire
organization can achieve a certain standard level of analytic skill.
The reliance on automated systems to do intelligence work is another element of
task standardization. The bureaucracy is always looking for ways to increase
performance while at the same time increasing efficiency. The human element is the one
part of the system that often creates the most problem. For an information processing
bureaucracy, automation is an approach that can achieve both effectiveness and
efficiency without having to adjust the often-unreliable human problem. Intelligence has
therefore begun to pursue "sensor to shooter" designs that remove the human element
altogether. Using information age sensors and MIS technologies, raw data is downloaded
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directly from collection platforms onto a common enemy picture screen. The system
conducts its own analysis using previously designed templates. Once the system
identifies the target as enemy, available weapons engage it. This example represents the
extreme end of automated intelligence; however, such a reality is not too distant. 6 The
prevalence of task standardization in the design of Marine intelligence is clearly apparent
by the reliance on formulaic Cold War era analysis, by the use of simple processes
configured to allow standard output regardless of operator, and by the increasing
replacement of programmed system decisions for human ones.
3. Control
Control is a third fundamental element of the bureaucracy, and it is perhaps the
most obvious element of Marine intelligence. The bureaucracy must be obsessed with
control for two reasons: tight control systems reduce task uncertainty, thereby increasing
efficiency, and organizational control reduces conflict, which typically prevails
throughout the organization. Control systems and organizational control are key
indicators of an organization more concerned with internal bureaucratic efficiency than
with supporting the consumer's demand for detailed intelligence.
6
There are many within DoD that are pushing for this type of warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
concept for information superiority known as Joint Vision 2010 is the most renown. It advances the
development of an information sensor grid that would identify space, air, sea and ground "targets". A
complete picture of the environment, and friendly and enemy forces would emerge Called "Network
Centric Warfare", this near perfect battlespace awareness would facilitate sensor to shooter warfare, where
targets are identified, processed and engaged. The human element is minimal in this configuration as it
slows down processing time. The key concept is increasing the speed of decision making by relying on
sensor "hits" and machine processes. By so doing this "locks out" potential enemy courses of action and
presents him with a dilemma he cannot overcome (Taken from a brief entitled: The Emerging Joint
Strategy for Information Superiority, given at NPS in 1 997).
The work of the Strategic Studies Group, a think tank that reports directly to the SECDEF. advances a
similar model. Of particular interest to this work is their view on how sensor to shooter concepts will
transform the way decision making and command and control is organized. They state that "...intelligence
will be subsumed by operations." (Casper. 1996 p. 85) Thus, they argue that sensor to shooter teclinology
and doctrine will require little need for an intelligence function in the future.
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Designed to eliminate task uncertainty, control systems enable anyone to
accomplish the task. Like a worker at McDonalds who prepares french-fries, every task is
simplified and standardized. In this case, the cook places the fries on an automated
device that signals the worker when finished. Little initiative is left to the worker.
Control processes eliminate all possible uncertainty of task, so that the organization can
operate efficiently without interruption.
The way intelligence is processed, as typified by the intelligence cycle described
above, reinforces the intelligence bureaucracy's efforts to eliminate task uncertainty
through standardized control processes. As described previously, the only way for a
consumer to receive intelligence product is to follow an assembly line process whereby
the consumer articulates the information need and submits a request for information, then
waits patiently for that request to flow up the hierarchy for review, approval, processing,
prioritization, further processing, and analysis, and then, finally, dissemination back
down the hierarchy. Each step in the cycle has rules and regulations that govern how the
task is done, ensuring accuracy and efficiency and mandating that intelligence processes
be carried out to the letter. The result is that every task, every request for intelligence, is
carried out in the same way.
Furthermore, the intelligence bureaucracy is not an open environment where
people talk and resolve issues associated with performing a complex and ambiguous task.
Rather it is configured to enforce a closed, tightly controlled system where tasks are
compartmentalized and an assembly line process forces the work to be accomplished in a
particular way regardless of conflicting viewpoints. Disseminated intelligence is the end
product of an established, sequential effort of collection, fusion, analysis, and approval.
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The intelligence cycle is conducted at the top of the organization and is performed
by a small analysis cell that is overwhelmed by other similar requests. Within this
configuration there is little sharing of unprocessed intelligence. Ideas from lower levels
do not influence the analysis that is strictly conducted at the top level. On the contrary,
the work of intelligence is reduced to a highly regimented information processing
enterprise. Data is fed into the system; it is manipulated and later disseminated. Only
those at the top can influence the production of disseminated intelligence. The top is
therefore the provider of the corporate knowledge of the organization.
Control processes proliferate to ensure that only intelligence that has been
approved by central authority is disseminated. To reinforce this, a strict hierarchy is
developed, as illustrated earlier in the presentation of vertical centralization. Intelligence
acquired by lower echelons is not disseminated to the corporate body until it flows up to
the top and is approved. Then it flows back down to the rest of the organization. Even a
dissemination authority must approve intelligence generated within the headquarters.
Only after it is approved is it then disseminated.
The role of control in Marine intelligence is paramount to this machine
bureaucracy. While accuracy is the goal of the hierarchical control processes, intelligence
output is painstakingly slow and reflects only the opinions of the top level, which is
restricted from coordination and communication with other parts of the organization.
4. Configuration of Divisional Intelligence Work
The final element of Marine intelligence's machine bureaucracy is the divisional
configuration that makes up the wider intelligence community. Marine intelligence is
only one piece in an enormous national intelligence bureaucracy that is driven to the
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divisional form because of the diversity of the intelligence mission. Each separate
external operation or division represents the many specialty functions of modern
intelligence, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) performed by the CIA the State
Department and other agencies, signals intelligence (SIGINT) by other agencies, and
battlefield intelligence by the services and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Each intelligence area is organized by function, to allow for the specialization of
task and the development of expertise. The functional specialties, referred to as
"stovepipes," are vertically integrated disparate operations that collect, process, and
analyze the different kinds of intelligence data for which they were designed.
Functional organization develops into occupational communities such as signals
intelligence and human intelligence; each is a separate intelligence function and has its
own career path, training program, and culture. (See Figure 3.4)
Legend
SIGINT - Government Agency
HUMINT - CIA, State Dept.
IMINT - Government Agency
TECHINT - U.S. Army
MASINT - Government Agency
Figure 3.4. The Divisional Intelligence Community.
The combined work of each functional area is fused to build an accurate, ever-
evolving picture of an enemy. For example, to determine the position of an enemy on a
battlefield several functional areas would be tasked to collect and report information
within the realm of their expertise. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) professionals would
detect and analyze radio emissions, human intelligence (FIUMINT) professionals would
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interrogate local residents or captured prisoners, imagery professionals (IMINT) would
analyze aerial photographs, etc. The reporting of each functional area is fused with other
functional data inputs, and intelligence analysts draw conclusions as to the location of the
enemy on the battlefield.
Because each division is a mini organization unto itself, there tends to be a high
degree of duplication of effort across divisions. This simultaneously minimizes inter-
division dependence and means that little coordination is needed to accomplish assigned
tasks. As a result, lateral communication between divisions is rare. When
communication is necessary, it is formal and usually follows a chain of command where
it circulates up to headquarters, then down to a division, then back to headquarters, and
finally back down to the sender. The need for divisional organization within the
intelligence community is considered to arise from the unique expertise required in each
of the various intelligence gathering realms. Divisionalization limits informal
communication between divisions and creates compartmentalization of information that
only slowly is able to make its way through the hierarchy to the corporate body.
C. ANALYSIS OF MARINE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
The fundamental mission of Marine ground intelligence is to provide combat
decision-makers the knowledge necessary to make informed decisions about an enemy.
Designed to support attrition era warfighting, Marine intelligence assumed the most
effective and efficient organizational design of the period, the machine bureaucracy.
In contrast, modern Marine Corps combat operations demand an intelligence
function that can support warfare by maneuver. It must be an agile enterprise capable of
harnessing the volume of information age data and generating precise intelligence on
emerging new order threats.
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Bureaucratic design creates a paradox of present day intelligence: intelligence
work arising out of turbulent combat conditions cannot be reduced to simple bureaucratic
processes or strictly hierarchical design. Nevertheless, in spite of this contradiction,
military intelligence has maintained this configuration.
As the Marine Corps enters the 21st century, it is taking advantage of the
information age and an ever-increasing array of powerful technologies like sophisticated
sensors and information processing systems. It is also facing a threat environment that is
more complex, uncertain and dangerous than that of the Cold War era Combat leaders
now demand information age intelligence to outmaneuver and counter powerful new
threat operations. Confronted with a complex task, Marine intelligence requires an
organizational design that can effectively manage disparate functional operations, fuse
and interpret their inputs, and rapidly disseminate precise intelligence.
In the next sections of this chapter, the elements of Marine intelligence
bureaucracy are analyzed with respect to these new demands of combat - and are found
sorely wanting.
1. Flaws with Centralization
The centralized-bureaucratic intelligence organization poses two major obstacles
that impede its ability to fulfill its mission. It lacks the manpower necessary to process
the amount of inquiry that is generated by maneuver warfare, and these few analysts are
unable to appropriately respond to information age intelligence.
How does the bureaucratic intelligence cycle play out in battle? (See Figure 3.5)
Assume a battalion needs to know if enemy units are located in a particular region prior
to an attack. The battalion intelligence officer sets the direction, and submits his units
critical intelligence shortfalls up the hierarchy. The request is processed and prioritized
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and eventually sent to collections who organizes available assets to gather data on the
request. Once the various assets have collected their data, the MEF (or MAGTF)
collections receives the data and forwards it to the Fusion Center. The Fusion Center
then processes the data into a usable intelligence product. The dissemination cell
approves the intelligence product, and it is then sent down the hierarchy to the requestor.
While this process may seem straightforward, in practice it is not that simple.
First, a good deal of information must be processed to coordinate the
interdependent subtasks that go into filling the intelligence request from MEF. Simply
requesting that an area be surveilled to determine the existence of enemy is imprecise and
can lead to misunderstanding and erroneous data. To successfully exploit advanced
national, theater, and organic sensors like JSTARS requires careful coordination. In most
cases, system operators who are located thousands of miles from the area of operations
must know precise information pertaining to the target area. Also, because face-to-face
communication is often impossible due to logistical and other constraints, successfully
communicating intelligence requirements is not trivial. Therefore, the MEF intelligence
collections cell must coordinate carefully with all assets to ensure requests are
understood.
Fusion analysis is also a complex process. Fusion intelligence analysts must have
expert knowledge on the enemy. Much of the data analysts receive is contradictory and
unintelligible; often it is just a series of white dots that mean nothing unless fused with
other data like satellite photographs or emissions from radio broadcasts. Additionally,
fusion analysts must also understand why the intelligence is needed. Will the battalion be
attacking the enemy from the air or the ground? When will they attack9 Understanding
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information of an operational nature is critical to providing precise intelligence necessary
for effectively confronting the enemy.











Figure 3.5. Intelligence Processing in the Intelligence Bureaucracy,
a. Overwhelmed by Maneuver Warfare Inquiry
One obvious weakness of the centralized intelligence bureaucracy is that
the greater amount of information needed to be processed, the more likely the top will be
overwhelmed. For the intelligence bureaucracy, intelligence work is largely an
information processing function: it collects disparate bits of data from a wide variety of
sources and, through expert analysis, transforms data into intelligence Because it is
centralized and there only exists a limited number of analysts and collection experts,
when the top is confronted with great numbers of intelligence requests, it quickly
becomes overloaded.
The information processing scale (Driver, 1990, pp. 38-39) below (Figure
3.6) provides a graphic example of this. As the number of intelligence demands
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increases, the central staff is initially able to process the requests, and the system
experiences a period of positive returns to scale. As the number of requests further
increases, the system reaches equilibrium. This is the point where for every one
additional request the returns decrease proportionally. Called the "prohibitive region," all
further demands on the centralized cell result in significant reductions in intelligence
processing capability This is where the system is unable to process data in a timely
fashion, and it responds by either ignoring intelligence demands or filling them after



















Figure 3.6. Information Processing Scale. After (Driver, 1990, p. 39)
To demonstrate this, first look at the demands of the modern battlefield.
As discussed in Chapter II, maneuver warfare is now the warfighting doctrine of the
Marine Corps. Maneuver warfare demands precise intelligence, for it requires the ability
to circumvent enemy strengths and attack from a position of advantage. Because the
identification of enemy weaknesses is not trivial, and because successful maneuver
depends on the ability to identify and exploit enemy weaknesses, complex intelligence
work is a key element in the successful application of maneuver warfare on the
battlefield.
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The task of intelligence supporting maneuver warfare is significantly
different than that of supporting attrition warfare. Instead of reacting to intelligence fed
from higher or lower, intelligence transforms and becomes proactive. As a result, all
intelligence levels throughout the hierarchy proactively inquire into the battlespace. Each
combat echelon demands a unique level of intelligence that will facilitate warfare by
maneuver.
Under a centralized structure, each echelon submits requests up the
hierarchy, where the majority of the assets are located. Once the requests arrive at
collections, they are approved, and assets are assigned. As described previously, the data
is then fused and disseminated. However, proactive inquiry demands a monumental
amount of intelligence work. The Fusion Center cannot fulfill the hundreds of requests
for information that accompany this level of inquiry. As a result, it quickly enters the
prohibitive region and the system suffers overload.
A factor that contributes to information processing overload is that each
request presents significant challenges for a small, centralized staff. Analysts are often
located far from the battlespace in protected environments where they do not know or
understand the complexities of the current enemy situation. When requests for
intelligence are submitted, the analyst who knows little of the unique situation facing
forward-deployed units must first interpret and then input them into the system. Then
they must be re-communicated to the collecting asset. Both these steps introduce the
probability for error and can ultimately effect the quality of the intelligence provided.
Finally, once the data arrives it must be interpreted. Again, many times the fusion
analysts have no idea what they are looking at, and accuracy is degraded. When
44
confonted with this level of inquiry, the system bogs down. Requests go unfilled or are
processed and disseminated in an untimely fashion.
In the Gulf War much criticism was directed at intelligence for its inability
to provide tactical commanders intelligence that was available at higher, strategic
echelons. The focus of this criticism has often been directed at the dissemination
technologies employed at the time. (Campen, 1992) Nevertheless, the centralized
intelligence bureaucracy is not designed to provide tailored, maneuver warfare
intelligence to tactical commands. The task of processing hundreds of requests simply
overhwhelms the central intelligence cell. More recently, the Army confronted the same
information processing dilemma as they attempted to reconfigure their organizations to
adapt to the information age. That experience is worth describing here, for its lessons are
equally applicable to Marine intelligence.
In March of 1997, (Brooks, 1997) the Army conducted its first exercise in
a series of advanced warfighting experiments to determine the effects of information age
sensors on the modern battlefield. Called Force XXI, their goal was to push sensor data
to the lowest levels possible so that every soldier could have the same battlefield
awareness as headquarters. With precise enemy intelligence in the hands of the corporate
body, the experiment was to determine if battlefield intelligence dominance would
provide friendly forces with increased lethality, increased survivability, and greater
ability to control the tempo of battle. To accomplish this, a complex information
management system was configured to move this common picture around the battlefield.
However, while the latest information technologies were used to develop and build a state
of the art MIS, intelligence remained a vertical, centralized structure. Hundreds of
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analysts and operators, manning national, theater, and organic level assets fed an
unprecedented level of data into a central fusion cell. "Every battle began with a 90
percent or higher read on the enemy... down to the individual fighting position and
vehicle." (Brooks, 1997) Sensors tracked the enemy and every enemy position was
located. "The enemy could not use a radio without being intercepted and located with
precise coordinates." (Brooks, 1997)
As a result of this phenomenal intelligence, friendly forces were able to
win the first initial contacts of every battle. However, as the fury of contact increased
after initial contact, the intelligence picture began to slow. Within a very short time,
friendly forces lost the near perfect picture of the enemy. While the official analysis has
yet to be published, one senior intelligence officer speculated that "it had to do with the
ability of the Army to assimilate the capabilities we have now." (Brooks, 1997) Referring
to the centralized information processing scale, the reader can see that with a robust
intelligence architecture supported with modern MIS and sensor data, the system quickly
reached the prohibitive region. Once there, combat units are left on their own and are
forced to move quickly into the movement-to-contact, attrition era maneuver.
b. Overwhelmed by Information Age Intelligence
A second challenge to centralized intelligence is posed by the information
age data that are associated with modern 21st century sensors - data so detailed that its
introduction into the centralized intelligence organization overwhelms operators and
equipment alike. Indeed, the introduction of such technologies, rather than eliminating
friction and the fog of war, simply confuses operators because of the overabundance of
information.
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To understand this, consider the following: modern sensors provide
narrow bands of data that, shown graphically, contribute to the situational awareness of a
battlespace. To add meaning to the displays, analysts require multiple inputs from assets
to validate "hits." These hits are often represented in the form of white dots and can
represent many things besides actual enemy vehicles. However, white dots fused with an
understanding of the enemy and validated by other collection assets can contribute to a
highly accurate battlespace picture.
Again, this process is not trivial. Operators must have an appreciation of
what is on the battlefield. Whereas this is not a difficult thing for forward-deployed units
that live and fight on the battlefield to do, it is extremely difficult for a centralized
intelligence bureaucracy, where analysts are far removed from the battlefield and their
appreciation and understanding of the environment is greatly reduced. Therefore, white
dots may indicate T-72 tanks in the attack to a scope-centric operator, but may indicate
something entirely different to an intelligence professional who is fighting on a battlefield
cluttered with metallic debris. These complications are multiplied as an over tasked and
overwhelmed Fusion cell attempts to fill the intelligence demands of a multitude of
different users.
2. Flaws of Standardization
It took forty years for the Army to develop doctrinal templates on the Soviet and
North Korean armies. How do you develop a template against an adversary that cannot
be easily identified because it does not move in large formations or use large pieces of
military hardware? Applying standardized formulas to intelligence work will surely prove
unreliable against the new threats emerging in the next century.
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The following chapters show that networked and asymmetric adversaries seem do
not seem to require a set pattern. Without an encyclopedic data array that describes the
enemy in detail, modern intelligence practices will be greatly strained. Therefore without
prepared, in-depth knowledge of the cultural, political, economic, geographic and
military attributes ofNew Order Threats, formulaic analysis models like IPB will be
rendered irrelevant. Left without an analytic approach to understand these threats,
intelligence professionals will be severely challenged.
Furthermore, the context of military intelligence is not simple and stable; rather, it
is chaotic and turbulent. Intelligence work arising out of turbulent combat conditions
cannot be reduced to simple tasks, the processes cannot be made repetitive, and so
standardization is impossible. In the emerging environment, threats are increasingly less
centralized and regimented. Former Soviet and North Korean templates no longer
provide answers on how an enemy will fight. Indeed, emerging threats think on their
own, and they adapt quickly to American technology. To counter these smart adversaries
simple, formulaic intelligence processes will prove unreliable and even misleading.
An additional weakness in the area of standardization of task relates to the nature
of information technologies, which tend to lure operators into a sense of passivity and
complacency. Operators become monitor-centric, only reacting when the system picks
up targets. In this circumstance, there is a tendency to believe the technology and accept
whatever it indicates. If the system says there is nothing, there is nothing. However, the
nature ofNew Order Threats presents serious problems for system-centric approaches.
These threats will be less visible to sophisticated intelligence systems and will operate
across a highly disordered, dispersed, nonlinear battlefield. Intelligence professionals
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who are accustomed to operating where systems reveal everything, are unlikely to detect
New Order Threat operations. As a result enemy operations may go undetected and thus
harness tremendous battlefield advantage.
3. Flaws of Control
It is readily apparent that the context of military intelligence cannot be reduced to
an assembly line process where a few analysts at the top produce the corporate enemy
picture with little input from within the hierarchy. Intelligence must be the sum of the
total organizational understanding towards its environment. The many bureaucratic
control processes designed to reduce task uncertainty and conflict restrict formal and
informal communications within the hierarchy. This in turn isolates the top from the rich
knowledge that abounds at the lowest levels of the organization.
While control measures are well suited for tasks that are simple and routine,
intelligence work is neither of these things; it is complex and dynamic. When confronted
with a rapidly changing threat picture, control processes restrict organizational
adaptation. They block the individual and group innovation necessary for successful
adaptation. Instead of encouraging organization-wide discussion and analysis, the
bureaucracy handles such non-routine actions by formalizing them and bumping them up
the hierarchy where they often are diffused and even lost before they reach the top of the
structure.
The inability to adapt to a changing task is particularly evident when the
intelligence bureaucracy confronts New Order Threats. As discussed below, New Order
Threats quickly adapt to intelligence technology and analytical techniques. When they
do so, they change the entire calculus for threat analysis. Intelligence production must
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change and adapt to New Order Threat intelligence counters or they will operate without
detection. The following example is illustrative of this point.
In a recent exercise
7
,
intelligence dominance was quickly achieved over an
aggressive and unconventional enemy. Using an array of sophisticated sensors and a
team of analysts, friendly intelligence had a complete track on every enemy unit on the
battlefield. By day two, however, after approximately seven hours of combat, the enemy
began to maneuver differently on the battlefield. Where before, he would aggressively
move tanks and other vehicles around the battlespace in an effort to out-flank and gain
access to friendly rear areas, by day two his tactics changed. He maneuvered less. In
fact, unless uncovered by forward moving friendly forces, he would not move at all.
When he did maneuver he used densely vegetated approaches that had thick overhead
canopy. He avoided moving his forces in convoy, preferring instead single vehicle
deployments and operations. Finally, he relied more heavily on scouts and the light
infantry battle.
To the intelligence section glued to sensor outputs and compartmentalized from
forward fighting units, the battlefield appeared empty. Nothing moved. As a result, the
official read from headquarters was that the enemy was not on the battlefield, and an
enemy free picture was disseminated throughout the organization. However, what the
7
During September of 1997, the 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (minus, reinforced)
conducted exercises to support an advanced concept development managed by the ASCIET program at the
National Guard Training Center, Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The program's objective was to operationally
test the Grenadier Brat (tactical IFF system) in near combat conditions. To support the exercise a robust
intelligence capability was attached to the LAR battalion to determine if battlefield intelligence dominance
would provide friendly forces, (a LAV company), with increased lethality, increased survivability, and
greater ability to control the tempo of battle. The unit selected as the OPFOR — a platoon from the
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA was equipped with Former Soviet weapons (T-72, BRDM, BMP,
ZSU-23-4, etc) and operated using a mixture of classic Former Soviet centralized tactics and non-standard,
American tactics.
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compartmentalized bureaucracy did not understand was that the enemy had adapted.
After taking a beating from friendly maneuver and fire, the enemy learned that
unnecessary exposure to overhead sensors almost always resulted in assured destruction.
Therefore, the enemy began to operate in manner that exposed him less to these sensors
Unknown to higher headquarters, forward friendly units were engaging enemy forces
operating vehicles along unmarked and highly vegetated trails in the training area. Also,
as contact was gained with the enemy, single vehicle battle positions were uncovered,
well camouflaged and uniquely positioned to avoid detection from aerial sensors. In less
than seven hours the enemy had countered friendly intelligence and developed an
asymmetric battlefield response that left friendly maneuver units with no intelligence on
the enemy to their front. Forced to operate in the attritionist, movement-to-contact
paradigm, the company suffered its highest number of friendly casualties, seven vehicles
destroyed.
Because these asymmetric developments remained at the lower levels of the
hierarchy, restricted due to bureaucratic control measures, the top was unaware of their
development and therefore unable to quickly adapt. Eventually, the intelligence cell was
able to learn of the enemy counters, but only after detailed debriefs had been conducted.
Battlefield debriefs are formal communication devices that are conducted to capture
battlefield events. They flow up the hierarchy in a methodical manner and reach the top
where they are often ignored because an already overwhelmed intelligence staff does not
have time to read them.
In this exercise a robust intelligence staff supported one maneuver unit. It took
one day to process the battlefield debrief and organize a counter to the enemy's
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asymmetric innovation. In combat, an intelligence staff of equal size would support
dozens of different maneuver elements fighting across a varied battlespace. Limited to
formal communication and coordination measures in a tightly controlled bureaucracy,
recognizing, and then countering an enemy asymmetry would take much longer. Such
delay would afford the enemy significant battlefield advantage.
4. Flaws of Divisionalization
Marine intelligence and the wider intelligence community struggle with several
problems associated with the divisional configuration. First, the nature of the divisional
bureaucracy precludes lateral communications between divisions. This often creates
tunnel vision, causing workers to see only the task involved within the scope of their
division. As a result, work is often duplicated between divisions, wasting valuable
resources and time. This also prevents effective collaboration between experts found
within separate divisions. Therefore the stovepipe configuration tends to
compartmentalize valuable information, hiding it from the corporate body. Information
that could be useful for one division's operations is sealed within the confines of another
division. Only after the top processes it, is it circulated. By then, the information is often
outdated and useless.
A second reason stovepipe divisions are an inappropriate design is that they are ill
suited for the level of agility necessary to match New Order Threat operations, which
demand great organizational agility and flexibility. Stovepipe divisions must be able to
quickly identify enemy evolution and quickly adapt to it. However, within the divisional
form, information often is unavailable to the entire organization until it circulates to the
top. Divisions may be unaware of enemy evolution and fail to adapt. Friendly forces that
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are left operating with intelligence practices that have been countered by the enemy could
lead to disaster.
By its nature, the divisional form is a slow and tedious approach to intelligence
work. The duplication of work, the compartmentalization of valuable information, and
the barriers to lateral communication waste valuable resources and slow intelligence
production. In an era where military leaders demand information age intelligence to
conduct warfare by maneuver, intelligence must be quickly available.
D. SUMMARY
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the elements of the Marine intelligence
bureaucracy and the implications of remaining in the current configuration in the coming
century. This chapter has illustrated the fact that, by design, bureaucracies do not process
complex information fast. They operate best in simple and stable environments and have
trouble assessing phenomena that have not been previously understood and documented.






Challenges for Intelligence Implications
Centralized -Centers resources at the top of
intelligence hierarchy.
-Low level elements dependent on top
for intelligence.
-Top quickly overwhelmed




-Uses formulaic Cold War era
analysis.
-Designs intelligence as series of
simple processes configured to allow
standard output regardless of
operator.
-Relies on systems instead of people.





different kind of intelligence
work.
- New Order Threats more
difficult to track using
information age sensors
Control -Reduces intelligence into
hierarchical process where output is
slow and reflects the opinions of the
top.
-Mandates accuracy through control
process; output is slow and represents




-Process is slow and
hierarchical, not suited for
New Order Threat
environment.
-Process is unable to adapt to
asymmetries characterized by
New Order Threat operations.
Divisionalization -Limits informal communications,
creates tunnel vision and impedes
interdivisional collaboration
-Information often compartmentalized
in separate divisions, not available to
corporate body until circulated
through hierarchy.
-Slow and tedious approach to
intelligence.
-Process is slow and
hierarchical, not suited for
New Order Threat
environment.
- Less likely to adapt to
asymmetries characterized by
New Order Threat operations.
Table 3.1. Summary of the Marine Intelligence Bureaucracy
The standardized, information-processing approach to intelligence, characteristic
•> of the intelligence bureaucracy, reduces the complexities of analysis into rote, formulaic
processes that are limited to regimented, well-studied, conventional adversaries.
Divisionalization and strict reliance on formal communications compartmentalizes
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information, often hiding it from the corporate body. Duplication of effort is often the
result. Collaboration between divisions is limited, so analysis is often division centric.
This produces distorted analysis that is often unable to identify complex, evolving threats
The intelligence bureaucracy's demand for control restricts informal
communication within the hierarchy. Information that flows up the formal hierarchy is
massive and complex, and as a result much of it is cut and reduced to prevent overload.
Even when understanding a predictable enemy, central authority often becomes
overwhelmed and is therefore consumed in just understanding what is going on.
Consequently, valuable intelligence remains at the higher echelons of command and
usually never makes it down to tactical units.
When confronted with unpredictable New Order Threats that display non-linear
attributes, bureaucratic intelligence is completely outclassed and may not even detect,
much less identify and analyze them. Designed for an adversary that is predictable and
that can be broken down into pieces and understood with linear logic, the intelligence
bureaucracy is unable to apply its strengths of efficiency and formalization to threats that
are not easily understood.
Furthermore, maneuver warfare places overwhelming demands on the intelligence
bureaucracy. Proactive inquiry floods the central intelligence cell with demands for
information age intelligence, overloading the system and reducing its processing
capability still further. With all the tools for collecting intelligence at the top, lower
echelons are left without intelligence. As a result, tactical units do not receive
intelligence when they require it, forcing them into attritionist tactics.
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The weaknesses of the intelligence bureaucracy highlight a fundamental principle
of 21st century ground intelligence. Intellect is the cornerstone to successful ground
intelligence work. Perhaps in a previous age, when threats mirrored the Soviet model
and clung to regimented tactics, centralized processes and sophisticated sensors could
provide the answers. However, the coming chapters argue emerging threats are
increasingly less centralized and regimented. They think on their own, and they adapt
quickly.
To counter these smart adversaries, Marine intelligence will need to look vastly
different from the way it does now. It must be organized around and designed to enhance
the deployment of intellect. Information systems aid in the collection of information and
the delivery of intellect, but they are not intellect unto themselves. Intelligence
professionals must harness intellect by freely and proactively inquiring into the
battlespace and by receiving directly critical battlefield information in a timely fashion.
Attrition era intelligence practices and organization must be abandoned if intellect and its
deployment are to shape future Marine operations. In sum, Marine intelligence must be
designed to be an intellect-centric, knowledge based enterprise. Configured with the
right tools, organized around intellect and its deployment, Marine operations demand an
intelligence function that can support warfare by maneuver. After exploring in the next
few chapters the nature of emerging threats, this thesis will be in a position to describe
just how such an enterprise could be configured.
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IV. THE ASYMMETRIC MILITARY THREAT
A. THE CHANGING THREAT PICTURE
"What is the foremost future security threat facing the United States in the
twenty-first century?" Many intelligence estimates answer this question with the
following response: "conventional, cross border aggression." Two significant policy-
setting studies reinforce this view. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review describes
large-scale, cross border conventional threats as the leading challenge to the United
States, stating that "more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and
the means to challenge U.S. interests militarily between now and 2015." The National
Defense University's 1997 Threat Assessment adds that, "in the next decade, the highest
prospect for an intense military confrontation is the outbreak of conventional conflict
between regional powers." Other leading military and civilian positions reiterate these
forecasts.
1
However, in contradiction to such assessments, an analysis of the present day
environment reflects a far different reality. Cross border, conventional wars represent less
than 3% of the 37 different conflicts waged during the last seven years. Furthermore,
declines in world military spending, force strengths, and foreign weapon acquisitions also
shed serious doubt on this prediction. While the end of the Cold War may explain much
of this decline, the fact remains that major cross border, conventional conflict has become
' While most government and non-government threat assessments are now recognizing low intensity
conflict (LIC) as the predominant form of modern warfare much of their analysis is still tied to looking for
Cold War era cross border, conventional aggression. Please see the Heritage Foundation's "Restoring
American Leadership" (Holmes, 1996) Indeed the way the American armed forces is deployed and
currently configured clearly demonstrates that conventional-cross border conflict is considered the
predominant military threat facing this nation.
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increasingly less likely for several reasons. First, belligerent nations are reluctant to
confront each other militarily because the economic and political costs have simply
become too high. Additionally, the clear conventional superiority displayed by the
United States and the West during the Gulf War has seriously undermined the confidence
of potential aggressors to risk confronting American technology and firepower.
Within this context a new form of warfare may be emerging. Cognizant of
American conventional might, aggressive twenty-first century threats will most likely
avoid military operations that are vulnerable to American technology and tactics.
Instead, such threats may be developing new operational forms that seek to operate
beyond American military dominance. Those tactics may include the capability to
execute rapid, undetectable operations that achieve victory not limited to immediate
tactical success. Under a new asymmetric form of war, success may be measured in
terms of access andfavorable opinion across the political, social, and economic
spectrum.
Consequently, this chapter proposes that the application of asymmetry to counter
Western and American conventional power is central to this new style of war.. Shedding
monolithic, Cold War era conventions, these new asymmetric militaries will rely on lean,
agile forces equipped with fewer, high cost, high-technology weapons. The emergence
of these new militaries may be the first sign of an asymmetric response to American
conventional and technological dominance.
The importance of knowing one's enemy was recognized over 2500 years ago by
the Chinese general and author, Sun Tzu. He wrote, "If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." Applying Sun Tzu's
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philosophy to understand how future conventional enemies will contend with American
power offers valuable clues into what the battlefield of the future may look like.
Accordingly, this chapter presents data that suggests the framework for twenty-first
century inter-state warfare may assume new characteristics in avoidance of American
conventional war dominance. The movement towards asymmetric fighting is one of the
foremost characteristics of this transformation. Pushed to seek asymmetry to confront
American military power, the data reveal that several nations are redesigning and fielding
new forces that are likely to challenge American conventional power. Adopting leaner,
more agile formations and deploying decentralized, potently armed forces, these new
militaries may pose serious threats to future Marine Corps operations.
This chapter first defines the environment that is inhibiting conventional warfare
and compelling asymmetric innovation within non-western militaries. Data is presented
to illustrate probable asymmetry efforts in several nations. The chapter then describes the
nature of these doctrinal and technological counters to American power. After laying the
statistical groundwork to support this chapter's hypothesis regarding asymmetric military
transformation, a case study on the modern day transformation of China's military is
analyzed in light of this argument.
Noting the massive reforms the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing to
demonstrate China's military transition from a monolith to an increasingly more powerful
and agile force, this study identifies several asymmetric developments appearing within
China's vast military. To illustrate the nature and power of China's evolving asymmetric
military, an analysis of a Chinese attack on Taiwan will follow. Juxtaposed against the
modern Taiwanese and American militaries, the clear advantages of China's new,
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asymmetric military will underscore the changing nature of twenty-first century
conventional conflict.
B. FORCES COMPELLING AN ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE
The build-up of conventional weapons and forces, hallmark of the Cold War, is
no longer the pattern of the day for enemies seeking military advantage over Western
forces. In fact, a fairly straightforward review of recent events illustrates how major-
armed conflicts are inhibited by the very superiority of Western, especially American,
conventional forces.
Throughout the Gulf War, the United States demonstrated clear conventional war
dominance. The remarkable success of American technology and combat power
displayed during that war sent chilling signals to the world's great military powers. In
less than 100 hours of ground combat, it was clear to the world that twentieth century,
conventional warfare had been rendered virtually obsolete. Any nation that dares to
confront the West must fear invincible weapon systems, hailstorms of precision guided
munitions, and assured destruction of its military power. Additionally, recent events in
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea reveal that direct confrontation with the West also can result
in disastrous economic consequences. Whether physically blockaded or sanctioned by an
international coalition, economic ruin of the challenger is almost always inevitable.
Consequently, direct confrontation with the West has become an unappealing alternative
and a no win-situation.
The precedent in international relations, established after the Cold War, is to
aggressively contain major-armed conflicts. A formal, predictable sequence of globally
agreed upon activities are taken to bring disputes to resolution. First, heavy international
pressure is applied. Next, economic and military sanctions are levied. Where necessary,
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UN forces are deployed to separate the belligerents and to enforce no fire zones. Because
of the unified worldwide response, hostile military aggression is therefore a difficult and
costly pursuit. Beyond the international pressures, the additional potential for direct
American and Western military intervention and the associated cost factors increase the
risk of direct conventional conflict by orders of magnitude. These factors help explain
why major-armed conflict has declined as a means of settling disputes.
Nevertheless, international relations historically have been marked by military
conflict spurred on by nationalism and ideology. If the future resembles the past, then the
twenty-first century world environment will be no different in this respect. In fact, as a
growing number of nations, particularly in Asia, continue to expand economically, they
can be expected to become more aggressive as they seek to influence and control their
surrounding environment (MCIA, 1994, p. 2). Such nations may look to accomplish this
by using military power. It is likely, therefore, that nationalism and ideology will
continue to fuel future military actions and bring about direct military contact between
belligerent or rogue governments and the United States.
1. The Nature of Modern Day Conflict
While nationalism has sparked conventional, cross border aggression in the past
and may continue to do so in the next century, the recent past suggests an interesting
anomaly to this pattern: since the end of the Cold War, major-armed conflict2 has
declined by over a third (SIPRI, 1996). Out of an average of 35 conflicts, 97% were
intrastate. Only two were inter-state: the Gulf War (1991) and the India/Pakistan border
Major-Armed conflict as defined by SIPRI are conflicts that produce over 1000 casualties.
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disputes (1993-to present). Every intra-state conflict was low- intensity in nature. 3 The
reasons for conflict varied; however, for analysis they are divided into disputes over
government (G) or territory (T). On average, 53% were disputes over territory with sub-
state actors attempting to separate from a central government. The other 47% were
typically incumbent governments facing non-government opposition. (See Table 4. 1)
Region
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
G T G T G T G T G T G T G T
Africa 8 3 8 3 6 1 6 1 6 1 5 1
Asia 5 10 3 9 5 9 4 7 4 7 4 8
America 5 - 4 - ij - 3 - 3 - 3 -
Europe - 1 - 2 - 4 - 6 - 5 - 3
Middle East 1 4 2 5 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4
Total 19 18 17 19 16 17 15 18 15 17 14 16
Total 37 36 33 33 32 30 27
Table 4.1. Major-Armed Conflicts. After (SIPRI, 1996).
These numbers are significant and indicate a clear trend as humanity enters the
twenty-first century While conventional war accounts for less than three percent of the
total number of conflicts waged during the last seven years, low-intensity warfare has
now become the predominant form of armed conflict. Should this trend continue over
time, it would suggest a decreasing likelihood of major conventional war between nation-
states and an increasing likelihood of smaller, less defined LIC conflicts.
3
Low-intensity conflict (LIC) can be distinguished from conventional conflicts in some important respects
(Ware, 1990). 1) They result more from conditions of widespread socioeconomic and political unrest than
from issues of national sovereignty; they therefore manifest the revolutionary redefinition of the political
order and culture (Ware, 1990). Accordingly they may take on regional or global political and ideological
dimensions. As a consequence, they can occur in the transnational arena, that is, without political
boundaries. LIC protagonists oppose regimes that have established political and military institutions. LIC
protagonists do not have such power and seek to destroy it. 2) Finally LICs are protracted: the choice of
weapons, strategy, tactics and employment of forces is asymmetrical; and the insurgents disregard
conventional notions of warfighting. (Ware. 1990)
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Additionally, this data suggests that the world's powerful nation-states are
entering a period of interwar peace. Since the close of the Cold War an interim period of
relative inter-state peace and stability seems to have begun, threats are uncertain and
nations scramble to prepare for the next conflict. The present interwar period may have
begun roughly around the close of the Gulf War in 1991 . SIPRI's data clearly indicate
that, since that conflict, inter-state, major-armed conflict has nearly disappeared.
To many theorists, the current interwar period is not unlike the interregnum
between WWT and WWII (Millet, 1994). During that period, defense resources of the
great powers like the United States and Western Europe were limited but technological
advances and corresponding changes in operational concepts occurred steadily. That era
witnessed the development of carrier aviation, armored blitzkrieg, amphibious doctrine,
air defense, and strategic bombing - all innovations that proved to be pivotal forces in the
ensuing war. Simply stated, militaries that failed to innovate and harness the new
developments of the period were simply outclassed and quickly defeated by those who
had done so. The French, British, Norwegian, Polish, and Soviet army contacts with
German blitzkrieg tactics during the first part ofWWII are prime examples of this point.
(Van Riper, 1997)
A parallel entry into another interwar epoch may have commenced with the
West's victory over Communism. The West, with a proven and highly potent military
capability lead by U.S. military power, and with victory firmly in hand upon the close of
the Cold War, possesses clear military dominance. Accordingly, potential rival nations
may be using this period to reorganize and prepare for future confrontations. If this is the
case, the greatest concern is that these nations may use the sophisticated, expensive
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advances achieved by the West to quickly leap frog into new generations of technology.
Avoiding the prohibitive development costs of first generation interwar developments4
,
they may leverage the savings to develop the next generation of weapons and doctrines.
In the following section, changes in global military infrastructure are explored and found
to highlight potential "interwar" transformations now occurring in several non-western
militaries.
2. Global Military Downsizing
To investigate the recent changing nature of military forces, it is essential to first
determine how military spending, military force size, and foreign weapon acquisitions
have changed worldwide since 1985. 5 SIPRI and IISS data are the sources of information
presented in the following tables, with total world defense spending shown in table 4.2;




31% decline from 1985 to 1995
Table 4.2. Global Defense Expenditures, 1985, 1994, 1995
(US$m, CY95$). After (IISS, 1996).
1985 1995
27,131.9 22,533.2
17% decrease from 1985 to 1995
Table 4.3. Global Numbers in Armed Forces, 1985, 1995
(In millions). After (IISS, 1996).
The advances currently being exploited by the Revolution in Military Affairs are considered to be the first
generation of interwar developments. They include technologies like stealth, information and sensor
technologies, etc.





62% decrease from 1987 to 1995
Table 4.4. Global Numbers of International Arms Deliveries,
1987, 1995. After (IISS, 1996).
Much of the significance of this data can be explained by the world peace
"dividend" that occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union Three key points can
be extrapolated from these data. Each is important and cannot be explained solely by the
closure of the Cold War. First, there is a substantial and continuing decline in global
defense expenditures between 1985 and 1995 (31%). Much of this statistic is explained
by the downsizing following the Cold War. Nevertheless, underlying this world-wide
trend is a surge in the procurement of advanced weapons. According to IISS there has
been a major demand for advanced weapons since the Gulf War among many non-
western nations (IISS, 1997). This increased demand accounts for a larger and larger
share of global defense expenditures. This may indicate a global trend away from large
quantities of less sophisticated and cheaper platforms to fewer, more high-tech, expensive
ones. According to IISS, large-scale procurement of tanks and other conventional
weapons has been reduced in favor of fewer, more powerful, similar systems. 6 Second,
there is an equally significant and continuing decline in the size of these same armed
forces (17% decrease). Discharging the hordes of personnel required to man twentieth
century era conventional armies, many militaries are shedding excess labor and building
" An example of this is in the numbers of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and fighter aircraft being purchased
by many less developed nations (Egypt. Iran. Saudi Arabia, China. India. Pakistan. Taiwan, etc.) Many of
these nations are procuring fewer MBTs and fighter aircraft but are acquiring die best systems money can
buy (IISS, 1996). The most popular tanks on the international weapons market are die Abrams Ml tank and
the most advanced versions of the Former Soviet T-72 and T-80. The same is true for advanced fighters
(F-16 and MIG-29). The reasons for this revolve around economics and strategy These nations are making
concerted efforts at acquiring and maintaining modern twenty-first century forces. Accordingly. Uiey are
shedding attritionist mentalities (overwhelm adversary with hordes of men and material) and seeking
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smaller, highly professional forces. Finally, international arms deliveries have shrunk
significantly from 1987 to 1995 (62%). Consequently, the numbers of tanks, fighter
aircraft, and other warfighting equipment that usually constitute the international arms
exchange has declined significantly.
The big picture painted by these three declining aspects of armed forces across the
globe is that many nations appear to be transitioning from Cold War era militaries that
were equipment and labor intensive to new, twenty-first century militaries that are lighter
and require fewer men and material.
3. Non-Western Conventional Military Transformation
While the end of the Cold War explains much of the decline in world military
infrastructure, two additional trends serve to highlight the conclusions advanced
previously. First, a block of economically advancing nations is increasing defense
spending as a result of sustained rates of high economic growth. Second, this same block
of economically advancing nations is, for the most part, reducing the total size of and




















Iran Increasing Yes 2,340 2,460 (+5% 305 513 (+68%)
Egypt Increasing Yes 2,234 2,417 (+8% 445 436 (-2%)
India Increasing Yes 7,638 8,289 (+9% 1,260 1,145 (-9%)
China Increasing Yes 28,945 31,731 (+10% 3,900 2,930 (-25%)
Indonesia Increasing Yes 2,486 2,751 (+11% 278.1 274.5 (-1%)
Malaysia Increasing Yes 3,142 3,514 (+12% 110 114.5 (+4%)
Singapore Increasing Yes 3,118 3,970 (+27% 55.0 53.9 (-2%)
Taiwan Increasing Yes 11,457 13,136 (+15% 444 376 (-15%)
Table 4.5. Economically Advancing Nations and Military Transformation.
After (IISS, 1997).
advanced weapons and technology to adapt to information age warfighting that emerged from the Gulf
War. (IISS, 1997)
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These data provide small clues that help demonstrate how a number of nations
may have begun to equip and organize their militaries differently While precise
conclusions cannot be drawn without an in-depth analysis of the military reforms
occurring within these nations, the shedding of forces and the increasing expenditures on
defense reveal highly probable military transformations. Reducing force strength while
simultaneously increasing defense spending may indicate the incorporation of new
military technologies and doctrines.
Many of these militaries for whom data is shown were armed and trained by the
Former Soviet Union. As a result, Soviet doctrine and tactics predominated within these
establishments: they were highly centralized, regimented, mass armies. Their large
numbers of cheap, reliable tanks and artillery compensated for their lack of sophisticated
weaponry. These militaries were attrition style forces, designed to fight and win through
overwhelming superiority of numbers and equipment. Accordingly, they demanded large
quantities of personnel and equipment to function.
In contrast, the information presented here demonstrates a possible shift from
Soviet style organization to one of a possible new, as of yet undetermined typology.
What is certain is that these nations have cast off significant numbers of personnel and
are acquiring large quantities of Western, hi-technology weapon systems and equipment.
All these signals may indicate a gradual transformation from Soviet like formations to
more modern, agile ones.
C. THE POSSIBLE NATURE OF THE ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE
American conventional dominance can be structured into four broad categories.
First, it has the capability to project power across the globe. Second, once it has amassed
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its forces it can bring to bear overwhelming firepower. Third, it possesses state of the art
technology and weapon systems. Finally, it has powerful intelligence systems that can see
and identify significant military weapons and formations.
Each of these four categories presents serious challenges to potential adversaries.
However, what has propelled American military power to the forefront of military
dominance is its leading edge in what is currently being described as the Revolution in
Military Affairs. Central to the RMA and American dominance is the successful
development and incorporation of precision guided weapons, advanced sensors,
unmanned aerial observables, and sophisticated information systems. Successfully used
together in the Gulf War and improved upon in the seven years since, these are the
technologies and operational concepts that provide the clear conventional dominance the
American military presently enjoys.
However, military history is replete with examples of adaptation. For every
innovative development there often follows a more powerful response or counter.
Bronze and iron as offensive instruments of war replaced stone weapons. The chaotic
tactics of the German hordes overwhelmed the Roman legion. The organized armies of
Europe were transformed by weaponry like the cannon, cartridge, machinegun, poisonous
gas, barbed wire, the tank, and the airplane. The great defensive tactics and barriers that
developed during World War I were rendered irrelevant by German blitzkrieg tactics of
WWII. The aircraft carrier replaced the battleship. Equally likely are future military
developments that will counter present day American conventional dominance.
American conventional dominance presents potential adversaries with strong
incentives to pursue asymmetric warfare to assure military success, to minimize losses,
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and to protect vital economies. To operate successfully against American conventional
dominance, future aggressor nations may frame military operations to operate outside of
American conventional strengths. To counter high-technology sensors, precision
weapons, or maneuver warfare, future aggressors may embrace new military practices
which incorporate rapid high speed offensives, strong defenses to deter conventional
response, undetectable forces and the enlistment of emerging, non-conventional threats7
to support conventional actions.
Identifying possible counters to American conventional dominance such as these
is important, as it provides key insights into how future adversaries may engage
American military forces (See Table 4.6). Several potential areas where asymmetric
responses are likely to emerge include counters to the very four factors that currently
account for U.S. superiority: precision weaponry, maneuver warfare, advanced sensors,
sophisticated information processing, and conventional dominance. (Stavridis, 1997)
7































Table 4.6. Asymmetric Conventional Responses. After (Stavridis, 1997).
1. Precision Guided Weapons
An enemy confronted with precision weaponry would design a defensive strategy
to ensure the survivability of its forces. The fundamental tenet of an effective defensive
strategy is to avoid detection: what cannot be seen cannot be targeted, and what
potentially can be seen must be hardened Hence, defensive techniques would include
the construction of hardened, underground sites to protect critical command and control
nodes. The dispersing of military assets throughout a region to complicate collection and
targeting would be another fundamental tactic. Examples would include the deployment
of assets within urban areas and no-fire areas such as hospitals, schools, and other civilian
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sectors. Such actions would also present targeting and collection difficulties. The key to
countering precision weaponry is confusing American intelligence through rapid
mobility and the use of deception and camouflage. (Stavridis, 1997)
As an example of such asymmetric responses to precision guided weapons,
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War effectively protected and employed his SCUD
launchers by using rapid mobility, simple camouflage, and decentralized tactics.
Hussein's SCUD threat was one of the primary intelligence and targeting priorities of the
war. The effort to locate Hussein's SCUD systems consumed precious overflight time of
billion-dollar intelligence and required the attention of special forces commandos. In the
end Schwarzkof s CENTCOM staff was unable to ever find more than a handful of these
dreaded terrorist missiles that rained on both Israel and Coalition forces. The Coalition's
inability to target and knock out Hussein's SCUDS gives testimony to the extreme
effectiveness of simple techniques in foiling precision systems.
In the future, techniques such as mobility, dispersion, and decentralization
coupled with new evolving technologies will place even greater demands on collection
and targeting efforts. Current developments like stealth and other new deception
technologies will proliferate as they become cheaper and more accessible. The
deployment of these asymmetric responses to American military dominance can be
expected within a few short years, and their successful incorporation will significantly
enhance the effort to counter precision weaponry. (Stavridis, 1997)
2. Maneuver Warfare
Maneuver warfare is one of the central organizing tenets of the Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) (Stavridis, 1997). It was developed during World War II within
the German Army and is now the doctrinal warfighting concept of the United States
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Marine Corps. Maneuver warfare treats the enemy as a system of interrelated parts
working together to achieve a particular mission. It focuses on the destruction of the
operating dynamic of the system rather than the destruction of all its component parts.
Fundamental to this concept is that attacking the operating dynamic will cause the system
to collapse and cease to exist as a cohesive entity. It is at this point when the enemy is
presented with a rapidly deteriorating situation it can not understand or react to that the
enemy is outmaneuvered and defeated. A counter to maneuver warfare may exist within
its very nature as a rapid, offensive oriented operational style. Called "responsive
maneuver" it combines static defenses with rapid counterattacks that attempt to outflank,
isolate, encircle and then destroy decentralized maneuvering units (Stavridis, 1997).
New, fast moving armored vehicles combined with smart, precision guided missiles may
provide the equipment necessary to conduct such operations. (Stavridis, 1997)
3. Advanced Sensors
The sophisticated array of modern sensors that are designed to identify
movement, communications emissions, and other critical intelligence present potential
adversaries with a formidable operational problem. Innovations of the American RMA
allow for near real time sensor to shooter capabilities. Hence what can be seen can be
destroyed. To avoid detection future enemies will move their operations from terrain that
can be easily surveyed by collection platforms to cluttered areas where identification and
tracking is nearly impossible {dispersing, burying, multiplying). Such areas include
urban environments, jungles, forests, mountainous areas etc. In addition an enemy might
use anti-satellite systems, dazzlers or lasers against optics and powerful jamming and anti
jamming technologies (blinding). Another technique is to overwhelm sensors with
clutter or other devices to prevent accurate assessment (confusing). Deception and the
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use of stealth and other rapidly advancing technologies may also be employed to prevent
effective intelligence collection. (Stavridis, 1997)
4. Sophisticated Information Systems
The ability to fuse information from the myriad of intelligence platforms and
widely dispersed friendly units is another hallmark of the American RMA. At no other
time in history have systems been developed that allow for a complete picture of friendly
and enemy positions to be displayed in near real time. This common operational picture,
when perfected early in the next century, will provide American military forces an
unprecedented advantage on the battlefield.
Countering this capability may take several forms. First, an enemy may learn to
trick the system by overwhelming or underwhelming it. Advanced information
technologies tend to lure operators into a sense of confidence. Operators come to expect
that the system will provide them the only "true" picture of what is happening. Thus,
when white dots on a computer monitor are not present, there is nothing to worry about:
there is no enemy. When successfully spoofed, information technologies and their
associated sensors do not inform decision-makers with critical intelligence; rather, they
lull them into a sense of over-confidence. Attacking the information system is another
counter. Whether an enemy deliberately targets critical command and control nodes,
jams essential communication channels, or employs effective information warfare tactics
against C2 nodes, the disruption for any length of time could be disastrous. American
tactics rely on coordinated fire support, intelligence and logistic support. These agencies
are often not co-located with the warfighter, and disruption of information could
dangerously expose deployed tactical units to enemy actions.
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5. Conventional Dominance
American and Western forces can bring to bear tremendous combat power to
every corner of the globe within a relatively short period of time. Employing precision
weaponry, maneuver warfare, advanced sensors, and sophisticated information systems,
well-trained, highly professional service members possess significant battlefield
advantages over other conventional militaries. To operate successfully against American
conventional power, future enemies may look to new technologies and tactics that exploit
American weaknesses. One concern is that future adversaries may seek new equipment
and doctrines that generate rapid, high-speed operations. Used effectively, a potential
enemy could launch an attack and secure objectives well before an effective military
response could be initiated. Another concern is the potential use of cheap, crude missiles
and mines. The enemy's massing of low cost but highly accurate cruise missiles against
targets could pose serious problems for deployed American forces. Even Aegis, Patriot
and Star Wars anti-missile systems could be quickly depleted of anti-missile weapons if
faced with a massive missile attack. Equally problematic are mines. Saddam Hussein
effectively denied an amphibious assault from the sea because of the massive flooding of
mines in the littoral region surrounding Kuwait and Iraq. Mines are a significant
challenge and while they can be removed, the process is time consuming.
Another counter to conventional dominance is the potential use ofweapons of
mass destruction (WMD). Such devices may range from low yield tactical devices to
highly advanced chemical and biological weapons. Their employment must not be
assumed to be constrained because of American nuclear weaponry. Indeed, as WMD
technologies improve, it is possible that their employment may not even be recognized
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until their full effects have been unleashed. Worse, identifying who employed the device
may be difficult, as third party terrorists may be used to insert and detonate such devices
Until accurate identification can be determined, reciprocity is confused. Once
identification is ascertained, the world community may impose serious constraints on
how reciprocity will be inflicted.
Other counters include those that go beyond what can be imagined presently.
Such discoveries and innovations that could completely change the way war is fought and
won are the most dangerous. These types of development are not impossible. The
accelerated advances in electronics, computing, and other high-technology areas within
the last few decades indicate more than ever that the twenty-first century promises to be
an age where technology and operational concepts will transform much faster than any
other time in history. Areas such as non-linear dynamics and chaos and complexity may
be understood and employed successfully in war. Rapid incorporation and successful
employment of new paradigms and technologies could provide future adversaries
dominance out of proportion to their political, economic, and military strength.
(Stavridis, 1997)
D. CHINESE PLA CASE STUDY
The ongoing transformation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a
perfect example of the nature of non-Western asymmetric military response to Western
conventional military dominance. The PLA military transformation highlights two
asymmetric developments designed to enhance successful power projection. First,
recognizing the vulnerability of massed troops and equipment to Western intelligence
collection and targeting, a reorganization of sectors of the army has begun With a focus
on power projection and survivability, China is transforming its army from large Soviet
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style formations to smaller airborne and marine forces.
8
Second, recognizing its inability
to outperform Western air power, China has invested in a low tech, inexpensive
asymmetric response: the missile. (SIPRI, 1995, pp. 359-389)
Let's begin with a discussion of China's move to enhance power projection. In
1984 the Deng Administration officially recognized that China had no major peer threat
and that major war was not likely for the foreseeable future (at least 50 years); (SIPRI,
1995, p. 362). As a result of this assessment, the Chinese military underwent a series of
major cuts. In ten years, total forces were reduced by one million, spending as a percent
ofGDP was cut from 10% to 7.5%, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was
reorganized and downsized, and thousands of facilities were turned over to the civilian
sector. The political leadership in China changed the national priority from the military
to the economy, stating that a modern military would arise out of economic success in the
industrial sector.
At the same time (1984-1994) China entered a new phase as a military power in
Asia. Shifting its focus from deterrence of foreign aggression to power projection, China
began to build a military that could provide a credible presence throughout the region. It
used the downsizing to realign and transition its military to fit with this new mission.
Two crisis areas serve to further motivate Chinese movement into power projection. First
is the conflict over the oil rich region known as the Spratley Islands. China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and Malaysia all have claims in this region. Significant to China is that the
Spratley Islands are estimated to possess 2 trillion dollars worth of oil reserves. As China
Information regarding the PLA's transformation of its Army and specifically its airborne and marine corps
units can be found in SIPRI's 1995 Yearbook. Several FBIS articles also contributed including "Chinese
Armed Forces Increase Sea-Crossing Offensive Capabilities", Wide Angle, 16 July 1997, by Liu Hsiao-
chun.
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faces increasing energy challenges in the 21st century due to its modernization efforts,
the Spratley Islands are seen as critical to the continued growth of the Chinese economy
The second crisis area is the dispute over Taiwan. China has unequivocally stated that it
will use force if Taiwan declares independence, develops nuclear weapons, slides into
chaos, or forms military alliances. China has seemed content, in the past, at the pace of
talks with Taiwan and the progress thus far made. However, recent incidents like the
election of the nation's first democratic President and the strong overtures at declaring
independence have lead to serious confrontations.
These two crises have served to crystallize power projection as the predominant
military mission for the Chinese armed forces. As recently as 1990 major military
realignments have occurred that further demonstrate China's dedication to this mission.
The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLA) has deployed its forces on China's
eastern and southern coasts. At the same time, PLA is consciously moving from "a
posture appropriate for coastal defense to one of sea control over the extent of its
territorial claims and Exclusive Economic Zone" (SIPRI, 1995, p. 380). Other
indications like the expansion of paratroop capabilities and marine infantry in the PLA
serve to further support the evidence for this apparent military restructuring.
Another aspect of China's military transformation involves the attempt to develop
and produce advanced weapon systems like the Su-27 fighter aircraft. It is uncertain
whether they are capable of leaping from second generation aircraft to advanced fourth
generation aircraft so easily. Though past experience clearly demonstrates that acquiring
and producing advanced active control (fly by wire) aircraft was beyond their
technological capability, China has not given up. China's careful approach to defense
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modernization may enable it to bypass an entire generation of development, rapidly
incorporating new technologies and doctrines 20 years from now just as their economy
mushrooms. (Pillsbury, 1993)
Apart from the restructuring effort aimed at power projection, China seems to be
dedicating the majority of its resources to missile development. Aware that it is
incapable of deploying high performance aircraft to counter Western air forces, the MND
appears to be developing highly accurate missiles as an asymmetric response. Chinese
missile designers reportedly use the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) for pre-launch
and mid course correction. Missiles of this variety were launched into the China Sea
during the Taiwan confrontation in early 1996. The great advantage to such weapons is
that no nation in the world possesses a system that can adequately destroy incoming
missiles. The Patriot counter missile system is probably the best such system in the
world, yet it only has an estimated 20% kill ratio. Inexpensive and easy to produce,
China could mass hundreds of such missiles against a land or sea target and no known
platform, space or ground, could counter it.
By strategically placing hundreds of missile batteries along its coast, China could
deny American naval forces entry into the region. Unable to deploy from aircraft carriers
and with few air bases in the region American airforces would be hard pressed to
generate enough sorties to neutralize the missile threat.
Missile development and the restructuring of the PLA represent two possible
asymmetric responses to American conventional dominance. The following scenario
demonstrates how these two asymmetric developments may be employed to foil World
and American intervention and guarantee Chinese military and political victory.
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E. PLA ATTACK ON TAIWAN
To illustrate the potential effectiveness of China's asymmetric developments
against conventional American military forces, this section speculates about a
hypothetical PLA attack on Taiwan.
The major obstacles currently deterring a PLA attack against Taiwan are the
Taiwanese army and the American lead reactionary force that would shortly follow any
Chinese military attack. Similar to the reactionary force deployed during the Taiwan
crises in 1996, an American task force could include two full carrier battle groups with
thousands of marines and several hundred fighter aircraft. Chinese military leaders have
expressed considerable concern about the technologies used by the US against Iraq, as
well as anxiety over the poor performance of their own technologies and similar Soviet
equipment in the hands of the Iraqis. Consequently, a Chinese attack against Taiwan
would be designed to avoid direct American military confrontation.
An American military response revolves around power projection, the massing of
overwhelming firepower, state of the art weapon systems, and powerful intelligence
platforms that give indications and warnings to alert and frame military action and
strategy.
To militarily overwhelm Taiwan, the PLA would need to execute a lightning fast
assault that would neutralize the Taiwanese military and secure the island before an
American Task Force could respond. Once Taiwan is successfully in Chinese hands, any
American military response would be severely constrained because of the likelihood of
precipitating a nuclear exchange. Thus, a successful Chinese attack would need to meet
these three requirements: immediately destroy the Taiwanese military, quickly secure the
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island, and deploy a missile engagement ring around the region to prevent American or
other forces from responding.
Each of these tasks involves significant asymmetric transformations in military
technology and doctrine, demanding avoidance of the enemy's strengths and exploitation
of his vulnerabilities. In this case the PLA generates two distinct military responses to
Western conventional dominance: a reliance on missiles and the development of light,
highly mobile shock troops. Both these developments operate outside Western
conventional dominance. They are unique developments that have no effective western
peer. By deploying missiles, the PLA exploits a significant Western defensive
vulnerability. Unable to provide a suitable defense, American forces would be forced to
operate outside the missiles effective range. Furthermore, missiles are easy to conceal
and difficult to track; they are perfect weapons of surprise. Taiwanese forces, unaware of
Chinese missile power, could be overwhelmed and annihilated by a surprise missile
attack. Light, highly mobile shock troops are also easy to conceal and are perfect
surprise forces. Highly trained and operating under the element of surprise, they could
overwhelm a sleeping conventional force unprepared for an attack.
Using these asymmetric forces together, the PLA would destroy the Taiwanese
military, secure the island, and prevent an American military response. A possible
scenario might play out in this way:
China launches an attack on major Taiwanese airfields, military sites, and other
significant facilities
9
using precision missiles. Simultaneously several paratroop brigades
are airlifted and dropped on Taiwan with the mission of destroying all remaining
Taiwan only has one major port its destruction in an initial attack would seriously impede rapid force
closure from American forces stationed in Japan.
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Taiwanese military forces. Within 24 hours, Taiwan could be in PLA hands. Caught by
surprise, America would not have time to put adequate forces in theater Assuming a 96
hour response time, American forces would move into the theater of operations just when
Chinese forces were putting the final touches on fully incorporating Taiwan into the PRC
American conventional forces would be powerless to prevent such a takeover and
even less capable of deploying enough forces to retake the island Given the fact that
China has nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile capability, it can be assumed that their
use would be threatened if an effort were made to retake Taiwan. American and world
response would be limited to international outcry and potential economic sanctions.
However, because of the negative effect this would have on the world economy, it is
doubtful that sanctions would be long lasting. 10
F. SUMMARY
This case study demonstrates how a lesser conventional power could and may
transform and seek asymmetric operations to confront and out maneuver American
conventional dominance. Using asymmetry as a fighting principle, nations such as China,
Iran, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Russia, and others are transforming their militaries and
acquiring powerful capabilities. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons underscores this. 11 The increasing number of transfers of advanced
10 The dive in the stock market during the first weeks in November of 1997 demonstrate how moderate
instability in Asian markets can have significant effects on the U.S. and World economies. A major
confrontation with China would create orders of magnitude greater chaos.
n
Dr. David Kay. formerly chiefUNSCOM inspector in Iraq and now with SAIC. recently gave a talk on
new threats to U.S. security at the National Defense University early in 1997. His comments centered on
proliferation issues. Some facts he highlighted included: 1) General Anatol Kuznechev. the senior Russian
official who was head of the latest nerve gas program, was incarcerated for over a year for smuggling nerve
gas technology to the Syrians He was instrumental in helping the Syrians establish a never gas program.
2) A Korean native was arrested in Japan in April of 1 996 for shipping sarin precursor to North Korea.
Police reported that this had been a long-running operation, and there was a substantial amount, perhaps in
the tons, that had been previously shipped. 3) Early in 1997 a Russian official admitted that in November
of 1993 two drunken Russian workers managed to steal two complete Russian tactical nukes from a factory
technologies like inertial and GPS navigation systems, computer information systems,
and satellite surveillance systems also highlights this point. Furthermore, as demonstrated
by the PLA example, other non-Western militaries may also be realigning their
conventional forces to operate successfully against the high-technology, conventional
superiority of twenty-first century Western forces. Shedding highly regimented,
centralized organizations and pursuing leaner more agile force structures, these militaries
will seek to get inside Western decision cycles, enabling significant advantage over them.
Using asymmetric options like missile technology and light, rapid deployment
forces, these asymmetric conventional adversaries severely challenge the capabilities of
the bureaucratic Marine ground intelligence enterprise. Asymmetric military threats out
think and out maneuver an enterprise designed to accommodate simple and predictable
adversaries. Unable to track and monitor their actions because they are hard to identify
and understand, intelligence is placed in a quandary and left unable to understand threat
actions. Left undetected or misunderstood these threats exercise powerful battlefield
advantages that afford them great operational capabilities. These powerful military
threats will exploit these battlefield advantages and seek to defeat Marine forces
asymmetrically. Once engaged in conflict, asymmetric tactics may focus on producing
casualties and destroying equipment. In an age where US casualties are unacceptable,
future asymmetric conventional adversaries will have many advantages.
in the Urals. The warheads were later captured and returned. 4) A Soviet submarine launched guided
missile and ERSHA navigation sets were found in Iraq three years after the Gulf War by international
inspectors. Of very late Soviet design, the equipment had inertial navigation technology that was capable
of being reversed engineered and applied to Iraqi WMD delivery platforms. 5) Recent media reporting
have highlighted the role of China as a major smuggler ofWMD and advanced technologies to rogue
nations like Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Most agree that any advanced technology entering China is
quickly redistributed to anywhere in the world willing to pay for it.
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The next chapter presents an analysis of another powerful New Order Threat that
promises to present grave challenges to Marine operating forces and render Marine
ground intelligence practices increasingly less effective and relevant. Called emerging,
non-conventional threats, these threats, like asymmetric military threats, also harness
asymmetry to overcome American conventional dominance. They are quick to adapt,
difficult to detect and nearly impossible to destroy through conventional means Again
because of their unique nature, Marine ground intelligence practices are severely
challenged when confronted with these threat actors.
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V. EMERGING NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS
A. IS HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF?
Centuries ago, criminal bands organized to control society's political and
economic systems. Led by the most ruthless of individuals, these bands flourished and
dominated the Medieval Ages and many other periods of recorded human history. Often
outnumbered and technologically inferior to the civilizations they preyed upon, these
gangs or hordes had miniscule resources and were forced to innovate or face defeat
Catalyzed by their inability to face the Roman Legion or Medieval Knight on equal
terms, they evolved and crafted new forms of warmaking. With little more than the skins
on their backs and simple weapons, these warlords and bandits devised tactics that
focused on exploiting the weaknesses of their enemy, allowing them significant strategic
advantage in spite of their rudimentary, low technology weapons.
The opposite tack was taken by "civilized" forces. Certain in their belief that they
could defeat any potential adversary, particularly the rabble of German hordes or
marauding criminals, modern militaries were slow to adapt to the new warfare of their
challengers. Rome fought a protracted war with the innumerable German hordes using
tactics that had long been rendered obsolete. The battlefield that the hordes brought to
history was too chaotic, bloody, and thoroughly disorganized for the traditional Roman
Legion. The Knights of the medieval period faced similar extinction because of an
inability to adapt to the new threat of their time. Encumbered by expensive, heavy armor,
the knights (high tech for their time) faced a quick demise when the rabble of warring
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gangs innovated and developed low technology infantry to stop the horse and bludgeon
the Knight with sticks and stones.
History may be repeating itself. Many of the "new" threat forms emerging from
the chaos of the Cold War are employing these centuries old tactics and principles to
great advantage against the conventional military powers of our time. Though now
equipped with modern weapons and hard-earned insights into conventional military
vulnerability, this emerging class of non-conventional threats displays characteristics
similar to those of ancient and medieval era warfare and may be undergoing
transformations in response to American conventional and technological dominance.
The goal of this chapter is to define and highlight the emergence of this new breed
of threat as well as to articulate the severe challenges they present to Marine ground
intelligence. Accordingly, after an overview of this new class of threats, this chapter
traces their early evolution and describes their nature, unique typologies, and powerful
ability to adapt to their environment. Termed low intensity or non-conventional, these
threats are shown to resemble traditional Cold War era, low intensity conflict (LIC) with
the added features of guerrilla warfare. Having their origins in the developing world,
these threats will be shown to be operating now in modern societies.
Once the foundation for understanding emerging, non-conventional threats has
been laid, this chapter explores and reviews cases ofhow society's response to these
threats drives them into new designs and tactics. An analysis of the strategies being used
by these threat organizations to adapt and shift their focus from the defeat of modern
militaries to the defeat of the political, economic, and social will of the nation-state is
presented. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the evolution to network design,
86
leaving no doubt that these threats are powerful and present great challenges to Marine
ground intelligence practices and design.
B. EVIDENCE OF GLOBAL INSTABILITY
As the United States enters the next millenium, it faces an uncertain world
environment. Now more than ever, the power and number of potential threats cannot be
easily predicted or classified. It is in this environment that the United States will most
likely face two major threats: asymmetric military threats and emerging, non-
conventional threats.
Previously in Chapter IV, global military trends data were used to illustrate how
lesser conventional powers could and may transform to seek asymmetric advantage to
counter American conventional dominance. The analysis in that chapter highlighted
several potential areas where asymmetric transformations could evolve to counter
American precision weaponry, maneuver warfare, advanced sensors, sophisticated
information processing, and conventional dominance.
Additionally, figures for recent conflicts (SEPRI and IISS data) were used to
demonstrate that there has been a steady decline in the number of major-armed conflicts 1
since the end of the Cold War. That data clearly indicated that cross border, conventional
war has fallen to its lowest level in modern history, while intra-state, low intensity
warfare has risen to become the predominant form of war.
Given the declining number of major armed conflicts, it would be expected that
world order, overall, would have experienced a period of stabilization. On the contrary,
1 As defined by SIPRI and IISS data, Major Armed Conflicts are those in which the number of victims is
greater than 1000. Please see SIPRI data presented in Chap. 4. Major Armed Conflict represents both inter
and intra state conflict.
2
Represents less than 3% of total armed conflicts.
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several key indicators reveal that the reduction in major-armed conflicts has not been
accompanied by a corresponding decrease in worldwide chaos and disorder.
To track the degree of global internal civil conflict and strife, let us analyze
refugee and internal displacement statistics (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Internal
displacement is a direct reflection of the impact of wars and civil strife on civilians within
a nation; the effects of natural disasters do not contribute to its numbers. Refugee data,
unlike internal displacement data, does not solely measure the impact of wars and civil
strife; it represents the numbers of people fleeing their towns and villages in any
emergency situation. 3 Including the refugee statistic as an indicator of internal disorder
is valid here for two reasons: it highlights the chaos caused by natural and unnatural
events, and it may indicate that the environment is ripe for or already plagued by non-
conventional threat exploitation.
A review of the data for migrations of refugees fleeing internal conflict and for
internally displaced people shows that these figures have not declined significantly over
the period from 1990-1995, and have even in a few cases risen. In broad terms, large
numbers of refugees fleeing a nation's border, or large numbers of internally displaced
people, can be assumed to indicate varying degrees of regional chaos and disorder. As the
number of worldwide major-armed conflicts decline, it would be expected that both these
statistics would also decrease by some order of magnitude. Yet, over this period (1990-
1995) internal displacement declined by only 1% and refugee numbers by 8%. This small
decline does not match the 30% decrease in major-armed conflict over this same period.
Natural disasters such as earthquakes, high winds, flooding, etc., contribute significantly to refugee
statistics Despite this, the refugee statistic is a valid indicator of internal disorder. Natural disasters are
often the catalyst for non-conventional threat operations. Witness Somalia. Ethiopia and other Western
African nations.
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In fact, the numbers of internally displaced people rose dramatically from 1990 through
1994 and has only recently declined Given the reduced conflict, it is reasonable to expect
a much greater decline in world chaos as reflected by these two indicators.
REGION 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Africa 5,451.150 4,531,950 4,650,342 6,119,800 5,879,700 5,222,300
Europe 737,600 675,200 3,157,500 2,858,900 2,421,500 2,520,700
Latin
America
171,950 131,500 109,700 101,650 297,300 256,400
East Asia
and Pacific
600,100 974,700 684,700 487,600 444,100 452,850
Middle East 5,698,600 6,850,700 6,370,850 4,825,900 5,447,750 5,449.100
South and
Central Asia
4.098,600 4,061.050 2,341.700 2,151,400 1.776.450 1,386.300
World
Total
16,758,000 17.225,150 17,314.792 16,545,250 16.266,800 15,337.650
Table 5.1. World Refugee Migrations by Region. After (IFRC, 1995, 1997).
REGION 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Africa 13,504,000 14,722,000 17,395,000 16.890,000 15,730,000 10.185,000
America 1,126,000 1,471,000 1,304,000 1,700,000 1,400,000 1.280.000
Asia 4,325,000 4,865,000 4,009,000 3,545,000 2,388,000 2.155.000
Europe 268,000 825,000 1,596,000 2,765.000 5,195.000 5.080.000
Middle
East
1,290,000 1,480,000 830,000 1,960,000 1.710,000 1.700.000
World
Totals
20,513,000 23,363,000 25,134,000 26,860.000 26,423,000 20.400,000
Table 5.2. Internally Displaced People by Region. After (IFRC, 1995, 1997).
An important point surfaces when internal displacement data is analyzed in
conjunction with SIPRI major-armed conflict data. What is evident in the summary chart
below (see Table 5.3) is that the number of countries experiencing internal displacement
far surpasses the countries experiencing major-armed conflict. In fact, there are twice as
many nations experiencing internal displacement problems as there are facing major-
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armed conflict. 4 Equally revealing is the comparison between major-armed conflict and
refugee data. It is apparent from this analysis that the number of countries experiencing
movement of refugee populations outnumbers those experiencing major-armed conflict
by nearly three to one. 5 Such information is enlightening as it reflects to some degree the
potential for LIC involvement in internal disorder and chaos in many nations.
Nature of Instability Number of Nations Affected
Major-Armed Conflict 25
Internal Displacement 46
Cross-Border Refugee Problems 66
Table 5.3. Comparison of Major-Armed Conflict with Chaos Indicators.
The data presented here highlight a paradox that is beginning to define the
twenty-first century threat environment: major-armed conflict may no longer be the
predominant cause of regional chaos and disorder. What then is creating the unexplained
levels of instability if major-armed conflict is not the primary cause7
For a possible answer to this question, let us now turn our attention to a new breed
of destabilizing and chaos-producing, non-conventional threats that are appearing
throughout the world. These new threats, left unchecked because they are confused with
police work, may be the direct cause of the high level of instability and disorder evident
in many parts of the world. These threats may increase in magnitude if nations fail to
recognize them for what they represent: a non-conventional enemy that leverages
inherent asymmetries to gain influence that is out of proportion to its political, economic,
and military strength. Traditional analysis is likely to fail to recognize these patterns of
new and powerful emerging threats. As a result, appropriate responses may be delayed
1
Please refer to appendix I for breakout.
~ Please refer to appendix I for breakout
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Left unchecked, the destabilizing effects of these threats could spread, potentially causing
the collapse of nations and altering the balance of power throughout the globe. This
chapter expands on the concept of asymmetry introduced earlier and advances the thesis
that a transformation appears to be taking place that has begun to alter the entire calculus
of non-conventional warfare.
C. MODERN ERA, NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS
1. Overview
While emerging, non-conventional threats are difficult to categorize, they share
one readily identifiable characteristic: they break down the order and legitimacy of the
state by discrediting its ability to protect and defend its citizens. Once this basic
responsibility has been maligned, the state loses relevance and its future is short lived. It
is through the resulting chaos that new order threats discredit modern society and
overwhelm its infrastructure.
New order threats comprise not a few, simple organizations but hundreds to
thousands of different organizations that span a continuum from simple to complex. They
are continually evolving so that tracking, measurement and analysis will prove difficult.
Modern convention, still predominately tied to Cold War analytic technique, describes
the Third World variants of these threats as guerrillas, rebels, human rights violators,
warlords, kidnappers, smugglers, etc. The variants appearing in the developed world
carry other names such as hackers, gangs, criminals, terrorists, or police work. (Bunker,
1997)
The transformation of the new threat into the modern age is mirroring modern
society's economic and technological evolution. Like today's business entrepreneurs, the
threats quickly adapt to the market place and find niches where they can succeed. They
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use the free, open marketplace to maneuver and democratic institutions as shields. Most
significantly, these threats are learning to operate effectively across a new battlespace:
the political, economic and mass media battlefield. Not unlike the battlefields from
which these threats sprang, the new battlefield is as chaotic and disorderly as the jungles
ofNicaragua and the mountain terrain of Afghanistan.
Bypassing military and other security organizations, the new threat lives within
the social, economic, and political arena of the enemy's homeland, exploiting its
weaknesses and using them to strategic advantage. Not unlike modern corporations, they
too must turn a profit. Uniquely positioned to exploit the new battlefield, profit making
can be instituted in multiple ways, ranging from conventional terrorist strikes and
guerrilla attacks to new era warfare. That warfare is expanding into areas such as
reducing the legitimacy of a government, influencing world opinion, or proliferating
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, pornography, prostitution and the like.
Perhaps an effective indicator of the existence of these new threats is the
movement of chaos from the Cold War battlefields of Third World nations to the streets
of modern society. Many nations in the former Soviet Union are facing this as new order
threats proliferate in the political, social, and economic environment:
Police in Russia estimate that about 3000 organized crime groups, allied into about
150 confederations, now exist and that half of the country's banks and real estate are
Mafia owned... These groups control not only traditional criminal activities such as
drug trafficking, prostitution, extortion, loan sharking, black marketing, etc but
also other spheres of influence. For instance, estimates show that 40,000 state run
and private companies are controlled by the crime syndicates in Russia. (Bunker,
1997)
This new warfare is still in an experimental form. It is evolving and growing,
matching society's technological and economic revolutions. As the world continues to
92
grow smaller through globalization of markets, economic reform, and advances in
technology, the United States and her allies become increasingly more vulnerable to these
threat actors. More at risk than the modern state will be the developing world, but as
nations battle for resources in the hyper-competitive world economy, confrontation of
some sort is inevitable.
What is the anticipated form of such confrontation with these new threats? Direct
conventional intervention with the United States appears less likely, given the present and
expected future superiority of U.S. forces. More likely is the potential for an aggressor
state to contract sub or transnational actors to wage New Order warfare. Such warfare
would not only be difficult to detect, but, once discovered, its source would be hard to
identify. Even if a source could be found, new questions over reciprocity would arise.
New rules of engagement would need to be developed as the "enemy" would not fit
traditional definitions and modes of operation. Also more likely is the potential for US
forces to operate in assisting other nations overwhelmed by this new warfare. Whether it
is humanitarian assistance or limited conventional intervention, the United States Marine
Corps soon will confront these emerging non-conventional threats.
2. Origins and Early Evolution
The Cold War is considered to be the birthplace of the emerging, non-
conventional threat. During the Cold War, the two Superpowers pursued policies of
detente mixed with limited expansionism. Intent on expanding their influence while at
the same time avoiding nuclear obliteration, the United States and Soviet Union
sponsored regional actors to advance their cause. Unable to fight each other directly, the
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Third World6 provided the battlespace for the two Superpowers to confront each other
indirectly through third party actors.
This Cold War period of intervention fueled many innovations in new order
warmaking. While the U.S. and Soviet Union were building huge conventional militaries
to confront each other on the plains of Europe, different forms of warfare were
proliferating in the frontier regions of Superpower domination. The Third World proved
to be fertile ground for American- and Soviet- sponsored groups to resurrect old guerrilla
tactics and to innovate new ones.
The Superpowers and their allies fuelled new threats' innovation through two
primary means. First, the large contributions of weaponry, money, and training provided
resources critical to warfighting and experimentation. Supplied with modern weapons
and tactics, new order threats learned new ways to fight. Second, the frequent deployment
of modern Superpower militaries to many remote battlefields provided new threats with
insights into modern conventional warfare. Witnessing first hand the devastating effects
of modern weapon systems, they were overwhelmed by the sophisticated electronics that
enabled precision intelligence and complex command and control.
At first Third World threats posed no real contest for Superpower militaries.
Conventional fighting is the bread and butter of modern militaries, and billions are spent
on procuring the most effective weapon systems and doctrine to achieve success.
However, these threats soon learned to avoid fighting on the terms of their modern
adversaries. Refining a new experimental form of warfare, they learned key weaknesses
and focused their efforts on exploiting them. Turning conventional weakness into a
In fact the term "Third World" was initially used to define those underdeveloped or developing countries
not allied with the Communist or non-Communist blocs.
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strategic advantage, the new threats shifted their objective from the defeat of the modern
military to the defeat of its political will. These emerging non-conventional adversaries
learned that strategic success came easiest when it had successfully defeated the enemy's
will to fight. Functioning across a new operational spectrum, the focus shifted from
achieving tactical success on a battlefield to achieving success across the political,
economic, and mass media spectrum of war
3. Typology of Modern Era, Non-Conventional Threats
The different manifestations of modern era, non-conventional threats seem to
reflect the political, social, and economic environment from which they evolve and
operate. For example, threats that arise and operate within the inner city look different
than those like Mafias and Cartels that operate in sophisticated, modern society.
Furthermore, terrorists, whose environment often is steeped in religion and transnational
activities, organize and operate differently than either the street gang or Mafias. Hence,
there appears to be a high degree of correlation between environment and threat type.
Accordingly, the nature of emerging, non-conventional threats can be
characterized by three types that categorize threats based on their operating environment.
For purposes of this thesis, the following typology system is used to facilitate discussion
First, three distinct typologies will be used, low, middle and high. Each type is
distinguishable by operating environment, organizational design, potential for danger or
degree of strength and power and degree of challenge to the social, political and










Low-Order Local Simple Low Low
Mid-Order Regional Bureaucratic Moderate Moderate
High-Order International Decentralized High High
Table 5.4. Non-Conventional Threat Types.
The first type of threat is termed "low-order" and operates within very narrow
geographic boundaries like neighborhoods. This threat typically involves local actors
whose sphere of influence is limited to the lowest level of organized society's political,
social, and economic environment. The second type of threat is termed "mid-order" and
operates within nation-state boundaries. While the influence of this threat is typically
only regional, some mid-order threats have extensive organizations that stretch across
nation-states. The third and final type of threat is "high-order" and typically operates
across international boundaries. The actions of this threat type are meant to affect the
entire global community. Let us examine each of these types in turn to learn different
ways new order threats may organize and operate in the twenty-first century
environment. This analysis serves to highlight the difficulties Marine ground intelligence
will have understanding these increasingly more powerful threats.
a. The Low-Order Threat
Low-order threats operate within narrow geographic boundaries, such as
neighborhoods or cities. Manifestations of low order threats include the street gang,
thugs, thieves, and many hate groups (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Low-Order Threat Types.
The organization of these threats often is a simple, loose structure (see Figure 5.2)
composed often to fifteen followers and a leader that is haphazardly selected and
typically the group's most charismatic member. Command and control in such groups is










Figure 5.2. Simple Structure of the Low-Order Threat.
Loyalty among group members is varied. However, in most cases it is not strong,
and these thugs and gang members are quick to leave a potentially dangerous scene to
save themselves. The low degree of allegiance precludes the group from hitting anything
but soft targets: low order threats typically attack unarmed, weak civilians and avoid
confrontation with law enforcement at all costs. Members are adventure seekers who
attack and vandalize for profit and thrill. Civil authority is generally incapable of
effectively controlling low order threats, often due to insufficient resources.
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incompetence, or complicity. In the inner city of developed nations, it may be because of
laws preventing effective police work.
b. The Mid-Order Threat
Mid-order threats are nation-state centered (see Figure 5.3). Examples
include private security forces, Mafias, Cartels, and sub-state rogue governments. They
typically organize as bureaucracies. Mid-order threats establish large bureaucratic
organizations to stabilize and exploit the nation-state environment (see Figure 5.4).
These organizations build efficient drug smuggling, prostitution, and gambling


















Figure 5.3. Mid-Order Threat Type.
By developing structures be on task specialization, these threats ensure
that the required experts run each of the many different operations. These threats
generally organize around a task such as drug production, distribution, or other illegal
activities. The key motivation for the organization is profit and power. Competition















Figure 5.4. Bureaucratic Structure of the Mid-Order Threat.
In an effort to control their environment and stabilize the task of running
the organization, mid-order threats may form alliances with other peer groups; often
times they form partnerships with law enforcement and government. Using specialists
with advanced technologies, the command and control of mid-order threats is capable of
planning and executing relatively advanced operations. In many nations the private
armies of these threats are more powerful than local or national forces; there they operate
with impunity. Many nations in Africa and regions of the Former Soviet Union are
struggling with large Mafias whose power threatens the state both physically and
economically.
c. The High-Order Threat
High-order threats typically are transnational in nature, and their actions
have worldwide repercussions (see Figure 5.5). Examples of high-order threats include
terrorist organizations, proliferators of advanced technology and weapons of mass

















Figure 5.5. The High-Order Threat Type.
The activities of transnational, high order threats demand decentralized
operations and highly trained specialists. Operating far from their safe havens, these
threats are required to survive and operate in the enemy's homeland. To be successful,
these experts must know the goals of their organization and possess the requisite
initiative to act quickly when opportunities arise. These threats are often autonomous
nodes in a highly complex, compartmentalized organization (see Figure 5.6). They are
forced into these organizational types in order to prevent compromise. Because of
security concerns and the difficulties of operating in the world environment, high-order
threat organizations resemble dispersed nodes connected to a central authority. The






Figure 5.6. The Decentralized Structure of the High-Order Threat.
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D. CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE AND THREAT TRANSFORMATION
The previous description of low, mid, and high-order threat types provides an
understanding of the initial forms of modern-era non-conventional threats. What might be
the impetus and mechanism for the transformation of new threats'? This next section
advances the theory that these initial forms are catalyzed to transform into more powerful
and threatening organizations by the response of society's conventional, dominant,
legitimate forces.
At a certain point, a threat may become sufficiently great to challenge the power
and legitimacy of established authority, at this point the regime is pressed to wage war
against the non-conventional threat. When this "conflict" is set in motion, modern
society unleashes powerful law enforcement and military organizations to destroy the
threat. Expending large amounts of resources and focusing ultra sophisticated
intelligence platforms and collection systems to identify and predict threat locations and
operations, society employs its armies of men and material in the battle. Faced with
annihilation by the technologically dominant conventional forces, the threat evolves and
takes on new forms.
The new threat forms that arise from this conflict with society are transforming
the threat landscape of the modern world (see Figure 5.7). Some low order threats are
transforming and showing signs of becoming mid-order, networked organizations. Others
are evolving into more powerful simple organizations. They form alliances with mid-
order threats and harness their unique asymmetries to outmaneuver society. A few mid-
order threats are abandoning rigid, centralized structures vulnerable to decapitation and
disruption and evolving into network like designs. High-order threat evolution is as of yet
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unknown, but it is suspected that it too will take advantage of the new technologies and
organizational designs of the information age. (Arquilla, 1996)





















Figure 5.7. Transformation of Low, Mid, and High Order Threats.
The network design presents tremendous challenges to traditional, hierarchical
militaries and law enforcement. Because of its decentralized nature, the network provides
the non-conventional threat with powerful, asymmetric operating advantages. Consisting
of nodes able to operate across large areas with little central guidance, the network is
agile and empowered to make decisions; it can not be easily countered.
Driven by the conflict with society to innovate and transform, low, mid, and high
order threats around the world may be evolving into network designs. The following
analysis of the transformation of street gangs and foreign drug cartels highlights this
evolution into networks and provides valuable clues as to how this process may be
occurring.
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1. Low-Order Threat Transformation: Street Gangs to Net Gangs
Street gang activity in the United States may illustrate, though particular features
will vary with geography and culture, a potential trend in the transformation of low-order
threats worldwide. Therefore, the following analysis of U.S. street gang evolution will
serve as an example of how low-order threats may transform in response to societal
"conflict".
U.S. street gangs are predominately comprised of disorganized, disenchanted
youth who see themselves as having little opportunity to achieve status or social identity
apart from running in gangs. Generally a phenomenon of disadvantaged inner city
sectors, marginalized youth on the whole seek gang life as a means to improve their
station in life and to protect their neighborhood. Unsophisticated and possessing little
formal education, they typically conduct low technology operations such as drug
trafficking and random criminal acts such as shootings and property defacement. As the
economic situation has worsened in the inner city, gang populations have swelled in the
U.S. In Los Angeles alone there are over 1,300 different street gangs with a total
population well over 100,000 members; this figure represents 4.3% of the entire
population of the city ofLos Angeles (2.3 million). (NDIC, 1996)
As their numbers increase and level of violence grows, gangs have come under
intense pressure from law enforcement. Also, peer competition for neighborhood control
and lucrative drug markets has intensified. Both these forces have pushed some gangs
into new, more powerful operations and net-like organizational forms.
In Los Angeles, Hispanic gang organizations have begun to adapt and change by
developing unique collaborative relationships with the Mexican Mafia. A potentially
new, highly "sophisticated" enterprise created from the fusion of the street gang and the
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drug Mafia may be the outward manifestation of such collaboration to counter increasing
competition and police pressure.
Black Chicago gangs have formed an unprecedented alliance that unites hundreds
of gang cliques in order to influence and shape a favorable operating environment. In
response to increased competition and police pressure, these gangs have begun working
together in an attempt to influence society at the political, economic, and mass media
levels. They have made progress toward that end by organizing political groups to
advance supportive politicians into important posts in government and by gaining
legitimate favor from residents by supporting community revitalization programs. By
investing in legitimate enterprises, these gangs have transformed themselves from their
marginalized status to become inextricably linked to the economy in many inner city
neighborhoods.
The following elaboration of these two examples demonstrates that when faced
with environmental pressure, gangs adapt and operate differently. While the future
evolution of the modern street gang is unknown, it is possible to see how it may
transform by studying its present day operations. The next two cases provide important
insights into this possible transformation.
a. Los Angeles Hispanic Gangs
In Los Angeles, the gang problem has risen to widespread proportions.
Crime and drug trafficking are at all time highs, and homicides have outpaced the
national averages. In fact, since 1994, gang-related killings represents, for the first time
in history over half of all homicides in the LA region.
A comparison of the national gang-related homicide figure with that ofLA
demonstrates with striking clarity the degree to which LA surpasses the rest of the
104
country in gang violence. In 1994, there were 1,810 homicides in the United States, of
which 779 were gang related. The total number of gang-related homicides in the LA
county area in 1994 was 588. Thus, over seventy two percent of the nation's gang-related
homicides occurred in Los Angeles. (NDIC, 1997)
The increasing level of violence in Los Angeles has stirred intense public
outcry. Consequently, more police have been fielded, and citizen groups have initiated
-7
campaigns to rid their communities of gang violence. Other efforts by Federal Agencies
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF) have focused on forming task forces with local, state, and national
agencies to assist in coordination and better share information. (Lopez, 1996) These
actions have resulted in record numbers of indictments and prison sentences. However,
there is little evidence that suggests gang participation and violence have decreased. In
fact, gang-related homicides and crime have increased steadily since 1994, as revealed by
a recent LA Sheriffs Department study that indicates that gang violence rose evenly by
about 4% each year. 8
How did the LA gangs respond to the heightened attacks from society and
the police? There is evidence that early in 1994, in response to increasing pressure from
law enforcement and the subsequent loss in drug revenue, the Mexican Mafia began to
interact with Hispanic LA street gangs. As the primary supplier of drugs into the LA
region, the Mexican Mafia began an effort to loosely organize and influence the
operations of the hundreds of disparate LA gangs. The Mafia's first activity in this effort
7 Once such effort as reported by a Los Angeles Times special report on " 18th Street Gangs" in November
of 1996 (Lopez, 1996) describes how citizens installed video cameras and slung banners across streets
advertising anti gang slogans. Apparently such efforts have been successful of ridding gang elements from
some communities. The problem is that gangs leave one neighborhood and quickly set up shop elsewhere.
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was to order a tactical change in the gang style of operations: instead of drive-by
shootings, execute walk-up shootings. By switching tactics so that fewer innocent
bystanders would be killed, the Mafia hoped to reduce the number of people affected and
thus to relieve the political outcry. The expected subsequent decline in police pressure
would permit the lucrative LA drug trade to resume as it had before the conflict with
society. While debate exists as to the success of central control over the numerous LA
street gangs, the change in the nature of gang-related homicides was significant. Drive-
by shootings dropped 36% in 1994 and 34% in 1995. Over this same time period, walk-
up shootings increased by 56%.
Other efforts at centralized control by the Mexican Mafia have meet with
marginal success. Such control usually means profit sharing within an established
hierarchy. Where benefits can be clearly identified, centralized control seems to offer a
valid reason for transformation. In other cases it does not, as in the example where
several LA street gangs rebelled against the Mafia because it was taking too big a bite
from their own enterprises. (Lopez, 1996)
Despite the possible different eventual outcomes, there does exist a clear
pattern suggesting that when required, Mafia and street gang can fuse into a single
organization. In a confidential bulletin produced by the California State Department of
Justice in 1996, a summary statement revealed that "some gang cliques are rapidly
evolving from criminal street gangs into more sophisticated groups." As Mafias, Cartels,
and other criminal elements come under increasing pressure from law enforcement, they
seem to favor the option of employing decentralized, street gangs to do drug trafficking,
Quote by Sgt. Wes McBride, project officer for Operation Safe Streets. Los Angeles County Sheriffs





weapon smuggling, and other illegal activities. By outsourcing the actual
tasks, Mafias and Cartels limit themselves to command and control functions and avoid
exposing themselves to police. This complicates counter narcotics efforts and often frees
the Cartel from police pressure while law enforcement contends with gang organizations.
While complete, direct control of street gangs from centralized authority may never be
possible, financial incentives may be sufficient to encourage marginal obedience.
(NDIC, 1996, pp. 20)
Clearly, the effects of Mafia and gang collaboration present serious
challenges to law enforcement. The highly decentralized gangs are difficult to detect and
they participate in unpredictable activities. Also, as the average age of most gang
members is sixteen, effective police work is complicated due to juvenile handling
procedures. The introduction ofMafia influence into this already destabilizing threat
brings potential professional direction and hugely profitable criminal activity such as
drugs and racketeering. If successfully fused, new "sophisticated groups" could emerge
whose organizational agility would undoubtedly pose serious problems for modern day
law enforcement.
b. Chicago Gangs
A second example of the evolution of low-order threats in response to
conflict with society is found in the street gangs of Chicago, considered to be some of the
most organized in America. (NDIC, 1996) More stylized than Crip or Blood Gangs of
the West Coast and adhering to traditional gang folklore and symbolism, many of
9A sweeping federal racketeering indictment filed in 1995 alleges Mexican Mafia leaders collaborated with
numerous Hispanic gangs in collecting protection payment from local businesses and dope dealers. The
gangs and the Mafia apparently split the money. Such activities have become prevalent as the once steady
drug income fluctuates due to effective police work (Lopez, 1996).
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Chicago's black gangs are aligned either to the Black Disciples or the Gangster Disciples
(two of that city's largest and most powerful street gangs). In the early 1970's, David
Barksdale, leader of the Black Disciples, formed an unprecedented alliance between the
two gangs. The alliance created a unifying racial umbrella around all allied black gangs,
known as "Folk" or "People." Barksdale's merger created the Black Gangster Disciple
Nation, which in its heyday was the largest street gang in Chicago. Feuding in the late
1980's created a split, and now the Black Disciples and the Gangster Disciples operate
independently and war on each other frequently. (NDIC, 1996)
During their brief union the two gangs created an unprecedented level of
cooperation between hundreds of allied gang cliques. In an effort to increase their drug
business and other criminal activities in the face of growing police pressure, the mega
gang developed a plan to control its environment. Beginning with a campaign to gain
widespread favor with residents in the neighborhoods they controlled, the mega gang
injected money into community projects 10 and bought and ran legitimate businesses. In
this way the gang alliance induced favorable economic growth in many neighborhoods.
As this growth was a stark contrast to the squalor that characterized much of the
dilapidated inner city, the mega gang's efforts fomented a large degree of popularity
amongst inner city residents. Next, the gang initiated a program to influence the political
arena and thereby to achieve politically what they could not accomplish themselves in the
neighborhoods: a reduction in the degree of police harassment. Supporting local
' The Better Growth and Development organization is one example of a community program established
by the Gangster Disciples. Growth and Development reflecting the sponsors name (Gangster Disciples),
this community based organization provides after school day care and sports programs for inner city youth.
(Source Sgt. Wes McBride LASD and John Seebeck Chicago Police Department.)
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politicians who were well-disposed to their cause, the gangs attempted to elect and
influence a number of city aldermen. 11
Was this effort at gang collaboration an isolated event arising from unique
properties of the Chicago gangs? They are not, for Chicago gangs in form are not unlike
any other gang or low-order threat: organizationally, they are as decentralized and
whimsical as ever. Gangster temperaments preclude cohesive, rigid hierarchies;
operating in roving bands of 10-20 members, they operate more out of a desire for
excitement than with any real purpose. Each small node or clique is tied to the higher
organization by alliance and name only. No centralization of wealth occurs, for profits
are rarely shared either downward or upward.
Yet, in Chicago, during this unprecedented period, allied disparate gangs
organized to confront an increasingly more effective police presence. Admittedly the
success of this effort is highly disputed; however, the fact that many of Chicago's
decentralized gang cliques organized to confront increasing police pressure provides
insight into the possibilities of these emerging gang organizations. While their nature is
fiercely independent, the Chicago gangs' experience may provide evidence that under
certain environmental pressures, fragmented gang cliques can unify and contribute to
achieving an organizational objective. (NDIC, 1996)
c. Alternative Outcomes of Gang Evolution
Many gang observers are of the opinion that gang movement towards
centralized organization is the first sign of the development of a Super Gang (NDIC,
11 The most publicized case was the candidacy of Walter Gator Bradley who ran for city Alderman in 1994.
Narrowly defeated, he had known ties to the Gangster Disciples. Bradley was a former convict who
sported gang tattoos and openly cavorted with the gang underworld. Source Sgt. Wes McBride LASD and
John Seebeck Chicago Police Department.
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1996). The delay in the establishment of such an organization may be attributed to the
lack of sophistication of present day members. Modern day gangs are too independent
and untrusting to pull together and form a cohesive enterprise. Furthermore, charismatic
leaders who do manage to rise to the forefront like David Barksdale 12 often experience an
early demise due to inter-gang rivalries, intra-gang jealousies, or arrests leading to
lengthy incarcerations (NDIC, 1996). In spite of similar maladies, however, the Costra
Nostra and other organized crime networks managed to achieve formation. Despite early
setbacks, evolution occurred, as it will most likely with street gangs. As with the
Hispanic gangs in LA or the black Chicago gangs, such evolution will most likely require
severe environmental pressure or competition. Faced with increasing environmental
pressure the street gang will either adapt or disappear. Given the continuing economic
plight of the inner city, it is unlikely that the social and economic conditions that breed
gangs will disappear soon. Consequently, gangs most likely will adapt.
Modern street gang evolution may follow a different course than that of
their organized crime cousins who transformed their gangsters into hierarchical,
professional crime organizations. Already, Mafias and Cartels are beginning to exploit
the agility and nimbleness of street gangs to peddle their drugs, racketeer, and perform
other criminal actions. Gang cliques have the advantage of being small, whimsical, and in
many neighborhoods so numerous that they far outnumber law enforcement. 13 Difficult to
eradicate through traditional police measures,
14
gangs are a unique counter to effective
12 A rival gang member shot David Barksdale to death.
In Los Angeles there are an estimated 100,000 gang members, while there are less than 15,000 law
enforcement personnel.
One gang, the Blackstone Rangers was targeted in the early 1990's by the ATF and the Chicago Police
Department because of its role as a major narcotics distributor. After numerous arrests and successful
prosecutions, gang activity slowed for a short while. However, once police suppression stopped many
former members returned and the gang reestablished itself. It now operates under another name. This
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law enforcement. It is unlikely that the uneducated and low-skill inner city youth, who
are the majority of gang membership, will develop simple street gangs into ultra
sophisticated criminal networks. Even with the exchange of knowledge and expertise that
may be occurring between organized cartels and street gangs, it is doubtful that street
gangs will evolve beyond their current organizational form. Instead street gangs may
become the operational arm for more organized interests, becoming, as in the case of Los
Angeles, more effective drug distributors, racketeers, and the like. Nevertheless, the
Chicago experience reveals that given the right environmental conditions, unprecedented
levels of net-like organization is possible among even low order threats.
2. Mid-Order Threat Transformation: Drug Cartels to Net Cartels
Like gangs, drug cartels also have been pushed to evolve into net-like typologies
because of the nature of their work, the increase in competition, and effective law
enforcement. Consider the monumental tasks facing a modern drug cartel. First the cartel
must operate across national borders, deep within hostile nations where police scrutiny
and peer competition is often severe. Also, the Cartel must work with a diverse
membership that speaks different languages, shares conflicting organizational beliefs, and
differs culturally from each other. Furthermore, the Cartel must integrate all of these
actors into a cohesive team that can quickly adapt to a hostile environment while at the
same time performing the central organizational mission: the production, transportation,
and marketing of illicit drugs.
Cartels are able to succeed "partly because... of their emphasis on networks rather
than formal organizations" (Williams, 1994, p. 105). Thus Cartels move towards network
phenomenon seems to be typical of highly decentralized gang-like organizations. Unless every deviant
gang member is imprisoned the culture and folklore of the gang survives.
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designs because they provide the organizational framework necessary to perform a
complicated task, operate within the chaos of the international arena, and outmaneuver
law enforcement.
Organizationally, the modern drug cartel is a decentralized, network-like
organization. Often composed of compartmentalized cells that are functionally
organized, each generally operates independently of centralized control. Whether
producing, transporting, smuggling, or distributing, each function is a node that has
"corporate knowledge" and is often free to adjust to its environment. Connected to
cutting edge information technologies, these decentralized, functional nodes come to life
when their services are required, and then quickly disappear upon completion of a task.
However, the drug cartel is a one-dimensional enterprise (Farah, 1997). Focused
primarily on drug production, distribution, and money laundering, the cartels have
become victim to sophisticated multinational counter drug efforts and peer competition.
Furthermore, the Colombian cartels' internal war with the Colombian government has
taken its toll on drug operations. Faced with these pressures, Mexican cartels, once
minor players in the international drug business, have risen to become the primary drug
suppliers to the U.S. (Farah, 1997)
Recently, however, Colombian cartels have begun to alter their organizations to
better compete and enhance organizational flexibility and agility to counter anti drug
efforts. Searching for more powerful net designs that provide this flexibility and
competitive edge, the Cali Cartel has forged a unique collaborative enterprise with
Russian organized crime groups. Seeking to gain access to new drug markets, acquire
professional expertise and weapons, and enhance organizational learning, the Cali Cartel
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and the Russian Mob have joined hands in what is being described as "the most
dangerous trend in drug smuggling in the hemisphere" (Farah, 1997)
Unlike the one-dimensional drug cartels, the Russian Mafia is multi-dimensional
with hundreds of gangs and thousands of people worldwide operating in many different
illegal operations. This breadth of knowledge brings tremendous capability to any Cartel-
Mafia joint venture. Comprising highly trained and professional members, the makeup of
the Russian mob was characterized by one expert as "people with PhD's, former senior
KGB agents with access to sophisticated weapons, people who have already fought real
insurgencies and laundered billions of dollars" (Farah, 1997). The Russians also bring to
the partnership access to high-technology weapons and equipment. In one known
exchange, the Russian Mafia attempted to sell two Russian submarines, several
helicopters, and an unspecified quantity of surface-to-air missiles to the Cali Cartel.
Since April of 1997, several Russian ships have delivered what are believed to be
shipments of AK-47 assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and other weapons in
exchange for drugs. (Farah, 1997)
The introduction of these types of weapons and technology are changing the
entire calculus of counter narcotic warfare. Access to surface-to-air missiles gives the
cartel an effective defensive weapon against helicopters, which are used by law
enforcement to attack remote cocaine fields, laboratories, and other Cartel outposts.
Submarines and armored attack helicopters provides traffickers an almost invincible
means of transporting drugs. Use of such weaponry would significantly change the way
drugs are transported.
113
Faced with such newly equipped threats, counter drug work could no longer be a
task relegated to law enforcement; trafficker use of submarines and attack helicopters
would demand military intervention. As indicated, the Cartels have tremendous tactical
flexibility because of their networked natures. Governments like Columbia, Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico are already struggling to grapple with this unique networked
menace. The introduction of sophisticated weapons into the equation could topple these
fledgling democracies. The recent coup in Cambodia is an example of this.
As another example, drug traffickers bent on transforming Cambodia into a narco-
state bankrolled Hun Sen (the co-prime minister who ousted rival Prince Norodom
Ranariddh). Sen militarily overthrew Ranariddh in a military takeover in July of 1997.
He allegedly secured the loyalty of the military by lavishing gifts and drug money on
prominent military leaders. After a brief battle, Sen's forces took power just months after
a democratically elected government had been established for the first time in decades.
Drug traffickers now operate in Cambodia with near impunity. As a result, Cambodia has
grown to become a major transshipment center for Southeast Asian heroin and marijuana.
(Thayer, 1997)
The collaboration between the Cali Cartel and the Russian Mafia also adds a new
dynamic to organizational awareness and adaptation. Russian criminal organizations "set
up cooperative efforts... they learn from each other and they work together to improve
operations" (Farah, 1997). The Russo-Colombian relationship may foster a new degree
of organizational professionalism within the Cartel. With the infusion of Russian
expertise, the Cartel may learn how to adapt more quickly to its chaotic environment.
New methods at countering anti drug efforts could evolve. The already flexible Cali
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Cartel network design might improve, further complicating counter drug efforts. As
already described, the Russian Mafia style of operations is very effective. Comprising
former military and KGB personnel, it is difficult to penetrate, and intelligence work is
further complicated by the language difference. The fusion of these two organizations
could substantially increase the power and effectiveness of both organizations.
The collaboration of the Cali Cartel and Russian Mafia demonstrates the adaptive
nature and network centric approach to operations of emerging, mid-order threats. In the
case of the Colombian Cali cartel, the collaboration is evidence of the Cartel's
tremendous organizational flexibility to adapt to a challenging external threat. For the
Russian Mafia, a Russo-Colombian enterprise is yet another signal of the increasing
global reach and power of a non-state criminal threat that has yet to be effectively
countered by society or a peer challenger.
While the success of these emerging organizational alliances and approaches is
uncertain, most law enforcement officials agree that "American and international law
enforcement is not organized to fight this threat" (Farah, 1997). Drug enforcement
officials are operationally constrained by bureaucratic organizational approaches to
operations. Furthermore, foreign governments concerned more with national sovereignty
than with tackling powerful transnational drug traffickers often impede collaborative
international efforts. Thus, counter drug efforts are rarely able to match the nimbleness
of maneuver displayed by the Cartels and Mafias. As these emerging threats gain
increasing power due to their inherent asymmetries, legitimate institutions will become
more vulnerable. Able to muster vast resources and knowledge from transnational
operations and collaborative relationships, the precarious state of nations besieged from
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mid-order threats, like Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Russia are likely to reach critical
mass. They may collapse the nation state and become narco-states where drug warlords
and transnational criminals operate with complete license, as appears to be the case in
Cambodia.
E. PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONDING TO NETWORK CENTRIC
OPERATIONS
Several overriding principles associated with network design and operations are
highlighted by the adaptation and organizational evolution of the LA and Chicago street
gangs and the Cali drug Cartel. The first principle is that the network design is the
quintessential design for threats operating in the twenty-first century (Arquilla, 1996). It
can think faster, respond more quickly, operate more efficiently, and deploy more
effectively than any other organizational design; it is without peer. This is particularly
evident when net-like criminal organizations confront bureaucratic intelligence and law
enforcement.
The second principle is that traditional hierarchical, law enforcement
organizations are ill configured to grapple with networked adversaries. Some
governments have attempted to adapt by abandoning stovepipe bureaucratic methods and
adopting network-like overarching, inter-agency approaches like the task force.
However, while the task force and other similar solutions offer society a way to mirror
the threat's organizational design, their success is often limited due to the many factors
that plague any public agency. Rivalry, lack of interagency cooperation, mistrust, and
misunderstanding are a few of the problems that impede network operations by legitimate
authorities within the U.S. These problems are only compounded when inter-
governmental networks are established.
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Thirdly, governmental counter drug efforts are still locked in 20th century tactics
and paradigms. Massive amounts of resources are spent in capturing suspected "central"
leaders. These decapitation operations have minimal effect on networked criminal
organizations, yet they remain the focus of many counter narcotic operations (Arquilla,
1996). Such actions are further evidence that modern law enforcement and counter drug
efforts are poorly organized and inadequately trained to address networked adversaries.
Finally, it must be recognized that network organizations cannot be defeated;
they can only be suppressed. Networks' dispersed, decentralized nature makes them less
vulnerable to collapse, and they have amazing empowering effects upon the people that
form them. Comprised of a new class of warriors, net-warriors are educated to think and
make decisions; they are risk takers and unconventional thinkers. Tied to their network
either because of economics, religion, or common cause, net-warriors are loyal to the
network regardless of the basis for their affiliation. These features create a network of
net-warriors who are powerful, intelligent, and in a sense individual microcosms of the
organization.
Attempts by law enforcement or militaries to collapse the network through well-
targeted attacks on key nodes may slow the network down, but unless every net-warrior
is imprisoned or eliminated a physical impossibility the network will most likely
reconstitute itself. Like the gang problem in many inner city neighborhoods, short of
imprisoning or eliminating every gang member, the gang seems to always reconstitute
itself. Hence, attempting to collapse a networked organization may only temporarily
suppress it and achieve short-term objectives; it is not an end all, permanent solution.
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F. SUMMARY
Emerging non-conventional threats present modern society with a perplexing
threat picture. To understand the picture, a new calculus for analysis is needed to
determine how these emerging organizations fight and wage war. As mentioned earlier,
international organizations like SIPRI, IISS and IFRCRC are increasingly less able to
explain the level of chaos and disorder that persists despite the fact that the number of
conflicts worldwide is decreasing. This confusion is brought about by the tendency of
these groups, like many militaries and intelligence organizations, to confound the
emerging non-conventional threats with crime or police work. This is understandable, as
the threat increasingly looks less like war and more like urban, low intensity conflict.
Using Cold War era thresholds like SIPRI's major war thermometer, 1 " many
policymakers are not seeing the reality of the world environment and remain fixated on
watching for twentieth century conventional war to appear.
This is not to say that conventional or even nuclear war has disappeared. Rather it
suggests that the emerging non-conventional threats are a phenomenon presenting the
modern world with a new threat paradigm that is largely misunderstood. Because of their
unique nature, these threats, unlike other forms of warfare, are not expressly tied to a
specific form of operations. This fact strains modern threat assessment. Consequently,
reams of data are not available to paint a realistic picture ofhow these threats fight.
However, recent history provides sufficient clues into the operational art of non-
conventional threats to provide a reasonable picture of how these threats can be expected
to fight; the figure below (Figure 5.8) summarizes the major points of that picture.


































































































Figure 5.8. Emerging Non-Conventional Threat Evolution.
The cases presented in this chapter, drawn from low-order threats like the
Chicago and LA gangs, demonstrate that the inherent asymmetries associated with gang
operations are difficult to counter using present day law enforcement tactics.
Furthermore, the gangs have the potential to form alliances and collaborate with more
powerful and highly organized Mafias and Cartels. These alliances may fuel the
development of powerful super gangs that evolve to become new mid-order threats like
Mafias or Cartels. Or gangs may evolve to become sophisticated, low-level operational
nodes for mid or high-level threats.
The final example of the Cali Cartel's collaboration with the Russian Mafia
provides evidence of the agility and adaptive nature of a mid-order criminal enterprise
faced with severe environmental pressure. Realizing its weakness as a one-dimensional
organization, the Cali Cartel's collaboration with the world's most powerful crime group
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demonstrates a specific intent to improve its organizational effectiveness and efficiency.
Faced with effective suppression from law enforcement, drained by the war with the
Colombian government and competition from Mexican Cartels, the Cali group is
adapting its organization to better confront its chaotic environment.
The powerful threats presented in this chapter represent a New Order of Threats
that promise to severely challenge Marine Corps operations in the twenty-first century.
New Order Threats assert this challenge because they are difficult to recognize and
understand. They put decision-makers in a quandary that results in delay or ineffective
response. Left unchecked, New Order Threats harness powerful asymmetric capabilities
that allow them to gain influence that is out of proportion to their political, economic, and
military strength. Thus, precise intelligence is the key to countering their asymmetric
capabilities.
However, given their unique nature, these threats present serious problems for
modern intelligence practices. As described in an earlier chapter. Marine intelligence is
designed to accommodate simple, predictable adversaries; its present day intelligence
methods and systems would be rendered ineffective by new order threat operations.
The next chapter presents a case study of one of the first modern American
military contacts with this new class of threat. It highlights how a low-order gang threat
evolved in less than a year to become a powerful, networked guerrilla militia that
unleashed enough combat power to ambush special forces commandos, repel repeated air
and ground attacks, and destroy the UN mission in Somalia.
This Somalia case study offers a perfect illustration of the new, emerging and
evolving non-conventional threat theory put forward in this chapter, and it bears out the
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weakness of Marine intelligence organization as identified in Chapter III. Unable to
identify much less predict the Somali threat's actions, decision-makers were severely
handicapped and vulnerable. Overwhelming decision-makers with unpredictable actions
and chaos, Somalis exploited American intelligence and operational weaknesses and




VI. AMERICAN MILITARY CONTACT WITH
NON-CONVENTIONAL THREAT: SOMALI CASE STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a case study that synthesizes the concepts of the previous
chapters of this thesis. In recounting a sequence of events in Somalia, this case study
illuminates the weaknesses of the current, hierarchical Marine intelligence organization,
makes evident the tremendous power that can be harnessed by an asymmetric force that
embodies the characteristics of decentralized, non-conventional threats, and dramatically
points to the possible new nature of armed conflict facing the Marine Corps in the
coming century
B. OVERVIEW
One of the first direct American military contacts with an emerging non-
conventional threat in the post Cold War era occurred during the American intervention
in Somalia from December 1992 to March 1995. This contact is significant because it
clearly illustrates how stovepipe, traditional analysis failed to see the threat for what it
was: a new class of threat. Left unchecked because of this, this threat defeated the
American military politically and destroyed the UN mission in Somalia The
predominate lesson derived from this contact is that once confronted with these new
threats, American intelligence is unable to accommodate their peculiar nature.
Consequently, the new threats overwhelm intelligence operations and render them
irrelevant. To operate successfully against these threats, U.S. forces must know and
understand them. As this case study describes, non-conventional threat analysis is not a
trivial matter. Indeed, to describe and track these threats, new intelligence methods and
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processes are required. The Somalia case is important because similar interventions
where U.S. forces confront these types of threats will likely continue well into the next
century, as evidenced by recent deployments to Rwanda, Haiti, Liberia, the Former
Yugoslavia, and Albania.
The focus of this case study is the October 3, 1993, Ranger incident in which
eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia. The United
States military had superior firepower and mobility, and the soldiers involved were
specially trained elite troops. The Somalis were supposedly unorganized, possessed little
firepower, and were assessed as marginal threats incapable of launching any sizeable
attack. Operating under old, Cold War paradigms, American intelligence failed to
understand the Aideed threat for what it was: a new class of threat. Years after the
furious, almost 24-hour battle, American military intelligence still is struggling to
understand an enemy whose nature is so foreign that it is threatens to render intelligence
irrelevant or spur massive reform.
Highlighting the stark contrasts between the American military and Aideed's
forces, this chapter describes how American intelligence misread the actual situation on
the ground because of its near exclusive reliance on Cold War analytic technique and
collection procedures.
Beginning with a brief historical summary to frame the context of the events that
lead up to that fateful date, the clash between Aideed's forces and the American military
is recounted in great detail to illustrate the new class of non-conventional operations and
tactics. Because of the nature of this particular threat, the October 3 clash can only be
presented from the U.S. perspective. However, sufficient detail can be gleaned from U.S.
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observations to provide a fairly complete picture ofhow Aideed's militia must have been
organized for this battle. The chapter will conclude with a brief analysis of Aideed's
tactics and their significance in defeating the American raid.
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Economically, Somalia is one of the world's poorest and least developed
countries. It has few natural resources and little economic potential. Politically, it is
dominated by clans whose fierce independence and unwillingness to submit to authority
has prevented national unity.
Over the last one and a half centuries, Somalia has been ruled by a series of
colonial powers including Britain, France, Italy, and other African nations. These
colonial powers invested little in Somalia's infrastructure, focusing instead on exploiting
the country's resources for their own economic gains. It was not until 1960, after fifteen
years as a protectorate of Italy, that Somalia gained its independence.
Somalia's first president, Abdirashiid Ali Shermaarke, led a democratic, clan-
dominated government. He was assassinated in 1969, and the Somali army assumed
control. The newly created Supreme Revolutionary Council named Army Commander
Major General Mohammed Siad Barre president.
Barre quickly consolidated power as the new Somali dictator and established his
clan as the ruling faction through force. Supplied by the Soviets, Barre built an army of
over 65,000 men, and in 1977, launched a major offensive into Ethiopia to seize ethnic
Somali lands. Initially bolstered by success, Barre's army penetrated deep into Ethiopia,
however, by 1978 his army was defeated in a series of Ethiopian offensives. Barre's
forces returned to Somalia in tatters.
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The defeat left Barre's military in ruins and sparked civil unrest throughout
Somalia. In an effort to control the fomenting unrest, Barre launched violent military
attacks on his opposition "By 1989 torture and murder had become the order of the day in
Mogadishu" (Metz, 1993, p. 50). Villages and communities where anti-Barre clans
lived were bombed, and the people were massacred.
By 1990 unrest had turned into full-scale revolution. In January 1991, Siad
Barre's government collapsed under the pressure of the warring Somali clans. Barre fled
Somalia leaving behind a war-ravaged country in which clans fought each other, each
attempting to establish itself as the legitimate authority.
The United Somali Congress (USC), the major opposition movement in
Mogadishu and central Somalia, announced the establishment of an interim government
and proposed that Ali Mahdi Mohammed (Mahdi) be named as the interim president.
Former army commander General Mohammed Faraah Aideed, also of the USC, opposed
Mahdi and formed his own USC faction. Intense fighting broke out in Mogadishu
between the clans supporting these two factions. Eventually, the fighting spread
throughout Somalia, with heavily armed clans controlling various parts of the country
allied either to Aideed or Mahdi.
The civil war caused widespread death and destruction. Events worsened as a
decade-long drought in central and southern Somalia left hundreds of thousands of people
starving. Severe malnutrition and other related diseases threatened almost 4.5 million
people: over half the population. It was estimated that 300,000 people had died from
malnutrition in a three month period, and that at least another 1.5 million were at
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immediate risk. Nearly one million refugees had scattered among the neighboring
countries. (Metz, 1993)
D. INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS IN SOMALIA
In response to the famine devastating Somalia, humanitarian relief efforts were
begun by the United Nations, and by March of 1991 the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were fully
engaged. A volatile security situation impeded the relief effort and forced the temporary
removal of relief personnel from Somalia on several occasions.
1. UNOSOM
The relief effort became a food distribution crises, and widespread looting of aid
supplies, robbery, and armed banditry caused the humanitarian aid activities to come to a
near standstill. In response, the United Nations under the direction of Secretary-General
Boutrous Boutrous Gali proposed the establishment of a United Nations Operation in
Somalia: UNOSOM. UN forces were to be sent immediately to monitor a recent cease
fire agreement in Mogadishu and to provide protection and security for the distribution of
humanitarian aid. After considerable delays and difficulties with the principal Somali
clans, UN forces began arriving in September of 1992.
The security situation continued to worsen. In October and November of 1992,
small enclaves in the cities, including the harbors and airports, were controlled by local
warlords who refused to comply with their clan leadership. Mogadishu was a divided
city controlled by rival militias, each contending for more power and unwilling to submit
to the rules of its family clan. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon, and their
vehicles and weapons were taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened,
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and even shelled. Airports came under fire; large sums of cash and relief aid were
extorted. Several relief workers were kidnapped and held for ransom; others were killed.
During this time, relief supplies piled up in the warehouses and ships offshore,
and only a trickle of aid was reaching those in need According to some estimates, as
many as 3,000 persons were dying a day, while the warehouses remained stocked with
food (Metz, 1993). Unless the problems relating to the security and protection of relief
supplies were resolved, the UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
would be unable to provide the necessary aid. (Metz, 1993)
2. U.S. Involvement Begins
On December 3, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 794 authorizing the
use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia. The United States, under the direction of President Bush,
intervened "because of the scale of human disaster and the realization that the United
States was the only nation perceived by the Somalis and by the regional states as being in
a position to maintain neutrality and with the ability to launch the necessary large scale
aid operation" (Metz, 1993, p. 50).
A United Task Force (UNITAF) was created whose mission was to establish in
Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance The first elements of
UNITAF, spearheaded by the United States, arrived on 9 December 1992. They were
joined by elements of the French Foreign Legion, forces from Belgium, Canada, Egypt,
Italy, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. (Metz, 1993)
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UNITAF's plan entailed the development of food distribution centers in each of
the major areas affected by the famine. By eliminating from the warlords' control what
had been a source of power for them, the relief supplies, UNITAF hoped to reduce their
violent threat. Once this was accomplished, the military command could then be turned
over to the United Nations.
3. UNITAF Operations
When U.S. forces first entered Mogadishu in December 1992, it was a ghost
town. Formerly a relatively prosperous African city of a million or so, years of civil war
and the recent famine had resulted in a massive exodus of most of the population. Those
that remained were mostly starving Bedouins who had come to the capital seeking aid or
young men and former army personnel who roamed the streets seeking profit.
At the time, two major clans ruled Mogadishu: Aideed's USC faction and
Mahdi's USC faction. The majority of the city was under Aideed's control, while the
Italian quarter and areas surrounding the New Port were under Mahdi's control. Each of
these men sought to establish a new authority in Somalia with himself as the new central
leader. Mahdi's claim was that he had been elected to be the interim leader by the ruling
clans following Barre's exile; Aideed's claim was that he was the primary force that
defeated Barre and should assume the leadership because of his successful efforts.
Both clan leaders had agreed to set aside their dispute and allow the UN to set up
an interim government composed of representatives from all Somali clans. All agreed
that the serious issue of providing relief to the thousands dying from the famine was the
first and foremost problem that needed to be tackled; "later," it was proposed through a
UN brokered plan, a central leader would be appointed. Consequently, both Aideed and
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Mahdi submitted to the UN cease-fire and sat back and watched as thousands of
American marines and soldiers occupied Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia, delivering
tons of food to selected relief sites.
During this period (December 1992- April 1993) the intelligence staffs of all the
tactical units involved were focused on three primary threats: landmines, roving
technicals,
1
and the Aideed and Mahdi clans. These threats arose from the debris of
Somalia's civil war, in which Barre's men had been heavily armed and possessed some
of the best Soviet equipment then available. The scattering of war equipment all over the
country meant that nearly everyone had a weapon or two; though by far, the majority of
the weapons were held between the Aideed and Mahdi factions. Both factions possessed
huge caches of weapons comprised of rocket propelled grenades (RPG's), ammunition of
all calibers, every class of small arms, a few tanks, and other heavy equipment. To pacify
both sides, the UN allowed Aideed and Mahdi to keep their cache sites with the
stipulations that they identify the sites' existence to the American task force, allow for
periodic inspections, and remove nothing without UN/U.S. permission.
Within a few short weeks after American Marines and other forces had entered
Somalia (December 1993), both sides had supposedly come clean. After taking inventory
and assessing each of the cache sites, UNITAF came to several conclusions. First,
neither clan was deemed to pose much of a threat to UN/U.S. forces for they lacked
heavy weapons and equipment in their arsenals. All the tanks, trucks, and other "heavy"
weapon systems were in an advanced state of disrepair. Second, all the authorized
weapon storage sites were a serious threat for they were filled with tons of small arms
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ammunition and weapons. All classes of weapons from Makarov pistols to heavy
mortars were stashed in the various Authorized Storage Points.
By January 9, 1993, UNITAF had completed its mission. UNITAF had rapidly
and successfully secured all the major population centers and humanitarian assistance
was being delivered and distributed without incident. Soon after the food distribution
network had been established and the famine crises had been contained, U.S. forces
began to disarm the population. This next phase of operations was part of a UN-brokered
agreement whereby the country would be disarmed to ensure the continued flow of aid
and to set the proper climate for the peaceful transition to Somali autonomy. In further
support of that transition, U.S. forces helped in the establishment of local municipal
governments, police forces and began rebuilding hospitals, schools and water systems.
Again, during this phase ofUNOSOM, both Aideed and Mahdi sat back and
allowed the American and UN forces to disarm the populace. Under special provisions
of the UN agreement, only specially authorized individuals could own weapons. Aideed
and Mahdi were allowed small private forces to act as bodyguards. Also, the NGO relief
agencies were allowed to employ Somalis and arm them to provide protection.
U.S. Marine units and other supporting nations actively participated in
confiscating unapproved weapons and stopping anyone who brandished a weapon in
public. Intelligence efforts focused on identifying unauthorized cache sites. Once a site
was discovered, forces were mobilized and the illegal weapons and ammunition were
seized. Several thousand weapons of all varieties were confiscated during this period
1 A technical was a pickup truck like vehicle with a heavy caliber machine gun mounted on it. These
weapon systems were used by criminal elements as well as the clans to extort relief agencies and attack
enemies.
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However, "the more weapons fished out of Mogadishu the more seemed to remain
hidden."
2
By mid January of 1993, UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in
southern and central Somalia. Because of the number of foreign forces that had joined
Operation Restore Hope, the first contingent of U.S. military personnel began to leave on
January 19th. The United States' immediate goal was to quickly turn over the operation
to a second UN force: United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) It was not
until March 1993 that UNOSOM II took administrative control and military command.
E. UNOSOM U: PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRACY
1. Disarmament
UNOSOM II was originally conceived as a peacekeeping operation that called for
the building of a secure environment and the rehabilitation of Somalia's political
institutions. The United States provided logistical support for this mission as well as
3,000 personnel. In addition to these forces, the United States also provided 1, 150
soldiers from the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division to supply a "rapid response when
specific threats, attacks or other emergencies exceeded the capabilities of other
UNOSOM II forces" (Metz, 1993, p. 53). This force was called the Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) and was commanded by Major General Thomas M. Montgomery.
One of the crucial tasks that fell to UNOSOM II was the disarmament of all
Somali factions and armed groups. This generated hostility from several clan leaders
who not only refused to cooperate in the disarmament process but also openly displayed
their noncompliance by setting up random roadblocks to frustrate relief distribution and
by attacking soft targets. The Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the faction of the
2 Quote from GYSGT Steven Hamby, Intelligence Chief, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.
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USC controlled by Aideed were the principal opposition forces to UNOSOM II, and they
were resorting to violence to frustrate its efforts. Aideed's opposition to the UN now was
arising due to the increasingly less important role he was playing in the formation of a
new Somali state. Furthermore, as peace settled across Somalia there existed less of a
need for a strongman to dominate the traditionally unruly clan structure As such, Aideed
began to see the UN reconstruction of his country as a direct attack on his clan and
personal ambitions at becoming the supreme leader of a new Somalia that "he" had
liberated from Barre. The small-scale attacks and open noncompliance during this early
period were the beginning signs of a significant rupture of one of the most dangerous and
powerful men in Somalia.
2. Peacekeeping
Concurrent with the activities of disarmament were the UN's efforts to help
Somalia establish the political framework necessary for the transition to a stable
government. Towards this end, the UN organized a series of Somali Peace conferences
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to assist in the creation of a Somali State based on
democratic principles. The Somali conferences held in January, March, and April of
1993 were attended by hundreds of clan leaders representing all of the major Somali
clans. In the initial meetings, strong support of clans for one of the two rival Mahdi and
Aideed factions was still evident. However, as peace began to return to Somalia, many
clans broke with General Aideed and supported the democratic model being developed at
the Peace Conferences. The concept of barring any one clan or ruler from dominating
state affairs resonated with most of the delegates, who had suffered severely under
Barre' s regime.
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Aideed's popularity was decreasing, and his status was becoming increasingly
marginalized by many of his former supporters. As the UN began promising protection
and financial assistance to ease Somalia into democracy, Aideed's designs to rule
Somalia were falling on less sympathetic ears. At the heart of the Somali Peace
conferences was the framing of a new Somali Government. If the Somalis could
organize themselves and set a suitable timetable for the establishment of a government,
the United Nations would finance the entire effort. At stake were billions of dollars in
investments that would flow into a democratic Somalia.
When the Second Peace Conference ended on the 28th of March, Aideed's
USC/SNA party had lost significant support from many of the central and southern
factions. Aideed left the conference early and never returned. This critically important
fact was noticed but hardly understood or attended to by U.S. and UN representatives.
Aideed's rejection by his fellow countrymen and loss of support and power was
perceived by him to be due expressly to the UNOSOM II initiatives.
With peace restored and the UN military forces ready to protect them, many clans
that had previously supported Aideed out of fear now voted against him and elected a
federal style democratic government. They had been ruled for twenty-one years under
the despotic Barre regime and believed supporting Aideed would only produce another
despot.
After the third conference took place in late May, Aideed made several obvious
overtures of discontent aimed at U.S. and UN leaders. Then, intent on not being reduced
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to a secondary role in any future Somali government, Aideed launched his first serious
attack against the UN.
F. ARMED CONFLICT
The event described below marks the first of a series of armed conflicts between
U.S. and UN forces and Aideed' s faction that would culminate in a protracted, daylong
battle. This initial incident dramatically reversed the direction of the momentum
achieved by the UN in helping Somalia find the road to peaceful, self-ruling order It also
demonstrates how poorly intelligence and decision-makers misread the Aideed threat.
Aideed's forces can be initially framed as a low-order, non-conventional threat
that harnessed inherent asymmetries of size, decentralization, agility and adaptiveness to
counter UN military forces in the streets of Mogadishu. As military pressure increased,
however, and Aideed and his leaders became the victims of an intense manhunt, a
transformation occurs. The former, disorganized rabble of Aideed's militia is catalyzed
by the violent UN response and evolves and adapts to the conventional war dominance
displayed by UN military forces and weaponry. This transformation was not detected
and left unchecked, Aideed and his militia evolved and developed powerful asymmetries
that allowed them to gain influence out of proportion to their political and military
strength. Perhaps one of Aideed's most powerful asymmetries ignored or undetected by
intelligence and decision-makers was how civilian casualties would gain Aideed
popularity and ultimately contribute to his victory over the UN mission.
1. Aideed Opposes UN - The June 5th Incident
One June 5, 1993, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 54 were wounded in a
series of ambushes and armed attacks throughout the Aideed-controlled sectors of
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Mogadishu. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu.
After an investigation, it was determined that the attacks were part of a calculated
and premeditated series of cease-fire violations by Aideed's militia to prevent by
intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate. In response the UN launched a
series of air and ground military actions. Radio Aideed was destroyed as well as several
weapon storage sites and clandestine military facilities. Thousands of Somali civilians
were killed in Mogadishu during the course of the UN retaliation, strengthening support
for Aideed's cause. Somali had been under foreign domination for much of its modern
history and the UN forces had suddenly turned into another colonial power. Aideed
instead of being a non-factor in Somali policies as its seemed he might become following
the peace accords in Ethiopia, became the clear leader of the Somali people facing
Western imperialism.
On June 17th 1993, with clear evidence implicating Aideed and his SNA militia
in the attack, the UN called on Aideed to surrender peacefully to UNOSOM II and to
urge his followers to surrender their arms. Aideed refused to surrender and continued to
attack UNOSOM II operations. During this period his power and influence grew as
disaffected Somalis, outraged by the UN's military actions, joined Aideed's militia.
After the incident on June 5th 1993, in United Nations Security Council drafted
and passed Resolution 837 calling for the apprehension of those responsible. The United
States played an important role in the passage of this resolution, which led to the United
States taking charge of the manhunt to bring in the clan warlord Mohammed Faraah
Aideed.
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2. Deployment of Task Force Ranger
Hostilities between UN forces and Somalis increased as the manhunt for Aideed
continued. The combined activities of the UN manhunt and the ambitious disarmament
mission ofUNOSOM II forces posed a direct threat to the clans of Somalia, and they in
turn resisted the UNOSOM efforts. On August 8, four US Army soldiers were killed
when a command-detonated mine exploded under their vehicle; Aideed's forces were
known to be responsible for the incident. After another mine exploded on August 22,
injuring six Americans, following this President Clinton announced that U.S. forces
would participate in the manhunt for Aideed.
Task Force Ranger (TFR) was given the manhunt assignment. TFR was
commanded by Army Major General William F. Garrison and consisted of Delta Force
Commands from Ft. Bragg, NC; a Special Forces helicopter detachment from Ft
Cambell, KY; and Army Rangers from Ft. Benning, GA. In Somalia, Garrison did not
fall under the operational command ofMG Montgomery, although they maintained a
close working relationship to allow for coordination ofTFR operations and the QRF.
3. Bakara Market Raid - October 3, 1993
In its search for Aideed, TFR relied on information from Somali agents, as other
sophisticated collection techniques were useless in tracking the low-technology enemy.
Acting on intelligence from such agents, TFR executed several raids into the Bakara
Market neighborhood in south Mogadishu. After numerous failed attempts to capture
Aideed, General Garrison changed his short term objective and decided instead to capture
Aideed's closest military advisers in the hope of pressuring Aideed to come out into the
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open. The raid on October 3 was the seventh raid Task Force Ranger conducted in
Mogadishu. Like the six previous raids, TFR planned to attack during daylight hours,
rely almost exclusively on heliborne insertion and extraction, and gave numerous
indications of its impending mission through a flurry of activity at the highly visible
airport. (Atkinson, Jan 30, 1994)
The ground tactics of the October 3 raid were also similar to those used in the
previous six attempts. Delta Force (part of TFR) was to fly to the objective while
members of the Army's 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment headed by Lieutenant
Colonel (LTC) McKnight would drive to the target. It was planned that, following the
capture of Aideed's staff, the prisoners would be transported back to the airport by
McKnight's forces due to restricted landing space for the large UH-60 Black Hawks
around the target building, while Delta Force would be extracted by air.
The unanticipated chain of events that followed the actual raid will be described
in detail and will be shown later in this chapter to have had tremendous implications for
UNOSOM II and the future stability of Somalia. The chronology of events below
documents the approximately 15 hours of combat operations that occurred on the
afternoon and following night of October 3, 1993.
At 1300 a Somali agent reported that Aideed's military advisers were meeting that
afternoon near the Olympic Hotel in the Bakara Market area. The agent identified two of
the lieutenants by name, Omar Salad Elmi and Mohammed Hassad TFR planners
identified the target building from a Hughes 530-reconnaissance helicopter, with the crew
observing the Somali agent as he drove by the building, stopped, looked under his hood,
and then drove.
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At 1455, MG Montgomery and MG Garrison discussed the impending mission
during a hurried phone call. Both commanders agreed that the Bakara Market area was
potentially dangerous, with Montgomery telling Garrison "... That's really Indian
country. That's a bad place" (Atkinson, January 31, 1994).
At 1500, Delta's C Squadron and a support element from the Rangers boarded
helicopters at their airfield headquarters only to quickly disembark for an intelligence
update. As it turned out, the agent that had identified the location of the meeting was
frightened during the earlier target reconnaissance and had marked a building that was
one block west from the target building. With amended maps, the raid force re-boarded
their helicopters and departed the airfield at approximately 1537.
At 1540 the Delta Force assault element of the raid force flew into the objective
area on Hiwadag Street aboard four MH-6 Little Bird helicopters. Billowing dust clouds
kicked up by the supporting Black Hawks created a "brown out" that blinded pilots and
raiders alike. Despite the poor visibility, the Delta assault element quickly jumped from
its aircraft and stormed into the building. The Rangers from the support element were not
so fortunate; Ranger PFC Blackburn lost his grip on the fast rope and plummeted 40 feet
to the street, sustaining serious injuries that required immediate evacuation. The ground
convoy, led by the Ranger Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel McKnight, arrived
at the target and immediately detached three vehicles to medevac an injured Ranger to the
airfield.
Between 1540 and 1610 the assault element swept through the building and
collected 24 prisoners including two senior Aideed lieutenants. LTC McKnight's Ranger
support element was waiting to extract the prisoners by ground convoy.
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After loading the prisoners into a five-ton truck, the nine-vehicle convoy departed
for the Joint Operations Command Center at the airfield. Relieved of their prisoners, the
Delta assault force called for their planed helicopter extraction. Unknown to Task Force
Ranger, however, hundreds ofgunman from Aideed's militia had converged on the raid
site during the preceding 30 minutes and suddenly massed rocket-propelled grenade and
small arms fire on the American helicopters.
At 1610, a Somali RPG struck a Black Hawk, call sign Super Six-One, that was
hovering overhead and brought it crashing down into an alley off Freedom Road,
approximately 300 yards east of the assault objective.
Although this was a serious problem, TFR had developed and rehearsed three
contingency plans in anticipation of losing a helicopter:
1. Insert 15 soldiers from a combat Search and Rescue (SAR) Black Hawk to
secure and provide medical aid at the crash site.
2. Dispatch a company sized quick reaction force (QFR).
3. Divert the main body of the TFR raid force from the target (objective building)
to the crash site.
MG Garrison learned of the crash while hovering over the objective in his
command helicopter. He initiated all three response plans almost simultaneously. Task
Force Ranger provided the first response with a MH-6 Little Bird helicopter from the raid
force that was on scene. The pilot daringly flew down and hovered next to the wreckage,
braving a torrent of Somali gunfire. As the pilot flew with one hand and fired a machine
pistol out the cockpit window with the other, the co-pilot jumped out and assisted two
wounded Delta snipers into the back of the helicopter. This left Super Six-One's two
pilots (both killed in the crash and pinned in the wreckage), two injured crew chiefs, and
one Delta sniper remaining at the crash site.
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The combat SAR Black Hawk soon arrived on scene and delivered 15 soldiers to
the crash site via fast rope. With two soldiers still on the ropes, Somali gunman nearly
severed the Black Hawk's rotor system from the fuselage with an RPG. The pilot
managed to maintain his hover until the last two soldiers were safely on Freedom Road,
and then flew back to the airfield to save his aircraft.
MG Garrison diverted the TFR ground convoy away from its route to the airport
and back to the crash site. From Garrison's perspective, this probably appeared a simple
matter of the convoy traveling two blocks north and three blocks east. From the ground,
however, McKnight saw a maze of alleys and streets that were rapidly filling with Somali
gunmen. Small arms and RPG fire raked the convoy from all directions, and an
exploding RPG round decapitated an American truck driver. With the convoy suddenly
in a fight for its own survival, Garrison ordered it to return to the airfield.
Despite the continuing heavy RPG fires, U.S. helicopters remained over the crash
site to provide close-in fire support for the soldiers on the ground. Swarms of Somalis
surrounding the crash site challenged the hovering gunships, and the sheer number of
militia forced gunners to ignore those with rifles and focus on those armed with RPG's.
At 1645 a second Black Hawk, Super Six-Four, was hit in the tail by an RPG
while hovering over the crash site. Spinning out of control, the helicopter crashed into a
neighborhood approximately one-half mile south of the Olympic Hotel The four-man
crew apparently survived the crash, although what happened afterwards is not clear. The
pilot vanished from the crash site and was never seen alive again, while the co-pilot,
Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, lay trapped and critically injured in the wreckage.
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Suddenly faced with having to defend a second crash site, Garrison launched both
the QRF Company from the airfield and a small Ranger relief column. Shortly after
departing the airfield, both convoys were ambushed by Somali gunmen and were
essentially blocked from advancing to the crash sites. The Ranger column turned back
almost immediately, while the QRF Company fought successive ambushes for 30
minutes before returning to the airfield at 1914. Neither force had been accompanied by
armored vehicles to increase their survivability and firepower.
After learning of the failed ground rescue attempts, the Delta squadron
commander allowed one of his Black Hawks, Super Six-Two, to deliver reinforcements
to the second crash site. The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Goffens, dropped two
Delta snipers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shugart, in
a clearing 100 meters southwest of the second crash site. Upon clearing the landing zone
(LZ), however, Goffens noticed the two snipers were having difficulty finding the crash
site through the maze of shacks and cactus. Hovering over the site, Goffens directed
Gordon and Shugart to the wreckage and remained on the scene until an RPG exploded
against the right side of his helicopter. Miraculously, Goffens kept the Black Hawk
airborne long enough to make a crash landing at the New Port.
Shugart and Gordon reached the crash site and managed to free Durant from the
wreckage. With the air cover gone, however, hundreds of Somali gunmen surrounded the
three Americans and closed to within 30 yards of the aircraft. Shugart and Gordon fought
valiantly and were hit repeatedly by small arms fire in their vain attempt to defend the
crash site. With Shugart and Gordon mortally wounded, the Somalis quickly swarmed
the crash site and captured Durant, who was subsequently held in captivity for eleven
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days before his release. Durant's testimony of Shugart's and Gordon's valor resulted in
their posthumous award of the Medal of Honor.
Nightfall came and the fighting continued around the initial crash site. Garrison
and Montgomery oversaw planning to launch a third ground rescue attempt from the New
Port, using a battalion sized task force consisting of the 10th Mountain Division's 2nd
Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, a Pakistani tank company, 32 Malaysian Armored
Personnel Carriers, and a ten-man detachment from Task Force Ranger. Lieutenant
Colonel David assumed command of the task force.
At the crash site several soldiers labored in the darkness to remove the pilot's
body from the Super Six-One's wreckage. The Delta squadron commander and the
soldiers on site refused to allow the Somalis to claim another American body and would
not leave until they could free him. The soldiers found cover in several houses along
Freedom Road, some of which still housed approximately 20 Somali women and
children. Although these Somalis were not harmed, Somali leaders later claimed that
American soldiers held them hostage and used them as shields during the battle. U.S.
military commanders later refuted this, citing security concerns for the troops at the crash
site and safety concerns of the Somali families as justification for retaining the homes.
At 2324, David's QRF departed the New Port for the first crash site. Leading with
the Pakistani tank commander, the QRF encountered a roadblock approximately one
kilometer from the port facility. The Pakistani commander refused to lead the column
from this point on, resulting in the Malaysian APC's assuming the lead (Casper, 1994).
Shortly thereafter the two lead APC's took a wrong turn and were destroyed by RPG fire.
The main body continued to move and triggered a second ambush approximately 500
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meters farther down the road. The lead tank stopped to return fire, effectively halting the
convoy for nearly half an hour. Upon resuming the march, the QRF divided into two
elements, Terminator and Tiger. Terminator proceeded towards the first crash site (Super
Six One) and Tiger towards the second (Super Six Four).
The Terminator element, carried by Malaysian APC's, encountered sniper fire
from the Olympic Hotel and dismounted to engage. They suppressed the Somali fire but
sustained three casualties in the process. Gradually working their way towards the crash
site over the next hour, they eventually arrived at 0155 and linked up with the Task Force
Ranger personnel. They remained at the crash site until dawn, when a FfUMVEE
succeeded in prying apart the helicopter wreckage to allow them to recover the pilot's
body.
The Tiger element arrived at the second crash site at 0145, finding only blood
trails leading away from the helicopter wreckage. Somali RPG gunners quickly engaged
Tiger's APC's with hundreds ofRPG rounds, inflicting several casualties and disabling
two APC's. While coordinating air support and direct fires against the Somali forces, the
Tiger element used thermite grenades to destroy sensitive equipment left in the helicopter
wreckage. The battle continued through the night, with repeated sorties from Specter
AC- 130 gunships and other helicopter gunships.
By 0700 on 4 October all forces had returned to a hastily prepared aid station in
Mogadishu's sports stadium. Initial counts of U.S. casualties numbered 18 dead and 84
wounded; the Malaysians counted one man dead and seven wounded.
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4. Outcomes of the Raid
The raid had several immediate results. First, the attack caused the United
Nations to call off its manhunt for General Aideed. Simultaneously, this clan leader
became a local hero whose prestige and power were heightened for having stood up to
the greatest military power on earth. Furthermore, the loss of thousands of Somalis who
were killed during the defense and rescue of Task Force Ranger further alienated the
United Nations Mission from the Somali people.
Following the raid, UN efforts at patrolling in the streets of Mogadishu were kept
to a minimum. UN and U.S. forces kept to their compounds, avoiding any potential
conflicts with the Somali population. Task Force Ranger was sent home.
Having suffered an embarrassing number of casualties, President Clinton
announced a deadline of 31 March 1994 for the withdrawal of American forces from
Somalia. Other nations soon followed suit, and by December it was clear that UNOSOM
II was over. All significant nation-building efforts were halted as each of the
participating nations prepared to withdraw from Somalia.
Despite his success in ridding the country of interfering international forces,
Aideed did not become the uncontested leader of the new Somali State. Anarchy and
chaos continued to rule the impoverished nation, and Aideed was unable to dominate the
rival clans. He was shot and killed by an assassin late in 1996.
G. ANALYSIS OF AIDEED'S MILITIA AS A NEW ORDER THREAT
In analyzing the Bakara Market incident, and the events that preceded it, a major
question must be asked: How was it possible for Aideed to mount a defense of this
magnitude without American intelligence having the least indication?
145
Understanding the answer to this question will reveal significant clues into
emerging, non-conventional threat operations. Most importantly, it will highlight the
ineffectiveness of present day tactical intelligence when confronted with these types of
threats.
This analysis will begin by first looking at the question of surprise and attempting
to provide insight into why American forces stumbled into Aideed's ambush. The
analysis will conclude with a brief look at Aideed's suspected defensive plan By
analyzing the complexity of the Mogadishan defense, compelling clues emerge as to the
purpose and commitment of Aideed and his clan in expelling the UN from Somalia.
1. Surprise?
Mogadishu is a relatively large city. On 3 October 1993, in less than an hour,
Aideed's forces managed to seal off the city with sophisticated and well defended
barricades, mobilize thousands of militia, and coordinate the fires of mortars, RPGs, and
other weapon systems. In short, Aideed's forces built a highly organized militia and
developed a complex defense plan without revealing any of this to American intelligence.
It seems unbelievable that an ambush and defense as complex and large as what
erupted that day could have escaped intelligence's attention, for key indications of
Aideed's growing power existed since the very day the Marines landed in December of
1992.
Major indications like the vast quantities of weapons that existed in Mogadishu,
the military like atmosphere that surrounded Aideed's headquarters, and the high numbers
of former Barre military officers and soldiers aligned to Aideed's cause were rampant and
hard to misunderstand. Other less obvious but equally important clues existed as well,
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such as Aideed's open disaffection with the Peace Process. Additionally, the full scale
confrontation that occurred in February 1993 when Aideed's forces suddenly began firing
artillery and mortars at Mahdi's forces on the other side of Mogadishu was another
powerful indicator that Aideed was not a small, insignificant stakeholder. Most telling
however, was the Pakistani incident in June. This and other terrorist-like attacks that
occurred from June to September were all strong signals of an increasingly more
powerful and discontented Aideed.
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that an accurate assessment of Aideed's
strength was made by American military intelligence before the October 3 raid. The
conversation between Montgomery and Garrison prior to launching the raid highlights
this lack of appreciation for Aideed's power when they refer to the raid site as simply
being in "bad guy" territory.
The Bakara Market always has always considered bad guy territory. Almost
always congested, it was an excellent environment for gangs of armed Somali men to
attack unsuspecting troops who, constrained by the Rules of Engagement, couldn't fight
their way out for fear of harming innocent bystanders. Consequently it was often
avoided, and little patrolling activity occurred there.
However, what occurred on 3 October proved that this bad guy's territory
extended far beyond the confines of the Bakara Market. Indeed, Aideed's militia seized
nearly the entire city and effectively sealed it preventing anything short of armored
columns to enter. Yet nothing discovered by this author suggests that a full appreciation
of Aideed's strength existed prior to 3 October. It is a proposal of this thesis that this
absence of adequate intelligence and understanding about the extent of Aideed's power
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and influence can account for the element of surprise so obviously experienced by the
raiding forces.
2. Characterizing Aideed's Defense
Three salient points emerge from a study of Aideed's ambush ofTFR and his
ensuing defense of Mogadishu. First, Aideed's preparations where highly organized and
complex. Second, Aideed'sforces were decentralized and led by experts. And third, the
ambush was not happenstance: it was a concerted effort by Aideed's faction to attack the
U.S. and UN, inflict politically inflammatory casualties, andforce a withdrawal. Aideed
knew that striking at America's political will would bring about the collapse of the
international effort in his country. Flis plan was to force this collapse and prepare the
way for his restoration as the de facto leader of Somalia.
a. Complex and Highly Organized Plan
Based on the events surrounding the October 3 incident, it is almost
certain that Task Force Ranger was ambushed. After six successive and identical raids in
less than thirty days, it is not unreasonable to assume that Aideed and his forces had a
fairly good idea ofhow an American attack would be conducted. Furthermore,
Mogadishu had been under heavy American presence for nearly a year, and Mogadishan's
had grown accustomed to American patrolling tactics and the incessant overhead air
traffic generated primarily by low flying helicopters.
Evidence that Aideed had conducted advanced preparations and achieved
a high degree of organization among his militia is readily at hand. When Task Force
Ranger landed on the Olympic Hotel, Aideed's militia immediately mobilized. It is likely
that a brief radio transmission alerting commanders was sent throughout the Mogadishu
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cordon. If radio communications were not used, foot or vehicle messengers were
probably used instead. In any case, in less than an hour a large and powerful militia
began to mobilize, roadblocks were constructed, and mortars and anti aircraft guns were
deployed for action.
Other evidence of deliberate planning for the ambush is apparent in the
hundreds of swarming militia who immediately converged on the raid site. Firing from
neighboring buildings and attacking from adjacent streets, Aideed's militia attacked the
main assembly area where the Task Force commandos were exfiltrating via helicopters.
During this initial confrontation Army helicopter pilots describe how dozens of Somali's
fired volley after volley ofRPG rounds at their hovering aircraft (Atkinson, January 31,
1994). When the first helicopter went down within a few short minutes after their attack,
the Somali militia seemed to gain confidence and become more daring. Confident
because they had been able to down a symbol of American and UN strength, hundreds of
militia forces began swarming through the streets firing at any American target. RPG
gunners focused on hovering aircraft, while militiamen armed with assault rifles swarmed
over the downed helicopter.
While Aideed's militia attacked the Task Force located around the crash
and extraction sites, a strategically complex and deliberate defense began to develop
around the city to seal the trapped Americans in and prevent any forces from entering.
Based on fragmentary accounts, it appears that Aideed divided Mogadishu into distinct
sectors. Faithful lieutenants, who more than likely served under Aideed in the former
Somali Army, may have commanded them. Once word was given to seal the city, each
of the sectors mobilized its forces and established complex barriers to prevent entry into
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Mogadishu. A sizeable force, armed with many different weapons including RPG's,
grenades, small arms, and possibly crew-served machine guns, defended all the barriers.
So tight and effective was the defense that nothing short of an armored forced entry could
penetrate it. Repeated American attempts to forcibly enter the city were staunchly beaten
back by a well-orchestrated militia that wielded a superior amount of firepower and
manpower.
During the battle, mortars and one known ZSU 23-2 anti-aircraft weapon
system were deployed to support Aideed's militia. One account states that Aideed as
central commander maintained the fire control over these weapons. During the fierce
night battle where several U.S. commandos sought refuge in houses filled with Somali
women and children, mortar fire was requested. Apparently, Aideed denied the fire
mission, refusing to fire on a house that may have contained innocent Somali women and
children.
In combination with each other, these events describe a highly complex
ambush and defensive plan. Organized into sectors, and aware of their distinct missions,
Aideed's militia deployed a formidable force that brought Task Force Ranger to its knees
and sealed Mogadishu off from outside attack for over 10 hours
b. Decentralized and Led by Experts
Aideed's militia was greatly enhanced by the number of experienced
soldiers that aligned themselves with Aideed's faction. Indeed, Aideed's ambush and
defense illustrate all the signs of a highly trained cadre of leaders conducting guerrilla
style warfare with untrained, Third World rabble. Themselves trained during the Cold
War in various Soviet war colleges, Aideed and his lieutenants were experts on guerrilla,
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low intensity warfare. Additionally, many of these same lieutenants were combat
veterans of Barre's Ethiopian campaigns. These former soldiers brought Aideed's militia
military discipline and knowledge that proved instrumental during the 3 October ambush
The level of expertise leading his forces allowed Aideed to develop a
complex defense. Assigning trusted, highly trained lieutenants to the each of the defense
sectors, Aideed was able to build a decentralized force that could respond rapidly to any
developing threat. Knowing the Americans could jam any radio communications or target
radio sites for destruction, this form of organization was crucial to success. Furthermore,
the decentralized nature of his force gave local lieutenants tremendous flexibility. This
flexibility no doubt contributed to the impenetrable barrier developed around Mogadishu
in lightning fast time.
3. Aideed's Achievement in Non-Conventional Terms
During the battle, Aideed's militia suffered horrendous losses. While no exact
body count was ever published, repeated sorties from KC-130 gunships and attack
helicopters were launched during the eighteen-hour ordeal. Hundreds of thousands of
rounds were fired into Mogadishu's streets. The true body count must have been
staggering. Yet, Aideed's battle with American and UN forces was not about conserving
forces and fighting another day. Indeed, Aideed fully understood that his rabble of
uneducated, poorly trained forces was no match for the technologically superior
American Army. Rather, the 3 October ambush was part of a concerted effort, begun
months before, to destabilize the UN's position in Somalia and guarantee Aideed's
position as Somalia's dictator.
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A student of several Soviet war colleges, Aideed was trained in special tactics and
knew how to wage war against established power. After all, he had only two years before
successfully ejected Barre from power using many of the same tactics he now employed
against the American and UN operation.
Marginalized by the Peace Conferences and losing power amongst the clans allied
with him, Aideed began a campaign as early as March of 1993 to gain the necessary
support to become the next ruler of Somalia. His plans were frustrated, however, by the
success of the UN effort. Impressed with the commitment of the UN to rebuild Somalia
and establish a new democratic government, many clan leaders turned their attention
away from Aideed and supported the UN proposals. By May of 1993 Aideed was
finished with the UN. He understood plainly that the political system that was
developing in Somalia was not going to accommodate him as supreme leader.
Consequently, he began a slow and methodical guerrilla campaign designed to embarrass
the UN mission and negatively influence the political will of the participating nations.
This first violent action occurred in June, when 25 Pakistanis were killed in an
ambush. Reacting violently, the UN killed hundreds of innocent Somali's in several
retaliation raids. By September of 1993, Somalia had been turned upside down. Clans
that once wavered in their support again aligned themselves with Aideed's USC faction.
In just four months, from May to September, Aideed had risen to national hero status,
reversed the popularity of the UN and the Nation Building operation, and had charged the
situation in Mogadishu to the boiling point. When the 3 October incident occurred, he
had built a sizeable militia and was ready to launch his coup de grace. Acutely aware that
American causalities would electrify the American public and create strong political
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opposition to continued American operations in Somalia, Aideed framed his attack to
produce maximum American casualties, regardless of the cost to his own forces
The 3 October raid presented the perfect vehicle for Aideed's plan. Twenty four
hours later, 18 Americans were dead, Mogadishu was a virtual death trap, and every
nation participating in the UN mission was clamoring to get out of Somali. Aideed had
won.
H. SUMMARY
Using the warfare of emerging, non-conventional threats, Aideed and his militia
overwhelmed what was designed to be a relatively small scale, precision UN/U.S.
operation conducted with the most advanced equipment and most highly trained
personnel in the world. The success of Aideed in this particular October 3 incident was
dramatically aided by the lack of appropriate intelligence about the nature and magnitude
of the threat he posed. This failure to acknowledge a New Order Threat, as described in
previous chapters of this thesis, can be attributed to the configuration of an intelligence
organization designed for a past era where threats were centralized, predictable and could
be monitored and tracked successfully using sophisticated sensors.
Aideed could not be understood because his power did not reside in equipment,
technology or organized, centralized forces. Rather Aideed's power centered on his
ability to estrange the UN mission and influence the Somali people to take up arms.
Therefore, intelligence practices were neutralized and unable to read the Aideed threat for
what it was because the traditional signals that alert intelligence were not there. Aideed's
forces were low technology and networked. They communicated by messenger and
combat power resided in mass human waves of lightly armed people that one minute
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would be a crowd at the market and the next a khat crazed stampede of rioting militia.
The technology-centric approach to intelligence where sensors and rote intelligence
processes dominate, is misaligned with this environment. These emerging New Order
Threats do not operate like the threats of the past. They cannot be monitored using only
sophisticated sensors and traditional intelligence practices. As demonstrated an
intelligence enterprise so configured will fail to recognize and understand these threats.
Therefore, New Order Threats will operate unchecked and gain influence that is out of
proportion to their military strength.
Accordingly, a new intelligence enterprise must be designed that can recognize
and monitor these asymmetric adversaries. The next chapter concludes this work by
recommending a new intelligence organization designed to enhance human intellect and
create a complimentary interface between the man and machine interface demanded by
the emerging threat environment. This network-centric intelligence enterprise shifts the
organization from rote information processing to intellect centric, knowledge creation. It
does this by pushing responsibility outward, flattening and removing hierarchy,
decentralizing and creating a virtual organization that harnesses the expertise of a wide
field of experts inside and outside of government. The reader is reminded, nonetheless,
that the New Order Threat environment represents such complexity that it will seriously
challenge even the network intelligence enterprise configured expressly to meet its
challenge.
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VH. DESIGNING AN AGILE MARINE GROUND INTELLIGENCE
ENTERPRISE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. OVERVIEW
Marine intelligence is a product of the industrial age. It is configured for the
predictable conventional adversaries ofWWII and the Cold War. It relies on centralized
control, vertical hierarchy and rigid, formulaic processes.
In Chapter IV, Chinese asymmetric responses to American conventional
dominance were highlighted. As described previously, both the missile and the
reorganization of Chinese ground units represent modern-day manifestations of defense
realignment spurred by American war dominance. This push to develop asymmetries
presents American forces with serious dilemmas. As they are perfected and proliferate,
they render obsolete many of the advantages of American conventional forces. For
example, unable to track Chinese forces because they are hard to identify, early warning
capabilities are frustrated. Also, missile locations and strengths cannot be identified
because they are hidden from traditional monitoring systems, preventing early warning
and response. Even tactics cannot be predicted because fighting style is decentralized
and unpredictable, creating havoc for intelligence, which must forecast enemy actions.
Each of these transformations poses serious challenges to an intelligence organization
designed to operate against predictable, regimented forces.
In Chapters V and VI, the inherent asymmetries associated with emerging non-
conventional threats were described to underscore their highly adaptive nature and
powerful operational capabilities. As mentioned, associated with their unique
asymmetries, non-conventional threats are able to organize into network designs that
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provide them with significant advantages over traditional law enforcement and modern
militaries. Quick to adapt, difficult to detect and nearly impossible to destroy, this threat
is spreading and growing more powerful. Not unlike asymmetric militaries, these
emerging threats also render irrelevant many of the advantages of American power and
technological dominance. Often confused with crime or simple police work, inadequate
measures are taken to combat them. Left alone they evolve and form complex,
collaborative enterprises with peers that strengthen their operations and make them
increasingly more powerful. Because of their unique nature, traditional intelligence
practices are unsuitable for tracking and analyzing their actions. As a result, they often
go undetected, and when they strike they confound and overwhelm.
Taken together, both asymmetric military and non-conventional threats present a
New Order of Threats that challenge an intelligence function designed for a the threat
environment of the past. In contrast, New Order Threats are, unconventional, networked,
agile, adaptable, evolving, asymmetric, non-linear and configured to operate across the
political, economic and mass media spectrum. These attributes enable tremendous
battlefield advantage. Because of these unique capabilities they overwhelm a
bureaucratic intelligence enterprise configured for a different environment (See Figure
7.1).
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New Order Threat Environment
and USMC Intelligence Misalignment
Figure 7.1. New Order Threats and the Intelligence Bureaucracy.
B. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
As presented in Chapter III, Marine Corps ground intelligence is organized
around four bureaucratic elements (centralization of assets and power, standardization of
task, organizational control, and divisional structure) and is currently misaligned with its
operating environment and task.
A parallel misalignment may be found between the American industrial
bureaucracies of the recent past and the changing competitive environment they faced.
Corporate leaders oversaw huge bureaucracies that, like military intelligence, were
centralized, hierarchical, wedded to systems and machines; inflexible, but assembly line
efficient. In the early 1980's, after having spent years perfecting industrial age processes'.
1
In the late 1 970's auto industry executives, frustrated with ever increasing labor costs, designed a system
that incorporated the latest advances in information technology in an effort to reduce the need for skilled
labor They built an advanced production control system with decision processing capabilities. Despite
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these organizations discovered that their structure and operations no longer synchronized
with the demands of their environment. American industry found itself in a new era, the
information age, which brought with it a fundamental paradigm shift. Knowledge and
intellect emerged as the building block for success, displacing the large bureaucratic
enterprise designed to manage huge capital and labor infrastructures. Faced with
competitors that could produce comparable quality goods at lower prices, many
corporations had to adapt or go out of business.
Continuing the analogy, the military can be said to confront turbulence on the
battlefield as private industry faces the uncertainties of the marketplace. In interwar
periods, however, a fundamental difference between the two exists in that mistakes in
environmental adaptation can spell financial disaster for industry, while no apparent
impending adversity compels the redesign of the professional peacetime military
establishment.
In industry, the stock market and constant competition triggers needed change or
validates previous practices, reminding corporations on a daily basis of their need to be
flexible and adapt to an ever changing environment. Unsure of what the competition will
do or how the market will respond, companies must decide whether to invest in new
strategies that could involve billions of dollars. In the hypercompetitive marketplace,
successful companies must be agile and uniquely organized to know and understand their
operational environment. In the process of conforming to the information age
environment, industry has adopted a new paradigm. With rare exception, the success and
these efforts, the industry remained tied to a rigid, hierarchical bureaucracy. As a result, the system proved
inadequate to meet more efficient Japanese competitors. Tied to bureaucratic processes and design, the
centralized authority was unable to keep pace with the market conditions. One analyst observed that "the
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productivity of firms facing environmental instability, like high-technology industries, lie
more in the firm's intellectual prowess than in physical assets like manufacturing plants,
property, and equipment (Quinn, 1992).
For the peacetime military establishment, no gauge exists to deliver such overt
signals as the stock market sends business. In fact, it generally takes a war to induce
revolutionary change in military design and practices, and it is usually only in wartime
that such changes can be tested for their efficiency.
The work of this final chapter is to suggest profound change, a paradigm shift, in
the way ground intelligence is organized using proven concepts developed by industry in
the competitive market place. Two major themes are developed in this chapter.
First, it is argued that intellect, not rote information processing, is the key to
properly configuring ground intelligence for twenty-first century warfare. Accordingly,
this chapter describes the relationship between intelligence and intellect; it articulates
what intellect is, its nature and unique value adding qualities. The pivotal role intellect
plays in understanding the increasing demands New Order Threats place on intelligence
will be described, making it apparent that ground intelligence must be configured around
a technology that seamlessly interfaces both human intellect and machine processes.
Achievement of this seamless interface requires a new organizational design that
optimizes the intellectual potential of the organization. Therefore, the second half of this
chapter suggests the network as the new organizational form that best harnesses and
leverages intellect and systems to respond and adapt to the challenges of a turbulent and
chaotic environment.
American auto industry had perfected the methods of fighting the last war and. this time, the Japanese beat
the pants off them!"(Macgregor, 1997, p. 35)
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C. THE ROLE OF INTELLECT IN MARINE INTELLIGENCE
1. Analysis of Threat Types
First, examine the steps involved in the analysis of the four types of military
threats described in this thesis (See Table 7.1). Two of the threats are traditional (a
twentieth century conventional military attack like the Iraqi attack in the Gulf War and a
non-conventional attack like street gang violence or Mafia hits), and two of them are
New Order (an asymmetric military attack like the hypothetical Chinese PLA attack on
Taiwan and an emerging, non-conventional attack like Aideed's attack in Somalia).
For simplicity, the analytical steps have been reduced into four broad categories,
as defined below.
Detection is the recognition that the enemy is attacking.
Identification is the understanding of who the enemy is.
Localization is the understanding of where the enemy is, his intentions and
capabilities.
Assessment is the understanding of the enemy's strategy and critical vulnerabilities

















Detection Not Hard Not Hard Very Hard Very Hard
Identification Not Hard Not Hard Very Hard Very Hard
Localization Hard Hard Very Hard Very Hard
Assessment Very Hard Very Hard Very Hard Very Hard
Table 7.1. Threat Analysis of Traditional and New Order Threats.
After (Berkowitz, 1997).
The table illustrates that twentieth century conventional warfare and traditional
non-conventional threats are initially less difficult to analyze and become progressively
more difficult. For these threats, detection is not hard; it is a simple task to assess that
explosions and maneuver indicate an attacking enemy. Identification is almost as easy:
160
under the rules of conventional war, combatants are required to have insignia and
uniforms. With regard to traditional, non-conventional threats, they also typically have
recognizable operating signatures. Since membership is a source of pride, it is
prominently displayed by the wearing of gang colors or tattoos, etc.
Localization and assessment of these two types of threats is more difficult,
however. Modern sensors can peer into the battlespace and identify most conventional
threats, but processing this raw data into intelligence that explains intentions, weaknesses,
and critical vulnerabilities is not trivial. For traditional, non-conventional threats this
effort is equally challenging.
While the difficulties of analyzing traditional threats clearly called for capable
intelligence, the analytical challenges New Order Threats present are orders of magnitude
greater. First, detection and identification are complicated by the nature ofNew Order
operations. Asymmetric forces, as described in Chapter IV, are configured to counter
American technology and military power. Therefore, they quickly adapt to sophisticated
sensor technology and other intelligence methods. Burying, dispersing, blinding,
confusing and multiplying are some of the techniques these adversaries may employ to
avoid detection and identification. Left unable to detect or identify these threats,
intelligence is placed in a quandary; and left blind to threat actions. Localization and
assessment are impossible, as the threats very existence is unknown. Left undetected or
misunderstood these threats exercise powerful battlefield advantages that afford them
great operational capabilities.
Like asymmetric threats, emerging non-conventional threats also employ
asymmetry to avoid detection and identification. However, these non-conventional
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threats leverage inherent asymmetries like network structures to confound detection and
identification. They are also often confused with crime or police work. This is
understandable, as the threat increasingly looks less like war and more like urban, low
intensity conflict. Because of their unique nature, these threats, unlike other forms of
warfare, are not expressly tied to a specific form of operations. This fact strains modern
intelligence practices. Accordingly, they operate undetected, making impossible
localization and meaningful assessment Like asymmetric military threats, this enables
tremendous battlefield advantage.
Consider some of the major differences between traditional threats and New
Order Threats (see Table 7.2). Traditional threats like the Soviet Red Army were
bureaucratic monoliths that adapted to challenges in a slow and deliberate fashion.
Taking decades to build weapons, infrastructure, and tactics, the Red Army was
additionally encumbered in deploying its massive forces. The mountains of material and
equipment along with the hundreds of thousands of soldiers took months to assemble.

































Decades Months to Years Years Months to Days
Time needed to
generate an attack
Months Hours Days Immediate
Table 7.2. Threat Characteristics of Traditional and New Order Threats.
After (Berkowitz, 1997).
Traditional, non-conventional threats, like Mafias and cartels, are more complex
and less easily characterized than conventional threats. While they too, tend to be
bureaucratic in form (though at a simpler level), they adapt more quickly to their
environment, enabling them to organize rapidly in crises and attack within a few hours
Traditional, non-conventional threats require little time to become threat organizations.
In the case of low-order gangs, they can organize within several days; mid-order threats
may take several months. These threats challenge and perplex because they are more
agile than hierarchical police and military forces.
New Order Threats, on the other hand, are inherently harder to characterize,
understand, and monitor. First, New Order Threats are small, lean and networked. They
are uniquely configured to hide their identity and actions to counter American
technological dominance. Second, asymmetric threat operations enable rapid, high-speed
operations that further complicate threat assessment Thus, their actions confuse and can
go undetected.
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Asymmetric military forces are small, lean, and decentralized; they execute
operations designed to counter U.S. technology and conventional superiority. Their
equipment generally consists of off-the-shelf technologies that require little engineering
to make them battlefield ready. Consequently the fielding of asymmetric forces requires
less time than traditional conventional forces. Due to their small size and agility, they
can attack within a few days. This gives them great battlefield advantage, for it makes
monitoring more difficult and causes critical indicators, that would otherwise alert and
warn, to go unrecognized.
Emerging non-conventional threats present the most difficulty to present-day
intelligence practices. Their small, networked organizations, many comprising just a few
technically proficient individuals or single operators, make detection nearly impossible.
Because of their hierarchy-free design, adaptation by these threats can be accomplished
with great speed. As with asymmetric threats, they acquire most of their equipment off
the shelf. Therefore, they can assemble powerful capabilities like biological, chemical,
and potentially, nuclear weapons in a short period of time. This enables them great
operational capability as they can deploy to conduct an attack almost immediately. Most
problematic is the fact that networked threats wage war differently than threats of the
past. Their weapons are less overt. These threats fight with weapons like small computer
discs that contain powerful computer viruses, or with small undetectable vials of
chemical precursor, powerful enough to terrorize large geographic areas. As a result, it is
difficult to even detect that attack has occurred as the symptoms produced by their attacks
are often confused with inner city problems like the drug problem, or, in the case of
biological weapon employment, "normal" diseases or epidemics. (Berkowitz, 1997)
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Clearly, an intelligence organization that must detect, identify, localize, and assess
New Order Threats will be faced with a difficult task. The question arises, given the
reality of these threats, what configuration of Marine intelligence would be aligned to
meet their challenge? To respond to this question, it is necessary to explore the
relationship between intelligence and intellect.
2. Intellect and Intelligence
Intelligence work is an intellectual enterprise. Simply put, intelligence is
knowledge about the enemy that is developed from information, which itself is not
intelligence but simply unevaluated data like radio intercepts and sensor inputs. Only
after raw data is analyzed and subjected to human interpretation does it become
intelligence. Intelligence should therefore not be merely an information processing
activity where raw information is reworked and repeated. Rather, intelligence should be
developed information that gives a meaningful assessment of a given situation. (MCDP2,
1997)
Intelligence, by its nature, deals in estimates and not in certainty. Because
information never speaks conclusively for itself; people must interpret and derive
meaning from it. Estimating what might be is the most intelligence can ever do, for it is
never possible to know everything about a given situation (Schmitt, 1997).
It is a main theme of this thesis that Marine intelligence, like the rest of the
Department of Defense, currently spends too much effort on the sensor part or physical
data collection aspects of intelligence and is neglecting the intellectual aspects. Even
recent intelligence initiatives propose the development of a new class of intelligence in
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which the intellectual part is removed (Casper, 1997). Termed sensor to shooter
intelligence, it presupposes that every target on the battlefield of the future will be
sensed,
2
leaving operators or machines the simple task of pushing a button to destroy the
targeted enemy.
However, the battlefield of the future will not be so simplistic. Future adversaries
will know American collection capabilities and learn to avoid them. While effective
ground intelligence of the future will require sophisticated collection platforms, these
platforms alone will not provide the intelligence necessary to operate against powerful
threats. Rather, it will be the fusion of raw sensor data with organizational intellect that
"figures out what an enemy is and what he is doing." Intellect is therefore the keystone to
a successful Marine ground intelligence enterprise.
For Marine intelligence operations to cultivate and harness intellect, however,
requires systematic reengineering. The organization must focus on intellectual processes
and match these processes with an organizational design that best leverages them. This
type of reengineering is not new to industry: by the year 2000, 85 percent of all jobs in
American and 80 percent of those in Europe will be knowledge based (Quinn,1996). The
productivity and success of these firms reside in the their intellectual capabilities.
What do knowledge based firms do to leverage intellect? The following section
will first examine what intellect is and how it is managed. This will highlight the need for
a unique organizational design that optimally leverages intellect to problem-solve. The
implications for Marine ground intelligence will be woven into the analysis to
2
Recent experimentation in November of 1996, called Hunter Warrior, conducted by the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab in 29 Palms spent an estimated 50 million dollars attempting to refine sensor to shooter
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demonstrate how intellect can be leveraged to transform present-day intelligence design
and practices.
3. Intellect as a Hierarchy of Processes
Intellect is defined as "knowing or understanding; the capacity for knowledge, for
rational or highly developed use of intelligence (Quinn, 1996)" Intellect, therefore is the
process of human cognition where disparate data elements are transformed through
analysis, evaluation, and integration into knowledge. By their nature, data are easy to
collect and disseminate. Intellect, unlike data, is generated differently and cannot be
easily disseminated. Data is the least useful for decision making; intellect, deployed
optimally, allows for deep insight into areas of inquiry and facilitates projection analysis
and successful decision making. (Quinn, 1996)
There are four levels to intellect: 1) cognitive knowledge (know what); 2)
advanced skills (know how); 3) system understanding and developed intuition (know
why); and 4) self-motivated creativity (care why); (Quinn, 1992, 1997). As an
organization develops and advances up each of these levels, the value of the firm's
intellect increases substantially. Successful firms develop all four levels within their
organization, thereby exploiting the intellectual capability of their enterprise to create
value or profits. (Quinn, 1996)
Marine ground intelligence functions primarily within the lower two levels of
organizational intellect. Top level analysts operate at the advanced skill level; they have
the tools and knowledge to probe freely into the battlespace. They then react to sensor
outputs and fuse this data with previously developed templates or other analytical tools to
tactics. Intelligence was reduced to machine processing of targets identified by sensors. This data was then
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produce information, which becomes the organization's enemy threat picture.
Intelligence work below the top level, restricted from inquiring into the battlespace by a
bureaucratic organization, is constrained mostly to the cognitive knowledge realm. With
few assets, they must rely on higher level analysts to provide knowledge on the enemy
and must therefore operate in a reactive mode, merely responding to what they are fed.
Limiting the intelligence operations to the "know what" and "know how" levels
of intellect, and not employing the "know why" and "care why" levels, severely
handicaps an enterprise. The full intellectual capital of the organization remains
underutilized, resulting in less than optimal analysis and problem solving. As described
in Chapter HI, the intelligence bureaucracy attempts to overcome this by implementing
tight control measures and standardized processes, which by their nature restrict intellect
and its creation. Intelligence work in the current Marine intelligence bureaucracy is
reduced to the processing of information, not the creation of knowledge. The end product
is therefore extremely limited in it usefulness, and the organization suffers accordingly.
Intellect has three defining characteristics. When understood and properly
exploited, these characteristics can enhance intellect in the Marine intelligence
organization by leveraging its brainpower and operating at the most advanced intellectual
levels. These characteristics are the exponentiality of knowledge, the benefits of sharing,
and the opportunities for expansion. (Quinn, 1996)
Not unlike learning curves, knowledge and intellect grow exponentially when
cultivated and developed properly (Quinn, 1996). The more knowledge is taken into the
organization and the more opportunities to develop it, the greater the increase in the total
knowledge base of the organization. This in turn increases the ability to identify and
fed to weapon platforms which engaged the targets.
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solve more complex problems. Therefore driving and capturing organizational intellect is
key to successfully harnessing an organizations intellectual reservoir. Several examples
illustrate these principles.
Arthur Andersen Worldwide (AAW) and McKinsey & Co. are both leading
business consulting firms where organizational knowledge is key to success. The
accumulated knowledge of both firms resides mostly in the heads of its people or in case
teams. To facilitate the development of organizational intellect, AAW has built an
electronic interlink that connects more than 82,000 people in 76 countries. This high-
speed connection allows caseworkers to create virtual groups around the needs of
customers. Thus as one team discovers innovative solutions to casework, this
information is immediately distributed throughout the organization. At the conclusion of
each case, the assigned team generates an after action report that highlights innovative
developments and successfully applied frameworks. Case teams across the organization
keep abreast of what each other has learned from the latest assignment. In both these
organizations there is a deliberate effort to decentralize learning to the case teams. There
is little guidance from the hierarchy and what matters most is the development of
individual intellect through practical experience. This focus on developing and fostering
organizational intellect is critical to success. Every opportunity is exploited to expose
consultants to new knowledge and experiences, (cf Quinn, 1992)
This example shows how team workers are given responsibility for outcomes at a
higher level of intellect. They are required to analyze their case outcomes, evaluate
salient points learned, and create an ongoing bank of solution approaches to apply to new
cases by communicating effectively with each other. Organizational and individual
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knowledge, therefore, increase exponentially. For both these companies the payoffs are
enormous, with intellect and its development as the center piece of these firms, both have
risen to become extremely successful enterprises.
Knowledge also grows exponentially when shared (Quinn, 1996).
"Communication theory states that a network's potential benefits grow exponentially as
the nodes it can successfully interconnect with expand numerically" (Quinn, 1996). The
sharing of knowledge is powerful. When one person shares with another, a synergy
develops to create more knowledge. Questions are raised, answers are provided or
challenged, and ideas change and are amplified. When knowledge is shared with one
person, this results in linear growth. However when it is shared among a variety of
people across different areas of expertise, exponential growth results. Again, an
illustration that exemplifies the point: (cf Berkowitz, 1997)
Recently a heated battle has been going on between the U.S. government and the
computer industry over the export of encryption systems using keys longer than 40 bits
(Berkowitz, 1997). Keys are numbers that are organized to resist decryption. The fear of
the government is that exporting long key lengths would be so secure that U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement would be unable to crack them. Commercial software
companies like Netscape have criticized these regulations, stating that if the government
can decipher their keys, anyone with knowledge and access to high-speed computers can
do so as well. Firms like Microsoft, Netscape, IBM, Novell and Oracle argue that no one
will buy their financial software overseas if they are restricted to 40 bit key lengths.
In 1994, RSA Data Security, Inc., the leading developer of cryptographic software
to the computer industry, decided to organize an exercise to prove to the government that
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parties outside the government could crack a 40-bit key. RSA posted a solicitation on
Internet bulletin boards along with the key and offered prizes to anyone able to factor
them. In a matter of hours, a group of computer aficionados across the U.S. and England
formed into a virtual group on line to work on deciphering the key. One participant
wrote a program that allocated work to individuals and informed key participants as to
the project's status. Before the project was completed, hundreds of people had joined the
effort, utilizing whatever computer resources they could find (one participant used a fax
machine to do some of his calculations). In ten months the team had the answer; the
encrypted message read, "This is why you should use a longer key."
When this story first hit the popular press, attention focused on the vulnerability
of industry and private citizens. However, the relevant and most significant point here is
the process that enabled such an incredible undertaking. First, team members separated
by thousands of miles self-organized to tackle a complex task. And second, the team
shared information on the subject throughout the experience, thus exponentially
increasing group intellect and contributing to successfully deciphering the key. Group
knowledge shared effectively leveraged intellect to tackle a complex challenge This is
the style of intelligence production likely to be best suited for the 21st century
(Berkowitz, 1997)
Compare this with present-day ground combat intelligence work. Like a slowly
moving assembly line, intelligence is collected, produced and disseminated Sure the
systems have changed, (we now have highly sophisticated listening and imaging
equipment) but the industrial era processes have not. Take for example a typical
intelligence requirement that most ground combat units need fulfilled prior to properly
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executing offensive operations. "Where is the enemy?" This request is submitted and
processed by several layers of bureaucracy until it reaches the layer where intelligence
collection, processing, and analysis are done. Here, an individual analyst will be assigned
to the request, and will be limited to only collection assets in processing it. Little
knowledge is shared up and down the hierarchy in an effort to clarify or problem-solve
collaboratively. Once fulfilled, the result is sent back down the hierarchy to the
requesting entity. Naturally, modern information technologies have greatly increased the
speed of this information flow. However the process of producing intelligence in a
centralized-detached fashion is inconsistent with the sharing of knowledge and the
leveraging of intellect for problem solving. Therefore, the end product is likely to be less
than optimal, degrading the decision making options for the battlefield commander.
Finally, there are four fundamental properties of intellect that describe how it
expands and adds value to an organization that properly harnesses it. 1) Intellect
increases with use; 2) it tends to have underutilized capacity; 3) can be self-organizing;
and 4) it is greatly expandable under pressure (Quinn, 1996). First, intellect expands with
experience. As organizations deploy their intellectual assets against problems each
individual involved is afforded unique opportunities to develop cognitive approaches to
problem solving. As experience increases, individuals more readily develop frameworks
to approach problems; soon expertise develops. Experts can tell the background from the
foreground and can quickly sift through data to get to core issues. As experience
increases organizational intellect tends to increase exponentially, and as experts from
other knowledge areas are included, their input can create steeper exponentials.
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Next, organizational intellect is difficult to harness and often goes underutilized.
Transitioning an organization from controlling to leveraging intellect demands
organizational reform. Even organizations that have sought new intellect enhancing
designs do not utilize their full intellectual potential. The full capabilities of human
brainpower are little understood. What is understood however, is that nurtured properly
it can be exploited to solve complex problems.
Intellect also can be self-organizing (Quinn, 1996). When given proper
opportunities and a nurturing operating framework, individuals confronted with complex
tasks will self organize into ad-hoc networks. These groups of experts will muster with
minimum formal organization, but generating a network synergy that will maximize
problem-solving intellect. Finally, when confronted with pressure, intellect expands.
Much research has been conducted to determine the performance results of intense
training, mentoring, and peer pressure within professional communities like law,
business, engineering, and medicine. In general, people who face intense 100-hour work
weeks in school, go on to intense internships, and then to demanding work environments
are more capable and valuable in the performance of their jobs than those who faced
lesser challenges (Quinn, 1996). The best intellectual enterprises create environments
where intellect can be stimulated and pressured to expand (Quinn, 1996).
D. LEVERAGING INTELLECT
A decisive factor in the capacity to leverage intellect is an organization's ability to
focus on those activities that create uniquely high value for its customers (Quinn, 1996).
For the military intelligence organization, the customers are the consumers of intelligence
products, in other words the battlefield commanders (division, regiment, battalion, and
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company commander, etc.) What activities are unique to the intelligence organization and
contribute most to what is desired by its customers? This section discusses what these
activities, called core competencies are and then examines them in depth to determine the
extent to which they currently are configured and use personnel in a manner that exploits
intellect.
1. Value Chain Analysis
For maximum leverage of intellect, an organization should concentrate its
resources and executive time around its core competencies so that it can perform them at
best-in-the-world levels (Quinn, 1996). If an organization's overall function is thought of
as a collection of activities that combine to produce a product, each separate activity
should be a significant source of value in the overall process. Value chain analysis is a
tool that disaggregates core competencies into intellect-based and non-intellect-based
activities. This is important as it aids in identifying those key intellect-based resources
that contribute most to the organization. These activities can then be scrutinized to
determine how they are performed and whether they add value to the organization.
For intelligence this means uncovering the intellectual-based resources like
expertise, knowledge basis, or systems that best provide combat decision-makers with the
intelligence they need to fight and win (Quinn, 1996). These resources (instead of actual
products or sensor platforms) are what create the level of intelligence demanded by
warfighters. By developing these activities and limiting non-value adding pursuits,
Marine intelligence can best leverage its intellectual resources into what it is supposed to
do: provide combat intelligence.
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Figure 7.2 illustrates a broad value chain analysis of Marine ground intelligence.
The Primary Activities portion of this diagram represents those activities that contribute
directly to the organization's core competency, battlefield intelligence. They are
concerned with the physical creation of intelligence, its dissemination and maintenance.
The support activities do not contribute directly to battlefield intelligence, but they assist
the primary activities and each other Since the support activities are primarily important




























Figure 7.2. Intelligence Value Chain, Primary and Support Activities.
The primary activities of intelligence focus around the battlefield, the enemy, the
dissemination of intelligence and its upkeep. Each primary activity is continuous and
iterative. Intelligence work fuses all of them together to form an accurate battlefield
assessment of the enemy and his intentions. In activity (1), the battlefield is scrutinized
This activity involves identification of how the battlefield environment will influence
friendly and enemy operations Examples of possible environmental conditions include
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such factors as the effects of weather and terrain on maneuver, and the impact of politics,
civilian press, and demographics on enemy and friendly forces.
In activity (2), the enemy is evaluated. Here intelligence work seeks to
determine how the threat organizes for combat and fights. When fighting a known threat,
historical data is used to build an assessment of the enemy. However, when operating
against unknown threats, this evaluation must developed as contact is made. Each
contact must be carefully scrutinized and the data is analyzedfor patterns and
distinguishing characteristic. After a thorough analysis, hypothesis can be drawn which
are used to develop conclusions on how the enemy fights.
In activity (3) the enemy courses of action (COA's) are developed. This is
where intelligence work fuses the results of the previous steps together into a meaningful
conclusion. In other words, given the identified effects of the environment and the
evaluation of how the threats fights, intelligence analysts synthesize this into meaningful
knowledge about what the enemy's most likely activities are expected to be. Once these
conclusions are drawn, this knowledge (intelligence) can be used to drive warfighting.
Accordingly, activity (4) is dissemination. Dissemination of knowledge is not
trivial. It is not simply copying a brief to a distribution list. It must be specially packaged
to convey meaning quickly and accurately.
Finally, in activity (5) the process is updated. Because combat conditions are
rarely static, the previous four activities must be constantly repeated to maintain an
updated enemy picture.
Having identified and briefly explained the core competencies, we can now
proceed to examine their performance in greater detail to determine whether Marine
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intelligence is optimally configured to leverage its intellect We will first break down the
primary activities of intelligence into sub-activities to facilitate further study The sub-
activities involved in describe the battlefield are displayed in figure 7.3.
Collect data \ Terrain \ Collect data \ Weather \ Collect data \ Battlefield \ Battlefield




Figure 7.3. Value Chain, Describe the Battlefield.
Note that of the seven broad sub-activities that contribute to describe the
battlefield, three activities are shown in white and represent those conducted primarily by
sensors and machines. The four activities shown in gray require human intellect for
analysis. There is an alternating pattern between sensor/machine activities and human
intellect activities, where the systems and sensors first collect data (e.g., on the terrain of
the battlefield or on the weather) and then humans interpret and analyze that data to
create knowledge. This diagram underscores the complementary interface between
machine and human; they are distinct processes but they are interdependent.
Now observe the value chain analysis for the next two core competencies of
Marine intelligence - evaluate the threat and determine threat courses of action (See
Figures 7.4 and 7.5).
Collect data \ Create Threat\ Create X Analyze
on Enemy /Model /Templates /^Tactics
\ Identify \.IdenUfy \/ HVT's ./Capabilities /
j Human intellect process
I Machine process
Figure 7.4. Value Chain, Evaluate the Threat.
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Snernvv/Collect data N. Identify E myV Identify N. Evaluate \ Prioritize \ Develop \ Createon Enemy /Objectives /COA's / COA's / COA's / COA's /Collection Plan
j Human intellect process
I Machine process
Figure 7.5. Value Chain, Determine Threat COA's.
Both of these primary activities begin with a sub-activity that is a machine
function, the collection of data. Once collected, the data is then analyzed in a series of
detailed steps that demand human intellect to extract interpretation and meaning. Again,
as in describe the battlefield, both machine and human interfaces are complementary. In
other words, in concert, they produce a product that neither could on its own. Without
raw data, analysis would be impossible; with only raw data, facts, not intelligence, is the
product.
This value analysis reveals two things about intelligence work. First, it is a highly
intellectual endeavor that demands a complementary interface between both man and
machine. Also apparent is that human intellect, not machines or sensors perform the bulk
of the sub-activities. And second, Marine intelligence is ill configured to leverage its
intellect to produce the level of intelligence demanded by modern warfare and the
emerging threat environment.
The centralized, bureaucratic configuration concentrates the core intelligence
activities at the top of the hierarchy, wasting much of the intellect of the organization.
Here, only the intellect of a dozen analysts is leveraged by the command level of
processing while the remaining organizational intellect sits dormant, dependent on higher
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for intelligence. In this configuration the three characteristics of intellect described
previously in this chapter are not exploited.
Only the few, top-level analysts experience exponentiality of knowledge because
all collection resources are at the top. The cores activities, all of which are extremely
complex and time-consuming activities are limited to a handful of compartmentalized
individuals. Also, little sharing of intellect takes place during intelligence creation, due
to a rigid hierarchy that impedes vertical and lateral communications. Finally, the
opportunities for expansion are greatly reduced, because only the few analysts at the
fusion center are able to ever see the full picture.
In this configuration, the end product of the intelligence bureaucracy is often not
intelligence but processed data. Indeed, overwhelmed by the demands from below and
the complexity of the task, analysts are hard pressed to spend much time leveraging
intellect. To compensate, the bureaucracy reduces this inherently intellectual enterprise
into a series of information-processing tasks. Thus for the sake of expediency and
efficiency, intellect is subordinated to rote processing of sensor data. Analysts simply do
not have time to think much about what they are doing; all they know is that the data is
coming in fast and must get processed and disseminated quickly. In effect, machine
processes take control of intelligence, and operators simply rework and disseminate its
output.
This dysfunctional interface between man and technology reduces a highly
intellectual activity, in which intellect is the key component, to a secondary, as time
permits, activity. The shuffling and processing of collated sensor data consumes the
operator, preventing the level of intellectual analysis required of a complex activity.
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Because the bureaucratic design centralizes intellectual processes at the top of the
hierarchy, technology drives the pace and composition of intelligence work. This
overwhelms human operators' activities when what should be taking place is human
operators commanding the technology.
Think back to the value chain analysis of the three primary activities of ground
intelligence, and recall the man and machine interface. Each primary activity entails a
sequence of sub-activities that demands a seamless interaction between steps conducted
by machine and those performed by people. Fused together, man and machine contribute
to battlefield knowledge and intelligence. However, when machine drives the human,
data is only transferred from one form to another. Raw data is reworked and repeated
throughout the organization, with an end result that is not battlefield intelligence.
In today's New Order Threat environment, intellect-based intelligence is more
critical than ever before. As presented, however, Marine ground intelligence is not
configured to leverage its organizational intellect. Configured as an intelligence
bureaucracy, machine processes dominate, and intellectual activities are reduced to
information-processing ones. The three fundamental characteristics of intellect,
exponent iality sharing, and expansion are subordinated to the demands of efficiency.
Indeed, the effort to avoid becoming overwhelmed takes precedence over everything,
even intellectual activity. But the experience of industry and the emergence of new
technologies and business approaches now enable such organizations to capture, develop,
and leverage intellectual resources successfully. Such an effort requires reengineering of
the organization. The key to such a transformation is designing the organization and
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developing information technologies around intellectual flows rather than command and
control concepts.
2. Organizing around Intellect
In the past, to enhance production efficiencies, most organizations were designed
around product clusters, work processes, geographical needs, or function (Quinn, 1996).
Thus, the bureaucratic form arose and became preeminent during the industrial age Less
focused on the needs of the customer or the professionals who worked within the
organization, this form of organization optimized the capacity of power holders to direct
and control their organizations (Quinn, 1996). Specific command and control procedures,
reinforced by rigid hierarchies, were developed to reinforce this power structure. For the
Marine intelligence bureaucracy, a rigid command and control hierarchy organized
around work processes ensured efficient use of limited intelligence assets and resources.
As the demands of the warfighter of the time were attritionist and therefore required less
detail, this design worked satisfactorily. Examine Figure 7.6 that depicts an attrition era
intelligence demand and its accompanying command and control (C2) process (The bi-
directional arrows depicts communication moving up and down the hierarchy.)
Attrition Era Intelligence Demand and C2
Intelligence
An attacking Regiment asks







Request goes to Division.
Request goes to MEF.
Request filled and sent to Division.
Answer provided to Regiment, yes.








Figure 7.6. Attrition Era C2 - Processing Attritionist Intelligence Demand.
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The intelligence demand is simple: "Are there enemy to my front7" Remember
from previous chapters of this thesis that attrition tactics do not demand precise
intelligence; attritionist battles are won through the massing of men and material Where
intelligence aids in directing the attrition army where to fight, it need not inform about
how to avoid strengths and exploit weaknesses. Accordingly, the C2 structure can easily
accommodate the transfer of this form of intelligence. However, the intelligence demands
of war by maneuver and the complexities ofNew Order Threats require entirely new
structures. Examine figure 7.7 which depicts modern day maneuver warfare intelligence
demands and the limits placed on them by an attrition era command and control process.
Maneuver Warfare Intelligence Demand and C2
Intelligence
An attacking Battalion asks
Where is the enemy? How is he deployed?
What are his most likely COA's?
What reinforcements does he have?
What are his artillery and air capabilities?
Where are they and will they effect me?
Need updates to this constantly throughout
the battle.
C2
Step 1 : Request goes to Regiment.
Step 2: Request goes to Division.
Step 3: Request goes to MEF and is assigned to
an analyst.
Step 4: Some answers provided others data is
unavailable.
Step 5: Partial answer to Division.
Step 6: Partial answer to Regiment.
Step 7: Partial answer to Battalion.
Step 8: Update on enemy from MEF to Division
Step 9: Update on enemy to Regiment.








Figure 7.7. Attrition C2 Processing Maneuver Warfare Intelligence.
Observe the complexity and volume of the intelligence clogs the C2 flow. The
contrast between Figure 7.6 and 7.7 highlights an important point: attrition era C2 design
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design and practices are overwhelmed by the detailed, precise intelligence that modern
sensors provide and maneuver warfare demands. Designed to support attrition era
operations, not maneuver warfare, the hierarchical C2 practices become overwhelmed by
the massive amounts of information age intelligence. An account of a recent exercise will
provide additional evidence of this mismatch between organizational design and the
intellectual activity it is supposed to support.
During a recent exercise the maneuver warfare intelligence demands of a LAV
Company, combined with the abundance of information age intelligence that was
generated, overwhelmed the C2 system. So abundant was the intelligence generated that,
left unsupervised, the S-2 could easily have clogged the communications TAC l 4 net with
relevant information throughout the exercise, denying TAC 1 's use by other agencies.
Equally likely, the company commander could have remained glued to the radio,
awaiting the near instantaneous intelligence updates that characterize modern collection
sensors. Thus, tied to centralized C2 processes, the company commander and the
battalion tactical net became overwhelmed.
On day 1, prior to contact with the enemy, the intelligence officer passed over the
TAC 1 net an abbreviated report describing four enemy positions to the company's front.
Needless to say, ten minutes later the company made contact with the enemy and
reported several vehicles lost in separate engagements. During the debrief, the company
3 ASCIET 97. Please refer to Chapter III, footnote #7 on page 50 for a complete description of this
exercise.
4
The primary communications pipe is the Tac 1 (tactical -1 meaning primary or command net) net that
connects battalion with the company. A similar communication pipe connects battalion intelligence with
regiment and so forth up the hierarchy (Called the Intel Net). For this example it is important to know that
there is no unique communications infrastructure to support a detailed intelligence flow from battalion to
the company. In effect, one man, the commander, is forced to fight his company, coordinate fires,
maneuver, report to battalion and finally receive detailed intelligence that demands the plotting of enemy
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indicated first that it hadn't received the intelligence, and finally later that it had but didn't
take the time to comprehend it. The company commander stated he was too busy
fighting his company to process, analyze, plot, and disseminate a lengthy battalion
communique. ASCIET 97 involved one maneuver company. In combat, a typical
battalion has three companies. The problems encountered during ASCIET 97 easily could
have been compounded by an order of magnitude of three.
The extended capabilities of new technologies and the successful experience of
many corporations in private industry now shed light on design and management
approaches that overcome these antiquated C2 problems and enable organizations to
leverage intellect to respond effectively to the challenging demands of its customers. For
ground intelligence, this means an intelligence organization configured to respond to the
demands of maneuver warfare and capable of operating against New Order Threats. The
term network organization has been used to embrace a variety of these new forms that
push responsibility outward, flatten and remove hierarchy, are faster and more responsive
to the demands of the customer, and are agile to adapt to the chaotic and ever changing
environment. The network organization breaks away from traditional command and
control and machine processes as the keys to success and reorients the organization
around intellectual based process (Quinn, 1996). The main function of the network
organization is to develop and deploy (i.e. attract, harness, leverage, and disseminate)
intellect effectively (Quinn, 1996). It is just such an organizational form that will be
explored in the following section.
positions on a map while at the same time his vehicle is bouncing around as he maneuvers on the




The emergence of the network organization follows closely with the need to
leverage the full intellectual capital of an organization to solve the critical and complex
problems that plague industry in the hypercompetitive marketplace (Quinn, 1996).
Networks are uniquely designed to do this, as they are expressly created to seek
dominance by being able to bring more talent and brainpower to bear on problem solving,
decision making, creative thinking or innovation than rivals can bring to a comparable
task. Not a single form of organizing, the network organization is a complex array of
fundamentally different organizational forms. At present there are many different
network models used throughout industry that bring intellect to bear on varied challenges.
Many firms "mix and match" the attributes that best serve their needs. (Quinn, 1996)
While the variety of models prevent the existence of a "typical" network, there are
four dimensions that characterize every network organization (Quinn, 1996):
Locus ofintellect: Where the deep knowledge of a firm's particular core
competencies primarily lies.
Locus ofcustomization: Where intellect is converted to novel solutions
Direction of intellectualflow: The primary direction in which knowledge flows
Method of leverage: How the organization leverages intellect.
One network model, called the Spider's Web by Quinn (1992), is particularly well
suited to intelligence. The remainder of this chapter describes how to reengineer the
configuration ofMarine ground intelligence to derive the powerful advantages offered by
the Spider's Web network, thus proposing a possible solution to the major problem posed
by this thesis: the pressing need to restructure military intelligence.
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2. Applying the Network
The table below presents the dimensions that would characterize military
intelligence in its new Spider's Web network form (See Table 7.3).
Structure of Organization: Net - comprised of internal and
external nodes
Example: The Internet
Locus of Intellect: Nodes
Internal Nodes:





Locus of Customization: Generation of Intelligence
Direction of Intellectual Flow: Node to Node
Method of Leverage: Exponential, Sharing, Expansion
Table 7.3. Marine Ground Intelligence Configured as a Network.
After (Quinn, 1992).
In the Spider's Web configuration, the organization is defined as a web like net,
comprising interconnecting internal and external nodes. Internal nodes are those that
reside at the intersection where intelligence interfaces with combat decision-makers;
internal nodes thus represent the intelligence staff assigned to combat echelons in the
Marine Corps (e.g., battalion, regiment, division, MEF, etc.). External nodes are those
that reside outside of the Marine organization, including both commercial and
government intelligence agencies. Commercial nodes include media reporters, private
satellite imagery companies, and academics. Government intelligence nodes include the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department, the National Security Agency,
the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others.
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This model of intelligence locus of intellect resides in the nodes, significantly
departing from the current intelligence bureaucracy. Here, the intelligence assets and
resources are decentralized in the internal nodes rather than centralized in the uppermost
level of the hierarchy; in effect, each internal node is a complete intelligence cell
uniquely packaged to provide the level of intelligence demanded by the warfighter it
supports. In other words, the internal node is a stand-alone intelligence section that can
do its own battlefield intelligence collection and analysis without having to rely on the
top. The additional locus of intellect residing in external nodes enables intelligence to
capitalize on the variety of sources of deep expertise in specific fields related to
intelligence, thus offering the organization a wide breadth of knowledge to draw upon.
The locus of customization in this model revolves around the generation of
intelligence, again a dramatic change from the present organization that revolves around
data processing. While individual nodes may operate independently when the problem
they face is limited in scope and complexity, they may tap directly into the network
(external and other internal nodes) and go beyond their own resources for help when it is
essential for them to enlist the intellect of others to solve a more complex problem.
When a problem is presented to the net, analysts self-organize into groups, electing
participation based on the expertise and value they can contribute to the problem at hand.
Once a given problem is completed, the group disbands, and individuals re-form into new
groups to address other emerging problems. Thus, the direction of intellectual flow
occurs between the external and internal nodes of a hierarchy-free network. In this
configuration, the method of leverage harnesses all three characteristics of intellect:
exponential ity, sharing and expansion. Exponentiality is evidenced as each node.
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particularly internal nodes, gains experience through intimate involvement in problem
solving. Sharing is widespread, as contact with even a modest number of collaborating
nodes can form knowledge connections that mount into the hundreds or thousands
(Quinn, 1996). And expansion is facilitated by the ability of nodes to participate in self-
organizing groups that can surge knowledge as necessary.
The figure below depicts an intelligence network operating in accordance with the
model being described (See Figure 7.8). Observe how each internal node is connected to
every other node throughout the organization. Recall that earlier chapters of this thesis
highlighted combat decision-makers' demand for precise intelligence to support
maneuver warfare. Now, following this network model, modern day information
systems, including the technology that drives the Internet, can make possible the
availability ofjust such intelligence. For example, Internet browsers allow users to
download a host of information from a variety of sources, from satellite imagery to
newspaper reports. The key to this process is that the users of the Internet themselves
select what they need. By contrast, under the present hierarchical intelligence system,
formal requests must flow to the top, be approved, processed, and flow back down.
Rather than adhering to such slow-moving C2 hierarchies, the internal intelligence node
taps directly into the network, enabling to investigate directly into a broad-based platform
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Figure 7.8. The Network Intelligence Architecture.
The intelligence network modeled after Quinn's Spider's Web offers to transform
an information processing intelligence bureaucracy into an agile, intellect-centric
enterprise. With respect to New Order Threats, the Spider's Web design gives
intelligence the form it needs to confront the very type of problem they present, one in
which no single entity knows what the enemy is, how he can be understood, or who may
have potential solutions. By casting a search that drives the work of many different
experts in diverse locations, the net brings together distinct parties in a collaborative
exchange. This approach multiplies the number of possible solutions and leverages the
intellect of a wide variety of experts from many different disciplines.
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3. Decentralized Intelligence
Clearly, two fundamental strengths of the network design make it extremely well-
suited for the mission of modern Marine ground intelligence: 1) the decentralization of
assets and resources to the internal contact nodes to support a highly disciplined focus on
customer demands, and 2) the ability to harness the intellect of many different experts in
varied fields. A simple example will serve to illustrate the tremendous advantage of
converting military intelligence into a decentralized organization.
New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Baltimore, and thousands
of other big and small cities across the United States all share one thing in common: they
only have one to two days worth of food stored in local supermarkets, distribution
centers, and warehouses. How then is it that the necessary food is always there? Who
determines that the right quantities and varieties are available at the right time and place?
The "market" determines these things. Millions of people making independent decisions
freely choose what they will sell and buy. The market adjusts, seemingly by a miracle,
and the food provided is just what the consumers demand. The thousands of sellers of
food learn what their customers need, and they adjust to those demands. A seller of food
wanting to meet the demands of the consumer must respond to ever-changing food
requirements or get out of the food business.
In contrast, centralized economies like the former Soviet Union do not respond to
the same signals as free markets. They sell, produce, and distribute food through a
centralized planning process, relying on a central committee to determine what customers
want and how it will be distributed. This is a classic problem of centrally planned
economies: there are only delayed, weak and fragmentary signals telling producers that
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customers are not happy. In other words, regardless of whether the planned offering is
what the customer wants or what the market requires, it still gets produced. So,
producers keep selling the same centrally planned items, and their products remain the
same: stagnant and unresponsive to changing demands. The crux of this problem is that
centrally planned organizations cannot possibly adjust to all the market demands they
face, because the few central administrators simply cannot digest and process the related
mass of information. As a result, the central command's decisions are generally off
mark, and the consumer suffers long lines and the lack of availability of the very items
they desire.
The market is responsive to the demands of the consumer because economic
decisions and power are decentralized. This same concept holds true for intelligence
work. The centralized intelligence bureaucracy is not flexible enough to respond to the
demands ofthe organization, and therefore produces a generic, less than desirable
product. Decentralization of intelligence assets and resources is critical to providing the
level of intelligence demanded by combat decision-makers. The power of decentralizing
lies in its focus on the consumer of intelligence. By decentralizing, intelligence nodes
have their own resources and assets so that they can probe proactively into their
battlespace and produce the intelligence they require. The ensuing reduced information-
processing load allows the intelligence agency to transition from a rote-information
processing to an intellect-based activity.
The network form dramatically reengineers the distribution of resources and
control, configuring each internal node as a self-contained unit equipped with all the
assets and personnel necessary to conduct independent intelligence operations. For
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example, the intelligence section of an infantry battalion would have its own tactical
sensors such as unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, and signals
intelligence equipment. In addition, a section of analysts would form a fusion center
similar to the MAGTF fusion center described in Chapter III.
There are many advantages to this configuration; each revolves around the
proximity of intelligence to the combat decision-maker. With the proper tools to probe
proactively into the battlespace, intelligence nodes can provide the detailed level of
intelligence that warfare by maneuver demands. In the decentralized network
configuration, the hierarchy wherein top-level managers evaluate the intelligence needs
of the organization and then develop intelligence is replaced with independent nodes of
intelligence consumers collecting their own data and processing intelligence based on
their own requirements. As the battlefield is fluid and ever changing, the close proximity
of intelligence personnel and combat decision-makers facilitates rapid mid-course
changes. Finally, combat decision-makers involved in life-or-death situations demand
first-hand knowledge. They don't have time to wait for coordinated intelligence to be
fused, approved, disseminated, and reworked; they need expert knowledge fast, and
decentralized intelligence nodes can perform the analysis quickly and effectively.
Furthermore, when knowledge is created, combat decision-makers want to interrogate the
analyst; this configuration places all the intelligence assets at the disposal of the combat
decision-maker. High-speed analysis is one of the great advantages of decentralized
operations.
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A second important feature of decentralization is the emergence of intellect-based
intelligence work. The problem of information overload has been well documented in this
thesis. Decentralization reduces this problem by shifting the intelligence production
burden to the internal contact nodes. In this new configuration, the volume and diversity
of demands and sensor outputs, by virtue of their distribution across many nodes, is
greatly reduced. Each node determines what it will collect and filters incoming data
accordingly. The independent self-contained nodes, empowered to collect and select data
that is most relevant to their needs, avoid overload by design. The node knows what it
can and cannot do, and therefore operates at a level that effectively accomplishes its
purpose. Additionally, able to inherently avoid overload, nodes will better leverage
intellect to conduct intelligence work. Less concerned with overload, decentralized
nodes now have time to conduct the intellectual activity so important to battlefield
intelligence. Responding to the demands of a few consumers instead of the entire
organization, the nodes can focus their intellectual efforts on critical processes such as
threat course of action development. Thus network intelligence is able to reduce
information overload, freeing up the organization's intellectual resources to develop
knowledge and intelligence and move from an information processing to an intellect-
centric activity.
4. Virtual Intelligence
The final aspect of network intelligence to be analyzed is the complex knowledge
linkages between nodes. This feature enables the organization to leverage its intellectual
producing capacity by a factor of hundreds. Many of the links between nodes cross great
geographic distances, achieving the concept of virtual intelligence, where knowledge
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need not be co-located with its clients (forward-deployed forces). In other words, virtual
intelligence exploits information technology and communication systems in order to
leverage a wide body of geographically separated experts through networked
collaboration. With this configuration, the internal contact node benefits from the
expertise and insight of a wide breadth of expert knowledge. In sum, the many
specialists that are made active participants during the network's collaborative exchanges
augment the internal nodes' limited expert knowledge. In today's threat environment this
is critically important, as the enemy is less likely to be understood, and solutions will
require the knowledge of experts from many different disciplines.
The network design has its own potential drawbacks, however. The rich
knowledge that the network produces can easily cause information overload. As intellect
and knowledge become the most important resources in combating New Order Threats, it
is increasingly imperative that the widest body of knowledge is available for analysis.
Every relevant piece of information adds to a more complete understanding and aids in
gaining an advantage over an adversary. But sifting through the mountains of generated
material risks complete inundation and overload. The answer to this overload problem
resides within the nature of the network. Through practice and experience, nodes will
learn how to participate and deliver succinct knowledge in easily understandable forms.
In other words, the internal nodes will learn how to use the system to avoid information
overload. This somewhat soft solution to the network problem is not without precedent.
194
Silicon Graphics, a leading manufacturer of state of the art computer equipment,
has a networked system in place for knowledge generation. Employees are allowed
unlimited access to the Internet and use it as a resource to collect intelligence on
competitors and to form collaborative working groups to solve complex problems. The
CEO described the access employees have to the wealth of information age knowledge as
phenomenal. He explained that at first, employees are consumed and inundated by the
tidal wave of knowledge the Internet unleashes - so consumed that for the first several
weeks they may even neglect their assigned tasks. However, after a short initiation
period, workers become savvy about the most effective ways to harness the web. Instead
of surfing for long periods of time and bouncing around a multitude of sites, users learn
which sites are most helpful and frequent them deliberately. Furthermore, workers
identify and subscribe to services that deliver information based on customized topic
lists. While information overload may indeed pose a problem, the network configuration
empowers people to direct their searches themselves and ultimately learn to avoid
overload and harness the network to their advantage.
The potential for overload may be further mediated by advances in information
technologies. One approach would be for intelligence to employ sophisticated browser
interfaces similar to the Internet. As different operating environments demand different
levels of intellect creation and interaction, different interfaces may need to be created.
For example, in a fast-paced combat situation, external nodes like national and theater
assets could combine with internal nodes and create a map sheet of the combat area on a
web page. Together, national nodes could place intelligence from national systems.
5
This is taken from comments given by the CEO of Silicon Graphics at a guest lecture given at the Naval
Postgraduate School in August of 1996.
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theater analysts could place intelligence from theater systems, and other internal nodes
could place their specific intelligence on the web page to build an enemy situation map in
real time - enabling the product to be instantaneously disseminated
In a less fast-paced environment, like Somalia, external nodes like economists and
academics could post generated knowledge on a web page. Internal contact nodes could
then scan and selectively choose what they needed. Recall that the network revolves
around the internal contact nodes; they work to provide maneuver warfare intelligence for
combat decision-makers and are accordingly the focal point for all organizational
knowledge creation. In effect, the organization sits dormant until the internal nodes query
the intellect of the network. Therefore, as a battlefield situation develops, the nodes
inform the network as to what is going on and direct queries for knowledge as required.
The network is then activated, and experts form into self-generating groups to tackle the
problems confronted by the contact node.
One of the most powerful aspects of the network is that ground intelligence can
reach outside its organization to acquire knowledge. Twenty-first century ground
intelligence cannot be limited to narrow analysis by focusing only on traditional
intelligence sources like organic, theater, and national assets. As demonstrated by the
Somali case study, New Order Threats are complex and difficult for traditional
intelligence sources to detect. Left undetected, they leverage asymmetry to garner
tremendous battlefield advantage. Aideed's powerful militia remained an unrecognized
force until Mogadishu exploded in violence in October of 1993. Could other experts
have helped intelligence professionals on the ground see a more complete picture than
what their sophisticated sensors were able to reveal? Could an economist, social
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scientist, expert on African internal affairs, and a media representative have contributed
to building a more realistic intelligence picture of the situation on the ground in Somalia9
An important premise of the intelligence network is that government does not have a
monopoly on intelligence work, that the commercial environment offers tremendous
knowledge generating capabilities. There exists more regional expertise and knowledge
on weapons and computer information systems in the civilian sector than in government,
and this is increasingly more true with every passing year.
The network allows these experts, geographically separated, to work
collaboratively in support of internal contact nodes that may be presented with complex
battlefield problems that demand expert attention. The network facilitates academics,
media representatives, analysts at the CIA or DIA, and business leaders to contribute to
virtual, self-organizing teams simply by sitting at their own desks. In this model, an
internal contact node communicates a need across the network. Using advanced
information technologies, the network uses knowledge about each analyst's work profile
to distribute the need to the right people. Experts spread across the network signal their
wish to participate and join in, contributing their expertise to knowledge creation. One
expert may have relevant imagery, while another may have some socio-political analysis
to contribute. Together with the internal contact node, the experts work to create
knowledge. This system relies on individual experts, spread across government, industry,
and academia to make the initial judgments as to whether their expertise matches the
problem at hand. The degree to which they then contribute is determined by how fast the
consumer needs an answer. The key to the collaborative network is that experts with a
breadth of knowledge self organize into collaborative teams that can respond with great
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flexibility and agility to the demands of the consumer. This expert knowledge can then
be applied to gain that ever so slight advantage over an increasingly more powerful and
sophisticated enemy.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter began by identifying the most important characteristic of ground
intelligence: intellect and its deployment. New Order Threats were juxtaposed with
threats of the past to demonstrate the importance, now more than ever, of intellect-based
intelligence. Intellect, however, was shown to have particular requirements for its
cultivation. Successful leveraging of intellect in the intelligence organization demands
reengineering that would focus the organization on intellectual processes and match those
processes with a design that best leverages them. The three key characteristics of
intellect, exponentiality of knowledge, the benefits of sharing, and the opportunities for
expansion, were described to be critical to any organization seeking to successfully
exploit its resident brainpower. A broad level value chain analysis was used to
demonstrate that rote information processing, not intellect-centric activity, characterizes
modern day ground intelligence work. Additionally, the complementary interface
between man and machine demanded by information age intelligence work was
demonstrated to be dysfunctional because of information overload, with machine work
dominating the intelligence process and relegating it to data processing.
The key to intellect-centric operations was shown to be designing the organization
around intellectual flows rather than around command and control concepts. For
intelligence, this entailed abandoning the attrition era C2, which is incompatible with the
demands of intellect based intelligence. The detail and complexity of information age
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intelligence was illustrated as clogging attrition era command and control infrastructures
and overwhelming the system and operators alike New technologies and successful
experiences in industry were used to shed light on how to reorganize intelligence around
intellectual flows. The network organization was identified as the emerging form that
accomplishes this reorganization by incorporating web-based technologies and
organizational design. The network form clearly pushes responsibility outward, flattens
and removes hierarchy, is faster and more responsive to the demands of the customer, and
is agile to adapt to a chaotic and ever changing environment. In contrast to the
intelligence bureaucracy, the main function of the network organization is to develop and
deploy (i.e. attract, harness, leverage, and disseminate) intellect effectively (Quinn,




Nature of Design Centralized -Hierarchical Decentralized -Web-like
Key part of
organization
The Top The Nodes







Top Down Mixed, all levels




Control Systems Significant Insignificant
Environment Simple and stable Complex and dynamic
Table 7.4. Comparison Between Organizational Forms of Intelligence.
Quinn's Spider Web was presented as the network form that best suits ground
intelligence. Two of its most salient features are ideally suited for intelligence: the
decentralization of assets and resources to the internal contact nodes to support a highly
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disciplined focus on customer demands, and the ability to harness the intellect of many
different experts in varied fields.
Network intelligence was modeled with each contact node configured to be a self-
contained unit, providing the crucial advantage of decentralization to allow for proactive
inquiry into the battlespace, a key element to effective intelligence support for maneuver
warfare. Other advantages of the model include the ability of intelligence nodes to make
mid-course changes and rapidly generate tailored intelligence. Perhaps the most
important outcome of decentralization is the shift from rote-based information processing
to intellect-centric work. The decentralized model was shown to reduce information
overload and free intellectual resources to develop knowledge, producing intelligence
rather than reworked data.
The network configuration also evidenced the capability to achieve virtual
intelligence, the concept that knowledge need not be co-located with forward-deployed
forces, by permitting collaboration between geographically separated experts from the
military, government, and private sector. This collaboration is an important feature of the
network, as New Order Threats are less likely to be understood by the narrow analytical
ability presently afforded to ground intelligence. Much debate has focused on the
potential for network overload; however, in this chapter the nature of the network was
shown to be able to preclude overload. Through practice and experience, nodes were
shown to be able to dynamically learn how to best function to avoid overload and
maximize the capabilities of the system.
Intellect is the cornerstone to successful ground intelligence work. In a previous
age, when threats mirrored the Soviet model and clung to regimented tactics and
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centralized C2, sophisticated sensors could provide all the answers. However, in the
emerging environment, threats are increasingly less centralized and regimented They
think on their own, and they adapt quickly. To counter these smart adversaries Marine
intelligence will need to look vastly different from the way it does now. It must be
organized around and designed to enhance the deployment of intellect. Information
systems aid in the collection of information and the delivery of intellect, but they are not
intellect unto themselves. People, fed critical battlefield information in a timely fashion,
deploy intellect. Attrition era intelligence practices and C2 organization must be
abandoned if intellect and its deployment are to shape future Marine operations. In sum.
Marine intelligence must be designed to be an agile, networked enterprise. Configured
with the right tools, organized around intellect and its deployment, Marine operations
demand an intelligence function that can provide that ever so slight advantage over an
increasingly more powerful and sophisticated enemy.
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Vin. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has sought to answer three broad questions. First, what is the emerging
threat environment of the twenty-first century? Second, is the present Marine ground
intelligence design adequate to support combat decision-makers in this threat
environment? Third, if not, what design changes are necessary to align intelligence with
this environment?
This thesis argues that Marine ground intelligence is improperly configured to
provide the intelligence required by maneuver warfare and to operate effectively against
the emerging threats of the next century. This work shows that, ill configured for threats
like the Iraqi Army, Marine ground intelligence will assuredly fail against emerging
twenty-first century threats that are asymmetric and adaptive. The restrictive boundaries,
formalized processes, regimented hierarchical approach to collections and dissemination,
and the centralization of assets and resources prevents Marine ground intelligence from
organizing properly to fulfill its critical mission. Unless significant change is realized,
Marine intelligence faces a serious dilemma: it can either reform or face ever decreasing
relevance and effectiveness as a central component of command and control on the
battlefield
This work demonstrates that Marine ground intelligence fits the pattern of a
machine bureaucracy that is centralized, hierarchical and slow. Designed to accommodate
attrition warfighting and simple, predictable adversaries, Marine intelligence is severely
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challenged when confronted with the demands of maneuver warfare and non-standard,
unpredictable New Order Threats.
Maneuver warfare places overwhelming demands on the intelligence bureaucracy.
Proactive inquiry floods the central intelligence cell with demands for information age
intelligence, overloading the system and reducing its processing capability. With all the
tools for collecting intelligence at the top, lower echelons are left without intelligence. As
a result, tactical units do not receive intelligence when they require it, forcing them into
attritionist tactics.
The New Order of Threat environment also severely challenges the Marine
intelligence bureaucracy. New Order Threats assert this challenge because they are
difficult to recognize and understand. Because of their unique nature, these threats, unlike
other forms of warfare, are not expressly tied to a specific form of operations. This fact
strains modern threat assessment. Marine intelligence is designed to accommodate simple,
predictable adversaries; its present day intelligence methods and systems are rendered
ineffective by these threat operations. Consequently, New Order Threats place
intelligence in a quandary that results in delay or ineffective response. Left unchecked,
New Order Threats harness powerful asymmetric capabilities that allow them to gain
influence that is out of proportion to their political, economic, and military strength.
The case examples drawn from actual and hypothetical military encounters in
Somalia and Taiwan, as well as low and mid-order threats like U.S. street gangs and drug
Cartels, all illustrate that asymmetric and emerging non-conventional threats are posing
greater complexity and will overwhelm a bureaucratic intelligence enterprise configured
for the past. These emerging New Order Threats are networked, unconventional, agile,
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adaptable, evolving, asymmetric, non-linear and configured to operate across the political,
economic and mass media spectrum.
In a previous age, when threats mirrored the Soviet model and clung to regimented
tactics and centralized command and control, intelligence practices heavily reliant on
sophisticated sensors to provide all the answers, worked. However, in the emerging
environment, threats are increasingly less centralized and regimented. They think on their
own and they adapt quickly. To counter these smart adversaries, Marine ground
intelligence must move from a rote information processing machine bureaucracy to an
intellect-centric network organization.
The key to the network organization is the focus on intellectual processes rather
than command and control concepts. The network pushes responsibility and control over
resources outward, flattens and removes hierarchy, is faster and more responsive to the
demands of decision-makers and is agile to adapt to a chaotic and ever changing
environment. The main function of network intelligence, therefore, is to develop and
deploy intellect against complex and difficult problems created by the demands of
maneuver warfare and New Order Threat operations.
Network intelligence decentralizes assets and resources to the internal contact
nodes allowing for a highly disciplined focus on the demands made by combat decision-
makers. Decentralization allows for proactive inquiry into the battlespace, a key element
to effective intelligence support for maneuver warfare. Other advantages include the
ability to make mid-course changes and rapidly generate tailored intelligence. Perhaps
most importantly, decentralization allows for a shift from rote-based information
processing to intellect-centric work. Decentralization reduces information overload freeing
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up intellectual resources to develop knowledge. The end product is intelligence not
reworked data.
The network also harnesses the intellect of a multitude of experts in varied field
and allows them to surge brainpower on critical problems. This focused collaboration is
important, as New Order Threats are less likely to be understood by the narrow analytical
ability found within Marine intelligence. To understand and predict against these threats
demands an organization that can leverage the intellect of experts from many fields within
the military, government and private sector. Thus, the virtual deployment of a wide field
of intellectual resources to solve complex problems is a key component of the network
intelligence enterprise.
Intellect is the cornerstone to successful ground intelligence work. Intellect
however is not easy to cultivate and harness. Successful leveraging of intellect demands
reengineering that focuses the organization on intellectual processes and matches those
processes with a design that best leverages them. Marine ground intelligence is ill
configured to leverage its resident intellectual resources. So far, in recent operations, the
individual innovation and "get the job done" attitude of intelligence personnel have averted
disaster through work-arounds.
Interestingly, high-level combat decision-makers do not tolerate the
"unworkableness" of their intelligence support. They therefore unknowingly push them
into informal network-like relationships to prevent the issues that really count from
slipping through the cracks. However, these "quick fixes" are rarely formalized by the
organization. There remains an official way to do intelligence, and then there is the
unofficial way things are done in crises. This manner of operations may have been
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sufficient for the past, but the new "order of things" promises to seriously challenge these
ill-configured and misaligned practices in the future.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
This thesis is intentionally short on detailed system descriptions or engineering
analysis of information systems because the decision to correct the shortcomings of the
current configuration will not be made by engineers but by leaders of Marines.
Accordingly, this work has been an effort to suggest an alternative approach to ground
intelligence; an approach centered around the complimentary interface between human
intellect and machine instead of one exclusively focused on sensor and machine processes.
Much work is required to bring the promise of network-centric intelligence design and
practices to Marine ground intelligence.
First, a collaborative partnership needs to be established with industry and
academia to harness the power and potential of intellect and network centric designs that
are coming to the forefront of modern business practices and academic research. Next,
these designs and practices must be prototyped at the lowest levels within the ground
operational force. Real-world statistics should be collected and a thorough analysis
conducted under near combat conditions to assist combat decision makers in determining
the viability and effectiveness of such radical change. Furthermore, this field testing is
essential to convince battlefield commanders of the utility of intellect-centric intelligence
and the power of the network intelligence enterprise.
An important component of the network intelligence enterprise is its adaptiveness
and agility. It must be understood that as a decentralized form of operations, each internal
node must be given the resources and freedom to innovate and adapt the nodes
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organizational design to best satisfy the needs of his commander. This is key as the ability
to proactively inquire into the battlespace and identify threat asymmetries, an important
component in developing preemptive options, demands this level of innovation and agility.
This suggests that an important component to network success is advanced
information technologies. In other words, the network organization demands capable and
powerful information systems.
Advances in information technologies have exploded in the last fifteen years. What
used to take twenty years to develop now takes eighteen months or less. Many argue that
hypercompetition in the information technology area is spawning mini-technical
revolutions. They state that every year monumental breakthroughs occur in high
technology computing that make the transition from vacuum tube based computers to
silicon circuit computers, pale in comparison. Regardless of the commentary, it is
understood that many information technologies are outdated eighteen months after they
are introduced. After eighteen months hardware is obsolete and software upgrades are no
longer available.
The challenge for Marine ground intelligence will be to tap into the cutting edge
of information technology while operating within the constraints of DoD's bureaucratic
budgetary and acquisition systems. Maintaining the technological lead necessary for
twenty-first century ground intelligence operations will not be cheap. Resources must be
spent wisely to avoid unncessary waste. A concerted effort must be made in redesigning
intelligence acquisition so that the right tools are placed into the hands of intelligence
professionals quickly and within the constraints of the current fiscal environment. The 10-
15 year acquisition cycle, a symbol of Cold War era operations, cannot continue to be the
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way things are done. This process must be reformed and acquisition cycle times must be
configured to be more in step with technological revolutions instead of bureacuratic ones.
Therefore a significant challenge for Marine Corps ground intelligence will be to harness
the revolution in information technology occurring in private industry and leverage it to
aid in maintaining that ever so slight analytical advantage required for operating
succesfully in the current operating environment.
Specific recommendations for future work follow.
1. The Network Organization
a. Decentralization
(1) Determine how to best organize and equip the internal intelligence
node of the battalion, regiment and division.
(2) Determine the security ramifications of decentralized operations.
(3) Explore information technologies that can assist in
disseminating intelligence from the intelligence node to lower combat echelons.
b. Virtual Intelligence
(1) Investigate how to best establish a network of experts that
spans across military, academic and industry.
(2) Study the security ramifications of virtual operations.
(3) Explore information technologies that can best leverage this
manner of operations.
c. The Innovative and Agile Intelligence Enterprise
(1) Determine the organizational changes in structure and
technology to enhance innovation and agility within the internal nodes.
(2) Research industry examples of innovative enterprises like
Intel,GE and Silicon Graphics and investigate how their focus on innovation can be
applied and incorporated within ground intelligence.
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APPENDIX A. MAJOR-ARMED CONFLICT VS. INTERNAL
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Bangladesh Rwanda Sri Lanka
Cambodia Sierra Leone Tajikistan
India Somalia Azerbaidjan
Indonesia South Africa Bosnia Herzegovina
Mvanmar Sudan Croatia
The Philippines Togo Serbia
Sri Lanka Uganda C>prus
Tajikistan Zaire Georgia
Algeria Colombia Moldovia
Angola El Salvador Yugoslavia
Liberia Guatemala Chechnvia







25 Internal Displacement 46
*The total annual number
in table 1.00 in Chapter 4,
of conflicts does not necessarily correspond to the number of conflict locations
since there may be more than one major armed conflict in each location.
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Israel Burundi Tunisia
Turkey Cameroon Uganda
Afganistan Central African Republic Zaire
Bangladesh Congo Zambia




The Philippines Gabon Belarus
Sri Lanka Gambia Bosnia-Herzegovina
Tajikistan Ghana Croatia
Algeria Guinea Czech and Slovak Rep
Angola Guinea-Bissau Hungary
Liberia Kenya Macedonia
Sierra Leonne Lesotho Romania
Somalia Liberia Yugoslavia
Sudan Malawi Bahrain














25 Refugee Countries 66
*The total annual number
in table 1.00 in Chapter 4,
of conflicts does not necessarily correspond to the number of conflict locations
since there may be more than one major armed conflict in each location.
Appendix Table 1.2. Major-Armed Conflict vs Refugee Data by Host Country.
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